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ABSTRACT.
By employing a comparative method that analyzes China’s increasing presence in 
dierent Latin America countries, this study explores key features and implications of 
Beijing’s approach towards this region. Colombia, Ecuador and Peru are used as case 
studies to evaluate China’s diplomatic rhetoric and the degree to which trade and 
investment realities live up to the goals proclaimed. Each of the countries examined 
seeks a more balanced relationship with external actors and recognizes China’s 
increased presence in the domestic political economy. Beijing seeks to distinguish itself 
as a soft power and “South-South” partner, and yet its ability to maintain this stance is 
complicated by the inevitable asymmetry that a rising China implies. e paper argues 
that China’s economic involvement in terms of trade, aid, loans and investment is 
indisputably important, but just one opportunity amongst many for these countries to 
achieve the political and economic goals that they have set for themselves.
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state-owned rms in priority sectors in China as not being so dissimilar from the 
United States: while clearly governed by dierent concerns, “national interests” were 
also cited by the US Congress in 2005 in its decision to prevent the takeover of Unocal 
by CNOOC.
CHINA’S TRADE WITH THE SUB-REGION.
Overall, trade with China has become especially important for the region as a whole 
and for the Andean sub-region in particular. While Peru, Ecuador and Colombia are 
all still dependent on the US market, China does seek to oer something of an 
alternative. As the second largest importer of fuel and minerals, China is increasing its 
presence in the Andean region. Peru leads the way with China as its most important 
partner of the three in bilateral trade (with aggregate gures doubling since the two 
governments signed a free trade agreement in 2009). Colombia has a more diverse 
industry with a strong manufacturing base, and heavily depends on the US market, 
with China accounting for only 3.6 percent of exports. When it comes to trade, 
Ecuador is not a priority for China in terms of volume, yet China sees considerable 
potential here and has taken an active role in the country when it comes to investment 
and loans for oil. 
Overall, China’s gains in imports between 2000 and 2009 have occurred while the US 
has either declined in signicance (Peru and Colombia) or remained static (Ecuador). 
Ecuador has increasingly relied on intra-regional destinations for its goods, while 
China and the United States have become slightly less important as export markets. 
Over the same period, Colombia has sent moderately more of its exports to the Asia 
Pacic, China and the EU, while seeing a slight decline in its exports to LAC and a 
move toward decreasing its dependency on the US market. 
CHINESE AID TO THE SUB-REGION.
Chinese aid to LAC has also been a subject of great speculation, although the 
withholding of some information and a view of aid and investment that diverges 
signicantly from traditional Western methodology is partly to blame for the 
discrepancies. For our purposes, we dene aid as any assistance coming from China 
that may be classied as concessional loans or otherwise designed to improve 
infrastructure or assist in the delivery of basic services to recipient countries. As 
mentioned earlier, it is not entirely clear how much China gives and where it invests 
(Stallings, 2013; Dussel Peters, 2012). e idea that cooperation is a key element of its 
relationship with other developing countries is steeped in a tradition that has been 
briey touched upon above. To dismiss the rhetoric and conceptions put across by 
Chinese development actors and commentators is disingenuous and rearms common 
misconceptions, as Varrall elaborates on in her work on Chinese development experts 
(2013). 
By reminding ourselves of these Chinese perspectives, we can see how Ocial 
Development Assistance (ODA) as dened by the OECD, does not allow for some 
types of “cooperation” between China and LAC to be understood as ODA. As Stallings 
(2013) points out, much of the ows that arrive in LAC and certainly those funds that 
reach Ecuador and Peru are not so easily dened. Bräutigam (2011) has questioned the 
accuracy of the China Development Bank’s label as a development bank, yet it appears 
that the Chinese government has maintained this label and the bank’s terms for loans 
to developing countries even in the face of criticism. We must rely on the data available 
with the understanding that it overlaps frequently and inconveniently. 
In terms of loans, Peru maintains a fairly even spread from the IDB, World Bank, 
China and the US. Peru has received signicant amounts of ODA from the United 
States in recent years. Chinese loans are a relatively new source of nance and, at 
roughly 22 percent, make up more than double the ODA coming from the US and 
closing in on the larger amounts from the IDB and World Bank, which account for 
roughly a third of the total from major sources of lending. 
Colombia has borrowed mainly from the World Bank and the IDB, while loans 
coming in from the US are less signicant and follow the pattern across the region. In 
other words, they are based on peace and security,3 while democracy, human rights, and 
October 1971. e Hierro Peru mine was purchased by China’s state-owned Shougang 
Company in 1992. Ecuador’s ties with China stand out for the loans-for-oil and other 
lending that ranks it among China’s biggest borrowers within Latin America. Beyond 
trade, Colombia’s relationship with China has been less pronounced (Creutzfeldt, 
2012; Ellis, 2014), although both sides are exploring the negotiation of a bilateral free 
trade agreement.
Peru’s Shougang deal reected a desire to diversify primary exporting partners. While 
Peru has apparently sought diversication in Chinese investments, away from primary 
commodities and into more higher-value production, a review of Chinese investments 
there today falls short of its expectations. Today, the Ecuadorian loans indicate that 
China is willing to be innovative in acquiring resources. ese loans are part of a 
symbiotic bilateral strategy to advance mining, crude extraction, renement and 
delivery and a general upgrade of infrastructure in the small, but remarkably endowed 
country, while allowing for an ambitious public spending scheme. It is worth noting 
that this relationship is dominated by large-scale projects and loans, and that there is a 
certain peculiarity due to the Ecuadorian government’s close involvement in these 
projects accompanied by a crowding out of investors from other countries. 
It has become a commonplace desire throughout the region to attract more investment 
and diversity in Chinese ventures, while China has indicated it will be looking to invest 
signicant sums in the short and medium term. One study estimates that China’s FDI 
outows could reach as high as US$1-2 trillion by 2020 (Rosen & Hanemann, 2012), 
and Latin America should be well positioned to capture a healthy portion of those 
funds. Optimism is tempered by those cautioning against the resource curse, or Dutch 
Disease, but it is unclear what could be done to eectively circumvent the economic 
and geographic realities that lead developing countries down this path. 
Another looming question is, to what extent are Chinese corporate activities, in fact, 
an extension of Beijing’s foreign policy strategy? China’s energy security is a national 
priority and its huge foreign currency reserves, coupled with state ownership of the 
energy and infrastructure rms, make a strong case for a national agenda. However, it 
may be more useful to consider the interdependence of national interests and 
role are evident as illustrated in the examples provided by Economy and Levi in their 
recent analysis of China’s resource quest, indicates that cooperation is preferred (in line 
with the behaviour of a rational state actor) and that new methods of forestalling 
conict are necessary and therefore likely. 
e implications are that the language and the goals laid out in ocial Chinese 
speeches and policy papers are not mere rhetoric, but rmly held and internalized (see 
for instance Song, 2012). Eective analysis of these attitudes should come in part from 
case studies that examine what Chinese cooperation means on the ground in countries 
where it is heavily investing. is is not to say that these approaches are always 
preferred to Western modalities or that there are not contingent and external factors 
that will undermine such intentions, but it does mean that the worldview of Chinese 
actors tasked with engaging developing countries can generate misinterpretation and 
confusion, with the overlapping of aid and investment statistics being just one example 
of this problem. Another critical issue that may arise is the reliance on leadership from 
partners abroad whose policies may appear complementary to the PRC’s vision but 
may be unpopular or problematic from other vantage points.  
at said, by empirically tracking China’s participation in the Andean region we can 
gain greater insights. While the values laid out in the Policy Paper are important to 
consider from the Chinese perspective and approach, what of the Andean experience 
and perspectives? 
We focus on these three Andean countries because they share similar endowment 
factors and have close trade and investment ties with the United States, as well as 
rapidly growing ties with China. At the same time, the cases diverge in terms of 
economic policy choice, with Peru and Colombia both pro-market countries that are 
members of the Pacic Alliance and negotiators for the Trans-Pacic Partnership. e 
embrace of free trade agreements in Colombia and Peru has resulted in remarkably 
open economies, although many critics of neoliberalism question how much this 
benets these countries and their respective populations. Ecuador, by contrast, claims 
to have moved away from neoliberalism and actually shuns FTAs, but critics of the 
current government, including former allies such as ex-ministers Alberto Acosta 
(Energy and Mining) and Fausto Ortiz (Finance), question if this is more rhetorical 
than factual due to such constraints as its historical reliance on foreign capital, 
highlighting the recent dependence on Chinese loans due to the willingness to break 
with traditional lenders such as the IMF and World Bank, by defaulting on its 
sovereign debt. Regardless of economic policy preferences, we suggest that China’s 
trade, aid and investment in these countries has given them greater room to manoeuvre 
in the management of their respective political economies. 
An analysis of case studies within the Andean sub-region of South America allows us to 
gain insights into three dynamic economic cases, all rich in natural resources but with 
distinct development strategies. It further allows for a view of dierent sectors within 
those countries where China is having a profound eect: mining in Peru, petroleum 
and electricity generation in Ecuador, and various commodities in Colombia, as well as 
a signicant manufacturing sector. Finally, by looking at these dierent sectors in LAC, 
we can disaggregate China and understand the considerations of actors from various 
companies that sometimes even compete with one another (González-Vicente, 2013; 
Fornés & Butt Philip, 2012). 
CHINA’S EXPECTATIONS IN THE ANDEAN REGION.
China has looked to LAC from much the same perspective it has engaged with 
Southeast Asia and Africa: as oering a wealth of opportunities for the world’s 
fastest-rising economic power and help for some chronically underdeveloped nations 
in these regions. e Andean sub-region holds rich deposits of oil, gas and minerals, 
but its geographical location renders it a logical gateway for Chinese products into the 
region, as well as regional exports back to China and the Asia Pacic region. 
Reciprocally, political leaders and economic actors in the Andean sub-region have been 
eager for their countries to play this role, most notably Chile and, more recently, Peru 
(Narins, 2012; Myers, 2012; Chen, 2011).
It is in this region where China rst sought a major investment in an iron mine in the 
early 1990s. e PRC’s relations with Peru have been strong ever since the Andean 
nation became the second country in South America after Chile to recognize the PRC 
in November 1971, shortly after the PRC gained its seat at the United Nations in 
US$155 million, less than 1% of inward FDI. e total given by the Chinese Embassy 
in Bogota stands at US$2.3 billion. Our research suggests Chinese capital interests in 
Colombia being over US$ 3 billion. is reects those assets acquired by Chinese 
SOEs in the hydrocarbon sector, which were previously owned by other transnational 
corporations, and reinvestments by Chinese companies with strong sales growth in the country.
Ecuador did not receive much investment from China until around 2009 and has since 
then been receiving ows that largely go to hydroelectric projects, the oil sector and 
copper mines. Most recently, initial nance agreements were reached with the 
Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) for a 30 percent share in the Pacic 
Renery at Manta, which will reportedly satisfy Ecuador’s petroleum needs and allow 
for oil exports to China and Asia (La Renería del Pacíco, 2013).
CHINA’S IMPACT ON DEVELOPMENT IN THE ANDEAN REGION.
Having signed FTAs with the United States, neither Peru nor Colombia is willing or 
able to turn away from Washington along the lines of a more combative Ecuador, 
although all three countries are clearly seeking to diversify their economic and 
diplomatic relations. China is a natural partner, due to the structural complementarity 
of factor endowments between China and all three countries. e question remains, 
however, as to the ability of these countries and the civil societies of which they are 
comprised, to work compatibly with Chinese companies and other PRC representatives 
on the ground in the context of ongoing investments and development projects.
For China to eectively carry out its stated aims in the Andean region, it will have to 
learn how to better broker with the increasingly organized and cohesive grassroots 
networks that have sprung to life around the complex extraction and related 
infrastructure projects that China is promoting. One important example of this is the 
movement to preserve not only indigenous groups but the extraordinarily biodiverse 
forests they have called home for millennia, including the Ecuadorian group Yasunidos 
and the Shuar people in the south of the country mobilizing against Chinese-led 
mining projects. It must also realistically assess the risks and navigate the regulatory 
frameworks now evolving within those governments. Economic considerations weigh 
heavily in government decisions, even when such decisions imply betrayals of trust and 
ideals that helped garner electoral support for national politicians. While citizen 
concerns may not be their top priority, Chinese rms must learn to balance their 
commercial and strategic interests with responsibilities and social realities rarely 
experienced at home. e question remains as to whether Chinese rms can carry o 
complex negotiations and societal intermediation as they seek to deepen their presence 
in the Andean region. An optimistic vision could even see China playing a positive role 
in reshaping the nature of these extractive realities and what they mean for the local 
communities aected by this behaviour. 
Still, the weak record of foreign extractive rms in Peru has been linked to the 
government’s own lax approach to regulation, as exemplied by the dual role of the 
Ministry of Energy and Mines (MINEM) as a promoter of mining and enforcer of 
environmental regulations. Sanborn notes that fears about the behaviour of Chinese 
rms are often generated by their multinational competitors and a media eager to 
sensationalize what a rising China means and that diligent oversight is necessary to 
smoothen the process (Sanborn & Torres, 2009, 351). As an interview with the 
Coordinator for Corporate Aairs for Chinalco in Lima, Peru revealed, Chinese rms 
regularly claim to be moving toward socially responsible action. ere appears to be a 
learning curve, as this company’s Toromocho copper mine project has beneted from 
the negative lessons of the Shougang iron mine, hiring Western executives to deal with 
the concerns of the surrounding communities (Irwin & Gallagher, 2013, 227). 
e learning curve required of Chinese enterprises is still quite steep, however. 
Although many manufacturing and trading rms in Colombia rely on imports from 
China, the perception persists that Chinese industry, along with the political and social 
structures it represents, constitutes a threat to the status quo. is perception has led to 
anti-Chinese demonstrations reminiscent of those in small towns in Mexico, though 
less violently articulated (Hearn, 2012). While some joint ventures have succeeded in 
adapting to local conditions and maintaining a low prole, the new Chinese owners 
(Sinochem) of Emerald Industries in Colombia succeeded in quickly oending the 
local population, leading to poor press and popular resentment. 
In Ecuador, the government is increasingly interested in challenging the role of 
multinationals, using enhanced centralization and oversight to benet as many civic 
groups as possible. Despite these eorts, there are battles brewing over oil and mineral 
concessions around the country and the perception among opposition groups and 
international observers is that Ecuador is merely replacing its dependency on Western 
multinationals and primary commodities with Chinese rms. ere may be some truth 
to these allegations, but in our interviews with activists, government ocials, and 
international critics of the Correa administration, we have found that the specic 
dangers presented by Chinese companies are often exaggerated and there is a similar 
pattern of sensationalism at work as that highlighted by Sanborn in Peru (2009). 
Moreover, the build-up in foreign exchange reserves and primary budget surpluses that 
have emerged as a result has allowed these countries to launch social programs and 
poverty reduction initiatives. ere is, in other words, something in this for everyone, 
including China, although it is incumbent on all stakeholders in this new evolving 
China-LAC scenario to carry their weight and act accordingly. 
CONCLUSION.
is paper illustrates ways in which China’s engagement with the countries of the 
Andean region coincides with that of the larger LAC emerging economies, and how it 
diers. e nature of China’s evolving ties with the three Andean countries discussed 
here ts with the general South American themes of economic complementarities in 
factor endowments and China’s voracious appetite for natural resources to spur its high 
growth model. e dierences lie mainly in the composition of state-society relations 
in the Andean region where civic groups, social movements, and indigenous 
communities have all been recognized as formidable actors on the national political 
stage. is aspect of China-Andean relations is less pronounced in larger more 
industrialized Latin American countries like Argentina, Brazil and Mexico. e 
Andean angle thus adds a new twist to China’s heightened interest in extracting 
primary commodities from the LAC region. 
In short, Chinese investors and ocials, who have not had their feet held closely to the 
re on their own authoritarian home turf, are now being contested. Interestingly, some 
Chinese companies operating in these countries have adopted the Western practice of 
donating to local governments for schools or hospitals, but this contribution to local 
social capital has not earned them much credit (Parish Flannery, 2013). Some scholars 
have argued that Chinese rms may be at a disadvantage precisely because of their lack 
of experience with societal intermediation on the home front, while others argue that 
this is changing (Alden & Hughes, 2009). If we take China’s 2008 Policy Paper at its 
word, the PRC leadership maintains that it will ensure the livelihood of people in 
partnering countries by “complying with local laws and regulations, and adhering to 
fair, transparent public works project contracts, making a commitment to and fullling 
the necessary social responsibility to protect the legitimate rights and interests of local 
employees, paying attention to environmental resource protection, caring for and 
supporting the local community.”
It remains to be seen whether the lofty goals of a new internationalism embedded in 
recent Chinese history can genuinely be achieved given the strength and scale of the 
Chinese economy with its inherent asymmetry and the power of market demands. 
However, such pronouncements should not be overlooked or discarded, as China’s 
dependence on massive primary commodity imports from LAC promises to become a 
permanent feature of China-LAC relations for years to come.  China has every 
incentive to make the relationship work, even if it must do considerably more to bring 
it up to true international standards. 
Certain unsavoury realities persist about the nature of resource extraction and the 
problems it invariably creates. e leadership required to navigate a nation’s way 
through the price uctuations, abundance, corruption, environmental problems, 
indigenous rights, resistance from civil society and diculty involved in institution 
building may lie beyond the realm of possibilities of any one country. It does appear, 
however, that the purported principles of China’s aid, trade, and investment with the 
developing world are sincere and oer an opportunity to the leaders of 
twenty-rst-century South America to set in motion processes and structures that can 
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governance, and education and social services are minor in comparison. Loans from 
China are negligible. 
Ecuador’s credit line received a much needed boost from China after it defaulted on 
$3.2 billion of foreign debt in 2008 following a government audit that found domestic 
laws had been violated, in addition to US Securities and Exchange Commission 
regulations and general principles of international law (Watkins & Anders, 2008). is 
came amidst a rejection of neoliberal policies and a reduced role in the drug 
interdiction scheme, which was the basis for US development assistance and 
preferential treatment in trade agreements. A signicant feature of Chinese loans to 
Ecuador is that they are based on oil (loans-for-oil), with China purchasing the oil on 
the spot market rather than locking in advantageous prices (Gallagher, Irwin & 
Koleski, 2012). 
CHINA’S INVESTMENTS IN THE ANDEAN SUB-REGION.
When it comes to investment, the data is, again, problematic, mainly due to the fact 
that China does not publish this information. For our purposes, investment will 
qualify regardless of being private (FDI) or public. China typically distributes its 
investment through various SOEs, which causes confusion and may be considered 
awkward for various reasons (Dussel Peters, 2012), although it looks and behaves like 
typical investment coming from private foreign rms. As mentioned earlier, there is the 
problem of a conceptual overlap between Chinese lending and investing. 
Peru had been a major destination for Chinese investment, but that trend slowed down 
after 2010. Chinese investments in Peru have primarily gone toward copper and steel 
concessions; overall, Chinese investment stock in Peru was US$796.48 million in 
2012, a 3.5 percent share of total FDI stock in the country. Mining is also the leading 
recipient of FDI in Peru, accounting for nearly 24 percent of capital stock at the end of 
2012 (ProInversion, 2014).
Colombia’s FDI from China is only a fraction of a percent of investment coming into 
the region; here, too, the published gures diverge. According to the Banco de la 
República, the accumulated gure for Chinese investment between 2000 and 2012 was 
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state-owned rms in priority sectors in China as not being so dissimilar from the 
United States: while clearly governed by dierent concerns, “national interests” were 
also cited by the US Congress in 2005 in its decision to prevent the takeover of Unocal 
by CNOOC.
CHINA’S TRADE WITH THE SUB-REGION.
Overall, trade with China has become especially important for the region as a whole 
and for the Andean sub-region in particular. While Peru, Ecuador and Colombia are 
all still dependent on the US market, China does seek to oer something of an 
alternative. As the second largest importer of fuel and minerals, China is increasing its 
presence in the Andean region. Peru leads the way with China as its most important 
partner of the three in bilateral trade (with aggregate gures doubling since the two 
governments signed a free trade agreement in 2009). Colombia has a more diverse 
industry with a strong manufacturing base, and heavily depends on the US market, 
with China accounting for only 3.6 percent of exports. When it comes to trade, 
Ecuador is not a priority for China in terms of volume, yet China sees considerable 
potential here and has taken an active role in the country when it comes to investment 
and loans for oil. 
Overall, China’s gains in imports between 2000 and 2009 have occurred while the US 
has either declined in signicance (Peru and Colombia) or remained static (Ecuador). 
Ecuador has increasingly relied on intra-regional destinations for its goods, while 
China and the United States have become slightly less important as export markets. 
Over the same period, Colombia has sent moderately more of its exports to the Asia 
Pacic, China and the EU, while seeing a slight decline in its exports to LAC and a 
move toward decreasing its dependency on the US market. 
CHINESE AID TO THE SUB-REGION.
Chinese aid to LAC has also been a subject of great speculation, although the 
withholding of some information and a view of aid and investment that diverges 
signicantly from traditional Western methodology is partly to blame for the 
discrepancies. For our purposes, we dene aid as any assistance coming from China 
that may be classied as concessional loans or otherwise designed to improve 
infrastructure or assist in the delivery of basic services to recipient countries. As 
mentioned earlier, it is not entirely clear how much China gives and where it invests 
(Stallings, 2013; Dussel Peters, 2012). e idea that cooperation is a key element of its 
relationship with other developing countries is steeped in a tradition that has been 
briey touched upon above. To dismiss the rhetoric and conceptions put across by 
Chinese development actors and commentators is disingenuous and rearms common 
misconceptions, as Varrall elaborates on in her work on Chinese development experts 
(2013). 
By reminding ourselves of these Chinese perspectives, we can see how Ocial 
Development Assistance (ODA) as dened by the OECD, does not allow for some 
types of “cooperation” between China and LAC to be understood as ODA. As Stallings 
(2013) points out, much of the ows that arrive in LAC and certainly those funds that 
reach Ecuador and Peru are not so easily dened. Bräutigam (2011) has questioned the 
accuracy of the China Development Bank’s label as a development bank, yet it appears 
that the Chinese government has maintained this label and the bank’s terms for loans 
to developing countries even in the face of criticism. We must rely on the data available 
with the understanding that it overlaps frequently and inconveniently. 
In terms of loans, Peru maintains a fairly even spread from the IDB, World Bank, 
China and the US. Peru has received signicant amounts of ODA from the United 
States in recent years. Chinese loans are a relatively new source of nance and, at 
roughly 22 percent, make up more than double the ODA coming from the US and 
closing in on the larger amounts from the IDB and World Bank, which account for 
roughly a third of the total from major sources of lending. 
Colombia has borrowed mainly from the World Bank and the IDB, while loans 
coming in from the US are less signicant and follow the pattern across the region. In 
other words, they are based on peace and security,3 while democracy, human rights, and 
October 1971. e Hierro Peru mine was purchased by China’s state-owned Shougang 
Company in 1992. Ecuador’s ties with China stand out for the loans-for-oil and other 
lending that ranks it among China’s biggest borrowers within Latin America. Beyond 
trade, Colombia’s relationship with China has been less pronounced (Creutzfeldt, 
2012; Ellis, 2014), although both sides are exploring the negotiation of a bilateral free 
trade agreement.
Peru’s Shougang deal reected a desire to diversify primary exporting partners. While 
Peru has apparently sought diversication in Chinese investments, away from primary 
commodities and into more higher-value production, a review of Chinese investments 
there today falls short of its expectations. Today, the Ecuadorian loans indicate that 
China is willing to be innovative in acquiring resources. ese loans are part of a 
symbiotic bilateral strategy to advance mining, crude extraction, renement and 
delivery and a general upgrade of infrastructure in the small, but remarkably endowed 
country, while allowing for an ambitious public spending scheme. It is worth noting 
that this relationship is dominated by large-scale projects and loans, and that there is a 
certain peculiarity due to the Ecuadorian government’s close involvement in these 
projects accompanied by a crowding out of investors from other countries. 
It has become a commonplace desire throughout the region to attract more investment 
and diversity in Chinese ventures, while China has indicated it will be looking to invest 
signicant sums in the short and medium term. One study estimates that China’s FDI 
outows could reach as high as US$1-2 trillion by 2020 (Rosen & Hanemann, 2012), 
and Latin America should be well positioned to capture a healthy portion of those 
funds. Optimism is tempered by those cautioning against the resource curse, or Dutch 
Disease, but it is unclear what could be done to eectively circumvent the economic 
and geographic realities that lead developing countries down this path. 
Another looming question is, to what extent are Chinese corporate activities, in fact, 
an extension of Beijing’s foreign policy strategy? China’s energy security is a national 
priority and its huge foreign currency reserves, coupled with state ownership of the 
energy and infrastructure rms, make a strong case for a national agenda. However, it 
may be more useful to consider the interdependence of national interests and 
INTRODUCTION.
We employ a comparative case study method to analyze some of the implications of 
China’s increasing presence in Latin America (LAC). Our departure point is “e 
China Policy Paper on Latin America” (China, 2008), which emphasized win-win 
rhetoric to characterize the rapidly growing political and economic ties between China 
and Latin America in the 2000s. e content of the Policy Paper, along with policies, 
principles and pledges laid out over the past decade by Chinese ocials concerning the 
China-Latin America relationship, is examined against the unfolding outcomes of 
China’s growing involvement in three Andean countries in the South American region: 
Ecuador, Colombia and Peru.1 rough these case studies we shall also address three 
specic themes: the extent to which growing ties with China seem to be transforming 
the development strategy of each country, whether a stronger relationship with China 
has aorded the receiving countries greater exibility and pragmatism in the design 
and execution of economic policy, and the eect that the longstanding relationships of 
each country with the United States are seeing upon the deepening Chinese presence.  
PERSPECTIVES AND METHODOLOGY.
Data in this eld presents challenges when looking at trade, aid, loans and investment. 
is is due not only to the dearth of independently veriable data but also to China’s 
particular view of its relationship with the developing world and the resulting 
categorisation of money ows. China self-identies as a developing nation, and its 
engagement with Latin America is more complex than a realist interpretation of the 
world tends to give credit for:2 in line with Varrall (2013) and the Chinese 
government’s Eight Principles for Economic Aid and Technical Assistance (China, 
1964), we argue that China’s development assistance is founded on a distinctive 
worldview that underscores genuine goodwill and principles of mutually benecial 
development, and has prioritized experimental approaches toward assisting in the 
construction of “ideal and modern societies.” Moreover, China’s recent success in 
defusing conict along its own borders where dialogue and a more regionally-sensitive 
role are evident as illustrated in the examples provided by Economy and Levi in their 
recent analysis of China’s resource quest, indicates that cooperation is preferred (in line 
with the behaviour of a rational state actor) and that new methods of forestalling 
conict are necessary and therefore likely. 
e implications are that the language and the goals laid out in ocial Chinese 
speeches and policy papers are not mere rhetoric, but rmly held and internalized (see 
for instance Song, 2012). Eective analysis of these attitudes should come in part from 
case studies that examine what Chinese cooperation means on the ground in countries 
where it is heavily investing. is is not to say that these approaches are always 
preferred to Western modalities or that there are not contingent and external factors 
that will undermine such intentions, but it does mean that the worldview of Chinese 
actors tasked with engaging developing countries can generate misinterpretation and 
confusion, with the overlapping of aid and investment statistics being just one example 
of this problem. Another critical issue that may arise is the reliance on leadership from 
partners abroad whose policies may appear complementary to the PRC’s vision but 
may be unpopular or problematic from other vantage points.  
at said, by empirically tracking China’s participation in the Andean region we can 
gain greater insights. While the values laid out in the Policy Paper are important to 
consider from the Chinese perspective and approach, what of the Andean experience 
and perspectives? 
We focus on these three Andean countries because they share similar endowment 
factors and have close trade and investment ties with the United States, as well as 
rapidly growing ties with China. At the same time, the cases diverge in terms of 
economic policy choice, with Peru and Colombia both pro-market countries that are 
members of the Pacic Alliance and negotiators for the Trans-Pacic Partnership. e 
embrace of free trade agreements in Colombia and Peru has resulted in remarkably 
open economies, although many critics of neoliberalism question how much this 
benets these countries and their respective populations. Ecuador, by contrast, claims 
to have moved away from neoliberalism and actually shuns FTAs, but critics of the 
current government, including former allies such as ex-ministers Alberto Acosta 
(Energy and Mining) and Fausto Ortiz (Finance), question if this is more rhetorical 
than factual due to such constraints as its historical reliance on foreign capital, 
highlighting the recent dependence on Chinese loans due to the willingness to break 
with traditional lenders such as the IMF and World Bank, by defaulting on its 
sovereign debt. Regardless of economic policy preferences, we suggest that China’s 
trade, aid and investment in these countries has given them greater room to manoeuvre 
in the management of their respective political economies. 
An analysis of case studies within the Andean sub-region of South America allows us to 
gain insights into three dynamic economic cases, all rich in natural resources but with 
distinct development strategies. It further allows for a view of dierent sectors within 
those countries where China is having a profound eect: mining in Peru, petroleum 
and electricity generation in Ecuador, and various commodities in Colombia, as well as 
a signicant manufacturing sector. Finally, by looking at these dierent sectors in LAC, 
we can disaggregate China and understand the considerations of actors from various 
companies that sometimes even compete with one another (González-Vicente, 2013; 
Fornés & Butt Philip, 2012). 
CHINA’S EXPECTATIONS IN THE ANDEAN REGION.
China has looked to LAC from much the same perspective it has engaged with 
Southeast Asia and Africa: as oering a wealth of opportunities for the world’s 
fastest-rising economic power and help for some chronically underdeveloped nations 
in these regions. e Andean sub-region holds rich deposits of oil, gas and minerals, 
but its geographical location renders it a logical gateway for Chinese products into the 
region, as well as regional exports back to China and the Asia Pacic region. 
Reciprocally, political leaders and economic actors in the Andean sub-region have been 
eager for their countries to play this role, most notably Chile and, more recently, Peru 
(Narins, 2012; Myers, 2012; Chen, 2011).
It is in this region where China rst sought a major investment in an iron mine in the 
early 1990s. e PRC’s relations with Peru have been strong ever since the Andean 
nation became the second country in South America after Chile to recognize the PRC 
in November 1971, shortly after the PRC gained its seat at the United Nations in 
US$155 million, less than 1% of inward FDI. e total given by the Chinese Embassy 
in Bogota stands at US$2.3 billion. Our research suggests Chinese capital interests in 
Colombia being over US$ 3 billion. is reects those assets acquired by Chinese 
SOEs in the hydrocarbon sector, which were previously owned by other transnational 
corporations, and reinvestments by Chinese companies with strong sales growth in the country.
Ecuador did not receive much investment from China until around 2009 and has since 
then been receiving ows that largely go to hydroelectric projects, the oil sector and 
copper mines. Most recently, initial nance agreements were reached with the 
Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) for a 30 percent share in the Pacic 
Renery at Manta, which will reportedly satisfy Ecuador’s petroleum needs and allow 
for oil exports to China and Asia (La Renería del Pacíco, 2013).
CHINA’S IMPACT ON DEVELOPMENT IN THE ANDEAN REGION.
Having signed FTAs with the United States, neither Peru nor Colombia is willing or 
able to turn away from Washington along the lines of a more combative Ecuador, 
although all three countries are clearly seeking to diversify their economic and 
diplomatic relations. China is a natural partner, due to the structural complementarity 
of factor endowments between China and all three countries. e question remains, 
however, as to the ability of these countries and the civil societies of which they are 
comprised, to work compatibly with Chinese companies and other PRC representatives 
on the ground in the context of ongoing investments and development projects.
For China to eectively carry out its stated aims in the Andean region, it will have to 
learn how to better broker with the increasingly organized and cohesive grassroots 
networks that have sprung to life around the complex extraction and related 
infrastructure projects that China is promoting. One important example of this is the 
movement to preserve not only indigenous groups but the extraordinarily biodiverse 
forests they have called home for millennia, including the Ecuadorian group Yasunidos 
and the Shuar people in the south of the country mobilizing against Chinese-led 
mining projects. It must also realistically assess the risks and navigate the regulatory 
frameworks now evolving within those governments. Economic considerations weigh 
heavily in government decisions, even when such decisions imply betrayals of trust and 
ideals that helped garner electoral support for national politicians. While citizen 
concerns may not be their top priority, Chinese rms must learn to balance their 
commercial and strategic interests with responsibilities and social realities rarely 
experienced at home. e question remains as to whether Chinese rms can carry o 
complex negotiations and societal intermediation as they seek to deepen their presence 
in the Andean region. An optimistic vision could even see China playing a positive role 
in reshaping the nature of these extractive realities and what they mean for the local 
communities aected by this behaviour. 
Still, the weak record of foreign extractive rms in Peru has been linked to the 
government’s own lax approach to regulation, as exemplied by the dual role of the 
Ministry of Energy and Mines (MINEM) as a promoter of mining and enforcer of 
environmental regulations. Sanborn notes that fears about the behaviour of Chinese 
rms are often generated by their multinational competitors and a media eager to 
sensationalize what a rising China means and that diligent oversight is necessary to 
smoothen the process (Sanborn & Torres, 2009, 351). As an interview with the 
Coordinator for Corporate Aairs for Chinalco in Lima, Peru revealed, Chinese rms 
regularly claim to be moving toward socially responsible action. ere appears to be a 
learning curve, as this company’s Toromocho copper mine project has beneted from 
the negative lessons of the Shougang iron mine, hiring Western executives to deal with 
the concerns of the surrounding communities (Irwin & Gallagher, 2013, 227). 
e learning curve required of Chinese enterprises is still quite steep, however. 
Although many manufacturing and trading rms in Colombia rely on imports from 
China, the perception persists that Chinese industry, along with the political and social 
structures it represents, constitutes a threat to the status quo. is perception has led to 
anti-Chinese demonstrations reminiscent of those in small towns in Mexico, though 
less violently articulated (Hearn, 2012). While some joint ventures have succeeded in 
adapting to local conditions and maintaining a low prole, the new Chinese owners 
(Sinochem) of Emerald Industries in Colombia succeeded in quickly oending the 
local population, leading to poor press and popular resentment. 
In Ecuador, the government is increasingly interested in challenging the role of 
multinationals, using enhanced centralization and oversight to benet as many civic 
groups as possible. Despite these eorts, there are battles brewing over oil and mineral 
concessions around the country and the perception among opposition groups and 
international observers is that Ecuador is merely replacing its dependency on Western 
multinationals and primary commodities with Chinese rms. ere may be some truth 
to these allegations, but in our interviews with activists, government ocials, and 
international critics of the Correa administration, we have found that the specic 
dangers presented by Chinese companies are often exaggerated and there is a similar 
pattern of sensationalism at work as that highlighted by Sanborn in Peru (2009). 
Moreover, the build-up in foreign exchange reserves and primary budget surpluses that 
have emerged as a result has allowed these countries to launch social programs and 
poverty reduction initiatives. ere is, in other words, something in this for everyone, 
including China, although it is incumbent on all stakeholders in this new evolving 
China-LAC scenario to carry their weight and act accordingly. 
CONCLUSION.
is paper illustrates ways in which China’s engagement with the countries of the 
Andean region coincides with that of the larger LAC emerging economies, and how it 
diers. e nature of China’s evolving ties with the three Andean countries discussed 
here ts with the general South American themes of economic complementarities in 
factor endowments and China’s voracious appetite for natural resources to spur its high 
growth model. e dierences lie mainly in the composition of state-society relations 
in the Andean region where civic groups, social movements, and indigenous 
communities have all been recognized as formidable actors on the national political 
stage. is aspect of China-Andean relations is less pronounced in larger more 
industrialized Latin American countries like Argentina, Brazil and Mexico. e 
Andean angle thus adds a new twist to China’s heightened interest in extracting 
primary commodities from the LAC region. 
In short, Chinese investors and ocials, who have not had their feet held closely to the 
re on their own authoritarian home turf, are now being contested. Interestingly, some 
Chinese companies operating in these countries have adopted the Western practice of 
donating to local governments for schools or hospitals, but this contribution to local 
social capital has not earned them much credit (Parish Flannery, 2013). Some scholars 
have argued that Chinese rms may be at a disadvantage precisely because of their lack 
of experience with societal intermediation on the home front, while others argue that 
this is changing (Alden & Hughes, 2009). If we take China’s 2008 Policy Paper at its 
word, the PRC leadership maintains that it will ensure the livelihood of people in 
partnering countries by “complying with local laws and regulations, and adhering to 
fair, transparent public works project contracts, making a commitment to and fullling 
the necessary social responsibility to protect the legitimate rights and interests of local 
employees, paying attention to environmental resource protection, caring for and 
supporting the local community.”
It remains to be seen whether the lofty goals of a new internationalism embedded in 
recent Chinese history can genuinely be achieved given the strength and scale of the 
Chinese economy with its inherent asymmetry and the power of market demands. 
However, such pronouncements should not be overlooked or discarded, as China’s 
dependence on massive primary commodity imports from LAC promises to become a 
permanent feature of China-LAC relations for years to come.  China has every 
incentive to make the relationship work, even if it must do considerably more to bring 
it up to true international standards. 
Certain unsavoury realities persist about the nature of resource extraction and the 
problems it invariably creates. e leadership required to navigate a nation’s way 
through the price uctuations, abundance, corruption, environmental problems, 
indigenous rights, resistance from civil society and diculty involved in institution 
building may lie beyond the realm of possibilities of any one country. It does appear, 
however, that the purported principles of China’s aid, trade, and investment with the 
developing world are sincere and oer an opportunity to the leaders of 
twenty-rst-century South America to set in motion processes and structures that can 




Alden, C. & Hughes C.R. 2009. Harmony and Discord in China’s Africa Strategy: Some Implications for Foreign Policy. China 
Quarterly, 199, 563-584.
Anders, S. & Watkins, N. 2008, December 15. Ecuador’s Debt Default. Foreign Policy in Focus. Retrieved from 
www.ips-dc.org/articles/ecuadors_debt_default_exposing_a_gap_in_the_global_ nancial_architecture. 
Bräutigam, D. 2011, January 15. Has China’s Export Financing Met Its Match? China in Africa: e Real Story blog. Retrieved 
from www.chinaafricarealstory.com/2011/01/has-chinas-export-nancing-met-its.html.
Chen, W.H. & Li, X.K. 2011, June 10. Xi Visits ‘Gateway to Latin America’. China Daily. Retrieved from 
http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/epaper/2011-06/10/content_12672857.htm.
China, People’s Republic of. 1964. Eight Principles. Retrieved from 
http://english.gov.cn/ocial/2011-04/21/content_1849913_10.htm.
China, People’s Republic of 1964. Eight Principles. Retrieved from 
http://english.gov.cn/ocial/2011-04/21/content_1849913_10.htm.
Creutzfeldt, B. ed. 2012. China en América Latina: reexiones sobre las relaciones transpacícas. Bogotá: Universidad Externado 
de Colombia. 
Dussel Peters, E. 2012, November. Chinese FDI in Latin America: Does Ownership Matter? Discussion Paper No. 33, Working 
Group on Trade and Environment in the Americas, Tufts University.
Ellis, E. 2014. China on the Ground in Latin America: Challenges for the Chinese and Impacts on the Region. New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan. 
Fornés, G. and Butt Philip, A. 2012. e China-Latin America Axis: Emerging Markets and the Future of Globalisation. New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Gallagher, K.P., Irwin, A. & Koleski, K. 2012, February. e New Banks in Town: Chinese Finance in Latin America. 
Inter-American Dialogue. Retrieved from http://ase.tufts.edu/gdae/Pubs/rp/GallagherChineseFinanceLatinAmericaBrief.pdf.
González-Vicente, R. 2013. Development Dynamics of Chinese Resource-Based Investment in Peru and Ecuador, Latin 
American Politics and Society, 55 (1). 
Hearn, A. 2012. Harnessing the Dragon: Overseas Chinese Entrepreneurs in Mexico and Cuba. In. 
Strauss, J.C. & Armony, A.C., eds. From the Great Wall to the New World. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 111-133.
Irwin, A. & Gallagher, K. 2013. Chinese Mining in Latin America: A Comparative Perspective. e Journal of Environment 
Development, 22, 2, 207-234. 
La Renería del Pacíco estará lista en cuatro años. 2013, July 1. El Telégrafo. Retrieved from 
www.telegrafo.com.ec/economia/item/la-reneria-del-pacico-estara-lista-en-cuatro-anos.html.
Myers, M. 2012, September 21. Chinese Trade and Investment in Latin America: Perspectives from Colombia and Ecuador. 
Inter-American Dialogue. Retrieved from www.thedialogue.org/page.cfm?pageID=32&pubID=3098.
Narins, T.P. 2012. China’s Eye on Ecuador: What Chinese Trade with Ecuador Reveals about China’s Economic Expansion in 
South America. e Global Studies Journal, 4 (2). 
OECD 2007. ODA Casebook on Conict, Peace and Security Activities. Retrieved from 
www.oecd.org/dac/incaf/39967978.pdf. 
Parish Flannery, N. 2013, September 12. How China’s Relations with Peru Explains its Approach to Diplomacy. e Atlantic. 
Retrieved from 
www.theatlantic.com/china/archive/2013/09/how-chinas-relations-with-peru-explain-its-approach-to-diplomacy/279618/.
Pashakhanlou, A. H. 2013. "Back to the Drawing Board: A Critique of Oensive Realism." International Relations 27 
(2):202-225.
Rosen, D.H. and Hanemann, T. 2011. An American Open Door?: Maximizing the Benets of Chinese Foreign Direct 
Investment. Asia Society Special Report. Retrieved from http://asiasociety.org/les/pdf/AnAmericanOpenDoor_FINAL.pdf.
Sanborn, C.A. & Torres, V. 2009. La economía china y las industrias extractivas: desafíos para el Perú. Lima: Centro de 
Investigaciones de la Universidad del Pacíco. 
Song, X.P. 2012. Elementos fundamentales del marco teórico de la política exterior de China. In B. Creutzfeldt, ed. China en 
América Latina: reexiones sobre las relaciones transpacícas. Bogotá: Universidad Externado de Colombia, 87-100.
Stallings, B. 2013, August 5. Chinese Aid to Latin America: Trying to Win Friends and Inuence People. Paper presented at a 
workshop on China-Latin American Relations. University of Southern California, Los Angeles.




Doctoral Candidate, Institute of China Asia Pacic Studies.
National Sun Yat-sen University, Kaohsiung, Taiwan.
ajchimienti@gmail.com
Benjamin Creutzfeldt.
Lecturer in Contemporary China Studies.
CESA School of Business, Bogota, Colombia.
benjamin.cr@cesa.edu.co
governance, and education and social services are minor in comparison. Loans from 
China are negligible. 
Ecuador’s credit line received a much needed boost from China after it defaulted on 
$3.2 billion of foreign debt in 2008 following a government audit that found domestic 
laws had been violated, in addition to US Securities and Exchange Commission 
regulations and general principles of international law (Watkins & Anders, 2008). is 
came amidst a rejection of neoliberal policies and a reduced role in the drug 
interdiction scheme, which was the basis for US development assistance and 
preferential treatment in trade agreements. A signicant feature of Chinese loans to 
Ecuador is that they are based on oil (loans-for-oil), with China purchasing the oil on 
the spot market rather than locking in advantageous prices (Gallagher, Irwin & 
Koleski, 2012). 
CHINA’S INVESTMENTS IN THE ANDEAN SUB-REGION.
When it comes to investment, the data is, again, problematic, mainly due to the fact 
that China does not publish this information. For our purposes, investment will 
qualify regardless of being private (FDI) or public. China typically distributes its 
investment through various SOEs, which causes confusion and may be considered 
awkward for various reasons (Dussel Peters, 2012), although it looks and behaves like 
typical investment coming from private foreign rms. As mentioned earlier, there is the 
problem of a conceptual overlap between Chinese lending and investing. 
Peru had been a major destination for Chinese investment, but that trend slowed down 
after 2010. Chinese investments in Peru have primarily gone toward copper and steel 
concessions; overall, Chinese investment stock in Peru was US$796.48 million in 
2012, a 3.5 percent share of total FDI stock in the country. Mining is also the leading 
recipient of FDI in Peru, accounting for nearly 24 percent of capital stock at the end of 
2012 (ProInversion, 2014).
Colombia’s FDI from China is only a fraction of a percent of investment coming into 
the region; here, too, the published gures diverge. According to the Banco de la 
República, the accumulated gure for Chinese investment between 2000 and 2012 was 
1. Bolivia has been omitted from this study of Andean countries due its relatively much smaller GDP, population size, and inward 
FDI volume, which would generate certain distortions in comparative numbers.
2. A number of authors have presented arguments challenging the oensive realism of Kenneth Waltz and John Mearsheimer (for 
instance Pashakhanlou 2013). More explicitly embedding our argument in this discourse is beyond the scope of this paper.
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state-owned rms in priority sectors in China as not being so dissimilar from the 
United States: while clearly governed by dierent concerns, “national interests” were 
also cited by the US Congress in 2005 in its decision to prevent the takeover of Unocal 
by CNOOC.
CHINA’S TRADE WITH THE SUB-REGION.
Overall, trade with China has become especially important for the region as a whole 
and for the Andean sub-region in particular. While Peru, Ecuador and Colombia are 
all still dependent on the US market, China does seek to oer something of an 
alternative. As the second largest importer of fuel and minerals, China is increasing its 
presence in the Andean region. Peru leads the way with China as its most important 
partner of the three in bilateral trade (with aggregate gures doubling since the two 
governments signed a free trade agreement in 2009). Colombia has a more diverse 
industry with a strong manufacturing base, and heavily depends on the US market, 
with China accounting for only 3.6 percent of exports. When it comes to trade, 
Ecuador is not a priority for China in terms of volume, yet China sees considerable 
potential here and has taken an active role in the country when it comes to investment 
and loans for oil. 
Overall, China’s gains in imports between 2000 and 2009 have occurred while the US 
has either declined in signicance (Peru and Colombia) or remained static (Ecuador). 
Ecuador has increasingly relied on intra-regional destinations for its goods, while 
China and the United States have become slightly less important as export markets. 
Over the same period, Colombia has sent moderately more of its exports to the Asia 
Pacic, China and the EU, while seeing a slight decline in its exports to LAC and a 
move toward decreasing its dependency on the US market. 
CHINESE AID TO THE SUB-REGION.
Chinese aid to LAC has also been a subject of great speculation, although the 
withholding of some information and a view of aid and investment that diverges 
signicantly from traditional Western methodology is partly to blame for the 
discrepancies. For our purposes, we dene aid as any assistance coming from China 
that may be classied as concessional loans or otherwise designed to improve 
infrastructure or assist in the delivery of basic services to recipient countries. As 
mentioned earlier, it is not entirely clear how much China gives and where it invests 
(Stallings, 2013; Dussel Peters, 2012). e idea that cooperation is a key element of its 
relationship with other developing countries is steeped in a tradition that has been 
briey touched upon above. To dismiss the rhetoric and conceptions put across by 
Chinese development actors and commentators is disingenuous and rearms common 
misconceptions, as Varrall elaborates on in her work on Chinese development experts 
(2013). 
By reminding ourselves of these Chinese perspectives, we can see how Ocial 
Development Assistance (ODA) as dened by the OECD, does not allow for some 
types of “cooperation” between China and LAC to be understood as ODA. As Stallings 
(2013) points out, much of the ows that arrive in LAC and certainly those funds that 
reach Ecuador and Peru are not so easily dened. Bräutigam (2011) has questioned the 
accuracy of the China Development Bank’s label as a development bank, yet it appears 
that the Chinese government has maintained this label and the bank’s terms for loans 
to developing countries even in the face of criticism. We must rely on the data available 
with the understanding that it overlaps frequently and inconveniently. 
In terms of loans, Peru maintains a fairly even spread from the IDB, World Bank, 
China and the US. Peru has received signicant amounts of ODA from the United 
States in recent years. Chinese loans are a relatively new source of nance and, at 
roughly 22 percent, make up more than double the ODA coming from the US and 
closing in on the larger amounts from the IDB and World Bank, which account for 
roughly a third of the total from major sources of lending. 
Colombia has borrowed mainly from the World Bank and the IDB, while loans 
coming in from the US are less signicant and follow the pattern across the region. In 
other words, they are based on peace and security,3 while democracy, human rights, and 
October 1971. e Hierro Peru mine was purchased by China’s state-owned Shougang 
Company in 1992. Ecuador’s ties with China stand out for the loans-for-oil and other 
lending that ranks it among China’s biggest borrowers within Latin America. Beyond 
trade, Colombia’s relationship with China has been less pronounced (Creutzfeldt, 
2012; Ellis, 2014), although both sides are exploring the negotiation of a bilateral free 
trade agreement.
Peru’s Shougang deal reected a desire to diversify primary exporting partners. While 
Peru has apparently sought diversication in Chinese investments, away from primary 
commodities and into more higher-value production, a review of Chinese investments 
there today falls short of its expectations. Today, the Ecuadorian loans indicate that 
China is willing to be innovative in acquiring resources. ese loans are part of a 
symbiotic bilateral strategy to advance mining, crude extraction, renement and 
delivery and a general upgrade of infrastructure in the small, but remarkably endowed 
country, while allowing for an ambitious public spending scheme. It is worth noting 
that this relationship is dominated by large-scale projects and loans, and that there is a 
certain peculiarity due to the Ecuadorian government’s close involvement in these 
projects accompanied by a crowding out of investors from other countries. 
It has become a commonplace desire throughout the region to attract more investment 
and diversity in Chinese ventures, while China has indicated it will be looking to invest 
signicant sums in the short and medium term. One study estimates that China’s FDI 
outows could reach as high as US$1-2 trillion by 2020 (Rosen & Hanemann, 2012), 
and Latin America should be well positioned to capture a healthy portion of those 
funds. Optimism is tempered by those cautioning against the resource curse, or Dutch 
Disease, but it is unclear what could be done to eectively circumvent the economic 
and geographic realities that lead developing countries down this path. 
Another looming question is, to what extent are Chinese corporate activities, in fact, 
an extension of Beijing’s foreign policy strategy? China’s energy security is a national 
priority and its huge foreign currency reserves, coupled with state ownership of the 
energy and infrastructure rms, make a strong case for a national agenda. However, it 
may be more useful to consider the interdependence of national interests and 
role are evident as illustrated in the examples provided by Economy and Levi in their 
recent analysis of China’s resource quest, indicates that cooperation is preferred (in line 
with the behaviour of a rational state actor) and that new methods of forestalling 
conict are necessary and therefore likely. 
e implications are that the language and the goals laid out in ocial Chinese 
speeches and policy papers are not mere rhetoric, but rmly held and internalized (see 
for instance Song, 2012). Eective analysis of these attitudes should come in part from 
case studies that examine what Chinese cooperation means on the ground in countries 
where it is heavily investing. is is not to say that these approaches are always 
preferred to Western modalities or that there are not contingent and external factors 
that will undermine such intentions, but it does mean that the worldview of Chinese 
actors tasked with engaging developing countries can generate misinterpretation and 
confusion, with the overlapping of aid and investment statistics being just one example 
of this problem. Another critical issue that may arise is the reliance on leadership from 
partners abroad whose policies may appear complementary to the PRC’s vision but 
may be unpopular or problematic from other vantage points.  
at said, by empirically tracking China’s participation in the Andean region we can 
gain greater insights. While the values laid out in the Policy Paper are important to 
consider from the Chinese perspective and approach, what of the Andean experience 
and perspectives? 
We focus on these three Andean countries because they share similar endowment 
factors and have close trade and investment ties with the United States, as well as 
rapidly growing ties with China. At the same time, the cases diverge in terms of 
economic policy choice, with Peru and Colombia both pro-market countries that are 
members of the Pacic Alliance and negotiators for the Trans-Pacic Partnership. e 
embrace of free trade agreements in Colombia and Peru has resulted in remarkably 
open economies, although many critics of neoliberalism question how much this 
benets these countries and their respective populations. Ecuador, by contrast, claims 
to have moved away from neoliberalism and actually shuns FTAs, but critics of the 
current government, including former allies such as ex-ministers Alberto Acosta 
(Energy and Mining) and Fausto Ortiz (Finance), question if this is more rhetorical 
than factual due to such constraints as its historical reliance on foreign capital, 
highlighting the recent dependence on Chinese loans due to the willingness to break 
with traditional lenders such as the IMF and World Bank, by defaulting on its 
sovereign debt. Regardless of economic policy preferences, we suggest that China’s 
trade, aid and investment in these countries has given them greater room to manoeuvre 
in the management of their respective political economies. 
An analysis of case studies within the Andean sub-region of South America allows us to 
gain insights into three dynamic economic cases, all rich in natural resources but with 
distinct development strategies. It further allows for a view of dierent sectors within 
those countries where China is having a profound eect: mining in Peru, petroleum 
and electricity generation in Ecuador, and various commodities in Colombia, as well as 
a signicant manufacturing sector. Finally, by looking at these dierent sectors in LAC, 
we can disaggregate China and understand the considerations of actors from various 
companies that sometimes even compete with one another (González-Vicente, 2013; 
Fornés & Butt Philip, 2012). 
CHINA’S EXPECTATIONS IN THE ANDEAN REGION.
China has looked to LAC from much the same perspective it has engaged with 
Southeast Asia and Africa: as oering a wealth of opportunities for the world’s 
fastest-rising economic power and help for some chronically underdeveloped nations 
in these regions. e Andean sub-region holds rich deposits of oil, gas and minerals, 
but its geographical location renders it a logical gateway for Chinese products into the 
region, as well as regional exports back to China and the Asia Pacic region. 
Reciprocally, political leaders and economic actors in the Andean sub-region have been 
eager for their countries to play this role, most notably Chile and, more recently, Peru 
(Narins, 2012; Myers, 2012; Chen, 2011).
It is in this region where China rst sought a major investment in an iron mine in the 
early 1990s. e PRC’s relations with Peru have been strong ever since the Andean 
nation became the second country in South America after Chile to recognize the PRC 
in November 1971, shortly after the PRC gained its seat at the United Nations in 
US$155 million, less than 1% of inward FDI. e total given by the Chinese Embassy 
in Bogota stands at US$2.3 billion. Our research suggests Chinese capital interests in 
Colombia being over US$ 3 billion. is reects those assets acquired by Chinese 
SOEs in the hydrocarbon sector, which were previously owned by other transnational 
corporations, and reinvestments by Chinese companies with strong sales growth in the country.
Ecuador did not receive much investment from China until around 2009 and has since 
then been receiving ows that largely go to hydroelectric projects, the oil sector and 
copper mines. Most recently, initial nance agreements were reached with the 
Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) for a 30 percent share in the Pacic 
Renery at Manta, which will reportedly satisfy Ecuador’s petroleum needs and allow 
for oil exports to China and Asia (La Renería del Pacíco, 2013).
CHINA’S IMPACT ON DEVELOPMENT IN THE ANDEAN REGION.
Having signed FTAs with the United States, neither Peru nor Colombia is willing or 
able to turn away from Washington along the lines of a more combative Ecuador, 
although all three countries are clearly seeking to diversify their economic and 
diplomatic relations. China is a natural partner, due to the structural complementarity 
of factor endowments between China and all three countries. e question remains, 
however, as to the ability of these countries and the civil societies of which they are 
comprised, to work compatibly with Chinese companies and other PRC representatives 
on the ground in the context of ongoing investments and development projects.
For China to eectively carry out its stated aims in the Andean region, it will have to 
learn how to better broker with the increasingly organized and cohesive grassroots 
networks that have sprung to life around the complex extraction and related 
infrastructure projects that China is promoting. One important example of this is the 
movement to preserve not only indigenous groups but the extraordinarily biodiverse 
forests they have called home for millennia, including the Ecuadorian group Yasunidos 
and the Shuar people in the south of the country mobilizing against Chinese-led 
mining projects. It must also realistically assess the risks and navigate the regulatory 
frameworks now evolving within those governments. Economic considerations weigh 
heavily in government decisions, even when such decisions imply betrayals of trust and 
ideals that helped garner electoral support for national politicians. While citizen 
concerns may not be their top priority, Chinese rms must learn to balance their 
commercial and strategic interests with responsibilities and social realities rarely 
experienced at home. e question remains as to whether Chinese rms can carry o 
complex negotiations and societal intermediation as they seek to deepen their presence 
in the Andean region. An optimistic vision could even see China playing a positive role 
in reshaping the nature of these extractive realities and what they mean for the local 
communities aected by this behaviour. 
Still, the weak record of foreign extractive rms in Peru has been linked to the 
government’s own lax approach to regulation, as exemplied by the dual role of the 
Ministry of Energy and Mines (MINEM) as a promoter of mining and enforcer of 
environmental regulations. Sanborn notes that fears about the behaviour of Chinese 
rms are often generated by their multinational competitors and a media eager to 
sensationalize what a rising China means and that diligent oversight is necessary to 
smoothen the process (Sanborn & Torres, 2009, 351). As an interview with the 
Coordinator for Corporate Aairs for Chinalco in Lima, Peru revealed, Chinese rms 
regularly claim to be moving toward socially responsible action. ere appears to be a 
learning curve, as this company’s Toromocho copper mine project has beneted from 
the negative lessons of the Shougang iron mine, hiring Western executives to deal with 
the concerns of the surrounding communities (Irwin & Gallagher, 2013, 227). 
e learning curve required of Chinese enterprises is still quite steep, however. 
Although many manufacturing and trading rms in Colombia rely on imports from 
China, the perception persists that Chinese industry, along with the political and social 
structures it represents, constitutes a threat to the status quo. is perception has led to 
anti-Chinese demonstrations reminiscent of those in small towns in Mexico, though 
less violently articulated (Hearn, 2012). While some joint ventures have succeeded in 
adapting to local conditions and maintaining a low prole, the new Chinese owners 
(Sinochem) of Emerald Industries in Colombia succeeded in quickly oending the 
local population, leading to poor press and popular resentment. 
In Ecuador, the government is increasingly interested in challenging the role of 
multinationals, using enhanced centralization and oversight to benet as many civic 
groups as possible. Despite these eorts, there are battles brewing over oil and mineral 
concessions around the country and the perception among opposition groups and 
international observers is that Ecuador is merely replacing its dependency on Western 
multinationals and primary commodities with Chinese rms. ere may be some truth 
to these allegations, but in our interviews with activists, government ocials, and 
international critics of the Correa administration, we have found that the specic 
dangers presented by Chinese companies are often exaggerated and there is a similar 
pattern of sensationalism at work as that highlighted by Sanborn in Peru (2009). 
Moreover, the build-up in foreign exchange reserves and primary budget surpluses that 
have emerged as a result has allowed these countries to launch social programs and 
poverty reduction initiatives. ere is, in other words, something in this for everyone, 
including China, although it is incumbent on all stakeholders in this new evolving 
China-LAC scenario to carry their weight and act accordingly. 
CONCLUSION.
is paper illustrates ways in which China’s engagement with the countries of the 
Andean region coincides with that of the larger LAC emerging economies, and how it 
diers. e nature of China’s evolving ties with the three Andean countries discussed 
here ts with the general South American themes of economic complementarities in 
factor endowments and China’s voracious appetite for natural resources to spur its high 
growth model. e dierences lie mainly in the composition of state-society relations 
in the Andean region where civic groups, social movements, and indigenous 
communities have all been recognized as formidable actors on the national political 
stage. is aspect of China-Andean relations is less pronounced in larger more 
industrialized Latin American countries like Argentina, Brazil and Mexico. e 
Andean angle thus adds a new twist to China’s heightened interest in extracting 
primary commodities from the LAC region. 
In short, Chinese investors and ocials, who have not had their feet held closely to the 
re on their own authoritarian home turf, are now being contested. Interestingly, some 
Chinese companies operating in these countries have adopted the Western practice of 
donating to local governments for schools or hospitals, but this contribution to local 
social capital has not earned them much credit (Parish Flannery, 2013). Some scholars 
have argued that Chinese rms may be at a disadvantage precisely because of their lack 
of experience with societal intermediation on the home front, while others argue that 
this is changing (Alden & Hughes, 2009). If we take China’s 2008 Policy Paper at its 
word, the PRC leadership maintains that it will ensure the livelihood of people in 
partnering countries by “complying with local laws and regulations, and adhering to 
fair, transparent public works project contracts, making a commitment to and fullling 
the necessary social responsibility to protect the legitimate rights and interests of local 
employees, paying attention to environmental resource protection, caring for and 
supporting the local community.”
It remains to be seen whether the lofty goals of a new internationalism embedded in 
recent Chinese history can genuinely be achieved given the strength and scale of the 
Chinese economy with its inherent asymmetry and the power of market demands. 
However, such pronouncements should not be overlooked or discarded, as China’s 
dependence on massive primary commodity imports from LAC promises to become a 
permanent feature of China-LAC relations for years to come.  China has every 
incentive to make the relationship work, even if it must do considerably more to bring 
it up to true international standards. 
Certain unsavoury realities persist about the nature of resource extraction and the 
problems it invariably creates. e leadership required to navigate a nation’s way 
through the price uctuations, abundance, corruption, environmental problems, 
indigenous rights, resistance from civil society and diculty involved in institution 
building may lie beyond the realm of possibilities of any one country. It does appear, 
however, that the purported principles of China’s aid, trade, and investment with the 
developing world are sincere and oer an opportunity to the leaders of 
twenty-rst-century South America to set in motion processes and structures that can 
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governance, and education and social services are minor in comparison. Loans from 
China are negligible. 
Ecuador’s credit line received a much needed boost from China after it defaulted on 
$3.2 billion of foreign debt in 2008 following a government audit that found domestic 
laws had been violated, in addition to US Securities and Exchange Commission 
regulations and general principles of international law (Watkins & Anders, 2008). is 
came amidst a rejection of neoliberal policies and a reduced role in the drug 
interdiction scheme, which was the basis for US development assistance and 
preferential treatment in trade agreements. A signicant feature of Chinese loans to 
Ecuador is that they are based on oil (loans-for-oil), with China purchasing the oil on 
the spot market rather than locking in advantageous prices (Gallagher, Irwin & 
Koleski, 2012). 
CHINA’S INVESTMENTS IN THE ANDEAN SUB-REGION.
When it comes to investment, the data is, again, problematic, mainly due to the fact 
that China does not publish this information. For our purposes, investment will 
qualify regardless of being private (FDI) or public. China typically distributes its 
investment through various SOEs, which causes confusion and may be considered 
awkward for various reasons (Dussel Peters, 2012), although it looks and behaves like 
typical investment coming from private foreign rms. As mentioned earlier, there is the 
problem of a conceptual overlap between Chinese lending and investing. 
Peru had been a major destination for Chinese investment, but that trend slowed down 
after 2010. Chinese investments in Peru have primarily gone toward copper and steel 
concessions; overall, Chinese investment stock in Peru was US$796.48 million in 
2012, a 3.5 percent share of total FDI stock in the country. Mining is also the leading 
recipient of FDI in Peru, accounting for nearly 24 percent of capital stock at the end of 
2012 (ProInversion, 2014).
Colombia’s FDI from China is only a fraction of a percent of investment coming into 
the region; here, too, the published gures diverge. According to the Banco de la 
República, the accumulated gure for Chinese investment between 2000 and 2012 was 
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state-owned rms in priority sectors in China as not being so dissimilar from the 
United States: while clearly governed by dierent concerns, “national interests” were 
also cited by the US Congress in 2005 in its decision to prevent the takeover of Unocal 
by CNOOC.
CHINA’S TRADE WITH THE SUB-REGION.
Overall, trade with China has become especially important for the region as a whole 
and for the Andean sub-region in particular. While Peru, Ecuador and Colombia are 
all still dependent on the US market, China does seek to oer something of an 
alternative. As the second largest importer of fuel and minerals, China is increasing its 
presence in the Andean region. Peru leads the way with China as its most important 
partner of the three in bilateral trade (with aggregate gures doubling since the two 
governments signed a free trade agreement in 2009). Colombia has a more diverse 
industry with a strong manufacturing base, and heavily depends on the US market, 
with China accounting for only 3.6 percent of exports. When it comes to trade, 
Ecuador is not a priority for China in terms of volume, yet China sees considerable 
potential here and has taken an active role in the country when it comes to investment 
and loans for oil. 
Overall, China’s gains in imports between 2000 and 2009 have occurred while the US 
has either declined in signicance (Peru and Colombia) or remained static (Ecuador). 
Ecuador has increasingly relied on intra-regional destinations for its goods, while 
China and the United States have become slightly less important as export markets. 
Over the same period, Colombia has sent moderately more of its exports to the Asia 
Pacic, China and the EU, while seeing a slight decline in its exports to LAC and a 
move toward decreasing its dependency on the US market. 
CHINESE AID TO THE SUB-REGION.
Chinese aid to LAC has also been a subject of great speculation, although the 
withholding of some information and a view of aid and investment that diverges 
signicantly from traditional Western methodology is partly to blame for the 
discrepancies. For our purposes, we dene aid as any assistance coming from China 
that may be classied as concessional loans or otherwise designed to improve 
infrastructure or assist in the delivery of basic services to recipient countries. As 
mentioned earlier, it is not entirely clear how much China gives and where it invests 
(Stallings, 2013; Dussel Peters, 2012). e idea that cooperation is a key element of its 
relationship with other developing countries is steeped in a tradition that has been 
briey touched upon above. To dismiss the rhetoric and conceptions put across by 
Chinese development actors and commentators is disingenuous and rearms common 
misconceptions, as Varrall elaborates on in her work on Chinese development experts 
(2013). 
By reminding ourselves of these Chinese perspectives, we can see how Ocial 
Development Assistance (ODA) as dened by the OECD, does not allow for some 
types of “cooperation” between China and LAC to be understood as ODA. As Stallings 
(2013) points out, much of the ows that arrive in LAC and certainly those funds that 
reach Ecuador and Peru are not so easily dened. Bräutigam (2011) has questioned the 
accuracy of the China Development Bank’s label as a development bank, yet it appears 
that the Chinese government has maintained this label and the bank’s terms for loans 
to developing countries even in the face of criticism. We must rely on the data available 
with the understanding that it overlaps frequently and inconveniently. 
In terms of loans, Peru maintains a fairly even spread from the IDB, World Bank, 
China and the US. Peru has received signicant amounts of ODA from the United 
States in recent years. Chinese loans are a relatively new source of nance and, at 
roughly 22 percent, make up more than double the ODA coming from the US and 
closing in on the larger amounts from the IDB and World Bank, which account for 
roughly a third of the total from major sources of lending. 
Colombia has borrowed mainly from the World Bank and the IDB, while loans 
coming in from the US are less signicant and follow the pattern across the region. In 
other words, they are based on peace and security,3 while democracy, human rights, and 
October 1971. e Hierro Peru mine was purchased by China’s state-owned Shougang 
Company in 1992. Ecuador’s ties with China stand out for the loans-for-oil and other 
lending that ranks it among China’s biggest borrowers within Latin America. Beyond 
trade, Colombia’s relationship with China has been less pronounced (Creutzfeldt, 
2012; Ellis, 2014), although both sides are exploring the negotiation of a bilateral free 
trade agreement.
Peru’s Shougang deal reected a desire to diversify primary exporting partners. While 
Peru has apparently sought diversication in Chinese investments, away from primary 
commodities and into more higher-value production, a review of Chinese investments 
there today falls short of its expectations. Today, the Ecuadorian loans indicate that 
China is willing to be innovative in acquiring resources. ese loans are part of a 
symbiotic bilateral strategy to advance mining, crude extraction, renement and 
delivery and a general upgrade of infrastructure in the small, but remarkably endowed 
country, while allowing for an ambitious public spending scheme. It is worth noting 
that this relationship is dominated by large-scale projects and loans, and that there is a 
certain peculiarity due to the Ecuadorian government’s close involvement in these 
projects accompanied by a crowding out of investors from other countries. 
It has become a commonplace desire throughout the region to attract more investment 
and diversity in Chinese ventures, while China has indicated it will be looking to invest 
signicant sums in the short and medium term. One study estimates that China’s FDI 
outows could reach as high as US$1-2 trillion by 2020 (Rosen & Hanemann, 2012), 
and Latin America should be well positioned to capture a healthy portion of those 
funds. Optimism is tempered by those cautioning against the resource curse, or Dutch 
Disease, but it is unclear what could be done to eectively circumvent the economic 
and geographic realities that lead developing countries down this path. 
Another looming question is, to what extent are Chinese corporate activities, in fact, 
an extension of Beijing’s foreign policy strategy? China’s energy security is a national 
priority and its huge foreign currency reserves, coupled with state ownership of the 
energy and infrastructure rms, make a strong case for a national agenda. However, it 
may be more useful to consider the interdependence of national interests and 
role are evident as illustrated in the examples provided by Economy and Levi in their 
recent analysis of China’s resource quest, indicates that cooperation is preferred (in line 
with the behaviour of a rational state actor) and that new methods of forestalling 
conict are necessary and therefore likely. 
e implications are that the language and the goals laid out in ocial Chinese 
speeches and policy papers are not mere rhetoric, but rmly held and internalized (see 
for instance Song, 2012). Eective analysis of these attitudes should come in part from 
case studies that examine what Chinese cooperation means on the ground in countries 
where it is heavily investing. is is not to say that these approaches are always 
preferred to Western modalities or that there are not contingent and external factors 
that will undermine such intentions, but it does mean that the worldview of Chinese 
actors tasked with engaging developing countries can generate misinterpretation and 
confusion, with the overlapping of aid and investment statistics being just one example 
of this problem. Another critical issue that may arise is the reliance on leadership from 
partners abroad whose policies may appear complementary to the PRC’s vision but 
may be unpopular or problematic from other vantage points.  
at said, by empirically tracking China’s participation in the Andean region we can 
gain greater insights. While the values laid out in the Policy Paper are important to 
consider from the Chinese perspective and approach, what of the Andean experience 
and perspectives? 
We focus on these three Andean countries because they share similar endowment 
factors and have close trade and investment ties with the United States, as well as 
rapidly growing ties with China. At the same time, the cases diverge in terms of 
economic policy choice, with Peru and Colombia both pro-market countries that are 
members of the Pacic Alliance and negotiators for the Trans-Pacic Partnership. e 
embrace of free trade agreements in Colombia and Peru has resulted in remarkably 
open economies, although many critics of neoliberalism question how much this 
benets these countries and their respective populations. Ecuador, by contrast, claims 
to have moved away from neoliberalism and actually shuns FTAs, but critics of the 
current government, including former allies such as ex-ministers Alberto Acosta 
(Energy and Mining) and Fausto Ortiz (Finance), question if this is more rhetorical 
than factual due to such constraints as its historical reliance on foreign capital, 
highlighting the recent dependence on Chinese loans due to the willingness to break 
with traditional lenders such as the IMF and World Bank, by defaulting on its 
sovereign debt. Regardless of economic policy preferences, we suggest that China’s 
trade, aid and investment in these countries has given them greater room to manoeuvre 
in the management of their respective political economies. 
An analysis of case studies within the Andean sub-region of South America allows us to 
gain insights into three dynamic economic cases, all rich in natural resources but with 
distinct development strategies. It further allows for a view of dierent sectors within 
those countries where China is having a profound eect: mining in Peru, petroleum 
and electricity generation in Ecuador, and various commodities in Colombia, as well as 
a signicant manufacturing sector. Finally, by looking at these dierent sectors in LAC, 
we can disaggregate China and understand the considerations of actors from various 
companies that sometimes even compete with one another (González-Vicente, 2013; 
Fornés & Butt Philip, 2012). 
CHINA’S EXPECTATIONS IN THE ANDEAN REGION.
China has looked to LAC from much the same perspective it has engaged with 
Southeast Asia and Africa: as oering a wealth of opportunities for the world’s 
fastest-rising economic power and help for some chronically underdeveloped nations 
in these regions. e Andean sub-region holds rich deposits of oil, gas and minerals, 
but its geographical location renders it a logical gateway for Chinese products into the 
region, as well as regional exports back to China and the Asia Pacic region. 
Reciprocally, political leaders and economic actors in the Andean sub-region have been 
eager for their countries to play this role, most notably Chile and, more recently, Peru 
(Narins, 2012; Myers, 2012; Chen, 2011).
It is in this region where China rst sought a major investment in an iron mine in the 
early 1990s. e PRC’s relations with Peru have been strong ever since the Andean 
nation became the second country in South America after Chile to recognize the PRC 
in November 1971, shortly after the PRC gained its seat at the United Nations in 
US$155 million, less than 1% of inward FDI. e total given by the Chinese Embassy 
in Bogota stands at US$2.3 billion. Our research suggests Chinese capital interests in 
Colombia being over US$ 3 billion. is reects those assets acquired by Chinese 
SOEs in the hydrocarbon sector, which were previously owned by other transnational 
corporations, and reinvestments by Chinese companies with strong sales growth in the country.
Ecuador did not receive much investment from China until around 2009 and has since 
then been receiving ows that largely go to hydroelectric projects, the oil sector and 
copper mines. Most recently, initial nance agreements were reached with the 
Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) for a 30 percent share in the Pacic 
Renery at Manta, which will reportedly satisfy Ecuador’s petroleum needs and allow 
for oil exports to China and Asia (La Renería del Pacíco, 2013).
CHINA’S IMPACT ON DEVELOPMENT IN THE ANDEAN REGION.
Having signed FTAs with the United States, neither Peru nor Colombia is willing or 
able to turn away from Washington along the lines of a more combative Ecuador, 
although all three countries are clearly seeking to diversify their economic and 
diplomatic relations. China is a natural partner, due to the structural complementarity 
of factor endowments between China and all three countries. e question remains, 
however, as to the ability of these countries and the civil societies of which they are 
comprised, to work compatibly with Chinese companies and other PRC representatives 
on the ground in the context of ongoing investments and development projects.
For China to eectively carry out its stated aims in the Andean region, it will have to 
learn how to better broker with the increasingly organized and cohesive grassroots 
networks that have sprung to life around the complex extraction and related 
infrastructure projects that China is promoting. One important example of this is the 
movement to preserve not only indigenous groups but the extraordinarily biodiverse 
forests they have called home for millennia, including the Ecuadorian group Yasunidos 
and the Shuar people in the south of the country mobilizing against Chinese-led 
mining projects. It must also realistically assess the risks and navigate the regulatory 
frameworks now evolving within those governments. Economic considerations weigh 
heavily in government decisions, even when such decisions imply betrayals of trust and 
ideals that helped garner electoral support for national politicians. While citizen 
concerns may not be their top priority, Chinese rms must learn to balance their 
commercial and strategic interests with responsibilities and social realities rarely 
experienced at home. e question remains as to whether Chinese rms can carry o 
complex negotiations and societal intermediation as they seek to deepen their presence 
in the Andean region. An optimistic vision could even see China playing a positive role 
in reshaping the nature of these extractive realities and what they mean for the local 
communities aected by this behaviour. 
Still, the weak record of foreign extractive rms in Peru has been linked to the 
government’s own lax approach to regulation, as exemplied by the dual role of the 
Ministry of Energy and Mines (MINEM) as a promoter of mining and enforcer of 
environmental regulations. Sanborn notes that fears about the behaviour of Chinese 
rms are often generated by their multinational competitors and a media eager to 
sensationalize what a rising China means and that diligent oversight is necessary to 
smoothen the process (Sanborn & Torres, 2009, 351). As an interview with the 
Coordinator for Corporate Aairs for Chinalco in Lima, Peru revealed, Chinese rms 
regularly claim to be moving toward socially responsible action. ere appears to be a 
learning curve, as this company’s Toromocho copper mine project has beneted from 
the negative lessons of the Shougang iron mine, hiring Western executives to deal with 
the concerns of the surrounding communities (Irwin & Gallagher, 2013, 227). 
e learning curve required of Chinese enterprises is still quite steep, however. 
Although many manufacturing and trading rms in Colombia rely on imports from 
China, the perception persists that Chinese industry, along with the political and social 
structures it represents, constitutes a threat to the status quo. is perception has led to 
anti-Chinese demonstrations reminiscent of those in small towns in Mexico, though 
less violently articulated (Hearn, 2012). While some joint ventures have succeeded in 
adapting to local conditions and maintaining a low prole, the new Chinese owners 
(Sinochem) of Emerald Industries in Colombia succeeded in quickly oending the 
local population, leading to poor press and popular resentment. 
In Ecuador, the government is increasingly interested in challenging the role of 
multinationals, using enhanced centralization and oversight to benet as many civic 
groups as possible. Despite these eorts, there are battles brewing over oil and mineral 
concessions around the country and the perception among opposition groups and 
international observers is that Ecuador is merely replacing its dependency on Western 
multinationals and primary commodities with Chinese rms. ere may be some truth 
to these allegations, but in our interviews with activists, government ocials, and 
international critics of the Correa administration, we have found that the specic 
dangers presented by Chinese companies are often exaggerated and there is a similar 
pattern of sensationalism at work as that highlighted by Sanborn in Peru (2009). 
Moreover, the build-up in foreign exchange reserves and primary budget surpluses that 
have emerged as a result has allowed these countries to launch social programs and 
poverty reduction initiatives. ere is, in other words, something in this for everyone, 
including China, although it is incumbent on all stakeholders in this new evolving 
China-LAC scenario to carry their weight and act accordingly. 
CONCLUSION.
is paper illustrates ways in which China’s engagement with the countries of the 
Andean region coincides with that of the larger LAC emerging economies, and how it 
diers. e nature of China’s evolving ties with the three Andean countries discussed 
here ts with the general South American themes of economic complementarities in 
factor endowments and China’s voracious appetite for natural resources to spur its high 
growth model. e dierences lie mainly in the composition of state-society relations 
in the Andean region where civic groups, social movements, and indigenous 
communities have all been recognized as formidable actors on the national political 
stage. is aspect of China-Andean relations is less pronounced in larger more 
industrialized Latin American countries like Argentina, Brazil and Mexico. e 
Andean angle thus adds a new twist to China’s heightened interest in extracting 
primary commodities from the LAC region. 
In short, Chinese investors and ocials, who have not had their feet held closely to the 
re on their own authoritarian home turf, are now being contested. Interestingly, some 
Chinese companies operating in these countries have adopted the Western practice of 
donating to local governments for schools or hospitals, but this contribution to local 
social capital has not earned them much credit (Parish Flannery, 2013). Some scholars 
have argued that Chinese rms may be at a disadvantage precisely because of their lack 
of experience with societal intermediation on the home front, while others argue that 
this is changing (Alden & Hughes, 2009). If we take China’s 2008 Policy Paper at its 
word, the PRC leadership maintains that it will ensure the livelihood of people in 
partnering countries by “complying with local laws and regulations, and adhering to 
fair, transparent public works project contracts, making a commitment to and fullling 
the necessary social responsibility to protect the legitimate rights and interests of local 
employees, paying attention to environmental resource protection, caring for and 
supporting the local community.”
It remains to be seen whether the lofty goals of a new internationalism embedded in 
recent Chinese history can genuinely be achieved given the strength and scale of the 
Chinese economy with its inherent asymmetry and the power of market demands. 
However, such pronouncements should not be overlooked or discarded, as China’s 
dependence on massive primary commodity imports from LAC promises to become a 
permanent feature of China-LAC relations for years to come.  China has every 
incentive to make the relationship work, even if it must do considerably more to bring 
it up to true international standards. 
Certain unsavoury realities persist about the nature of resource extraction and the 
problems it invariably creates. e leadership required to navigate a nation’s way 
through the price uctuations, abundance, corruption, environmental problems, 
indigenous rights, resistance from civil society and diculty involved in institution 
building may lie beyond the realm of possibilities of any one country. It does appear, 
however, that the purported principles of China’s aid, trade, and investment with the 
developing world are sincere and oer an opportunity to the leaders of 
twenty-rst-century South America to set in motion processes and structures that can 
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governance, and education and social services are minor in comparison. Loans from 
China are negligible. 
Ecuador’s credit line received a much needed boost from China after it defaulted on 
$3.2 billion of foreign debt in 2008 following a government audit that found domestic 
laws had been violated, in addition to US Securities and Exchange Commission 
regulations and general principles of international law (Watkins & Anders, 2008). is 
came amidst a rejection of neoliberal policies and a reduced role in the drug 
interdiction scheme, which was the basis for US development assistance and 
preferential treatment in trade agreements. A signicant feature of Chinese loans to 
Ecuador is that they are based on oil (loans-for-oil), with China purchasing the oil on 
the spot market rather than locking in advantageous prices (Gallagher, Irwin & 
Koleski, 2012). 
CHINA’S INVESTMENTS IN THE ANDEAN SUB-REGION.
When it comes to investment, the data is, again, problematic, mainly due to the fact 
that China does not publish this information. For our purposes, investment will 
qualify regardless of being private (FDI) or public. China typically distributes its 
investment through various SOEs, which causes confusion and may be considered 
awkward for various reasons (Dussel Peters, 2012), although it looks and behaves like 
typical investment coming from private foreign rms. As mentioned earlier, there is the 
problem of a conceptual overlap between Chinese lending and investing. 
Peru had been a major destination for Chinese investment, but that trend slowed down 
after 2010. Chinese investments in Peru have primarily gone toward copper and steel 
concessions; overall, Chinese investment stock in Peru was US$796.48 million in 
2012, a 3.5 percent share of total FDI stock in the country. Mining is also the leading 
recipient of FDI in Peru, accounting for nearly 24 percent of capital stock at the end of 
2012 (ProInversion, 2014).
Colombia’s FDI from China is only a fraction of a percent of investment coming into 
the region; here, too, the published gures diverge. According to the Banco de la 
República, the accumulated gure for Chinese investment between 2000 and 2012 was 
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state-owned rms in priority sectors in China as not being so dissimilar from the 
United States: while clearly governed by dierent concerns, “national interests” were 
also cited by the US Congress in 2005 in its decision to prevent the takeover of Unocal 
by CNOOC.
CHINA’S TRADE WITH THE SUB-REGION.
Overall, trade with China has become especially important for the region as a whole 
and for the Andean sub-region in particular. While Peru, Ecuador and Colombia are 
all still dependent on the US market, China does seek to oer something of an 
alternative. As the second largest importer of fuel and minerals, China is increasing its 
presence in the Andean region. Peru leads the way with China as its most important 
partner of the three in bilateral trade (with aggregate gures doubling since the two 
governments signed a free trade agreement in 2009). Colombia has a more diverse 
industry with a strong manufacturing base, and heavily depends on the US market, 
with China accounting for only 3.6 percent of exports. When it comes to trade, 
Ecuador is not a priority for China in terms of volume, yet China sees considerable 
potential here and has taken an active role in the country when it comes to investment 
and loans for oil. 
Overall, China’s gains in imports between 2000 and 2009 have occurred while the US 
has either declined in signicance (Peru and Colombia) or remained static (Ecuador). 
Ecuador has increasingly relied on intra-regional destinations for its goods, while 
China and the United States have become slightly less important as export markets. 
Over the same period, Colombia has sent moderately more of its exports to the Asia 
Pacic, China and the EU, while seeing a slight decline in its exports to LAC and a 
move toward decreasing its dependency on the US market. 
CHINESE AID TO THE SUB-REGION.
Chinese aid to LAC has also been a subject of great speculation, although the 
withholding of some information and a view of aid and investment that diverges 
signicantly from traditional Western methodology is partly to blame for the 
discrepancies. For our purposes, we dene aid as any assistance coming from China 
that may be classied as concessional loans or otherwise designed to improve 
infrastructure or assist in the delivery of basic services to recipient countries. As 
mentioned earlier, it is not entirely clear how much China gives and where it invests 
(Stallings, 2013; Dussel Peters, 2012). e idea that cooperation is a key element of its 
relationship with other developing countries is steeped in a tradition that has been 
briey touched upon above. To dismiss the rhetoric and conceptions put across by 
Chinese development actors and commentators is disingenuous and rearms common 
misconceptions, as Varrall elaborates on in her work on Chinese development experts 
(2013). 
By reminding ourselves of these Chinese perspectives, we can see how Ocial 
Development Assistance (ODA) as dened by the OECD, does not allow for some 
types of “cooperation” between China and LAC to be understood as ODA. As Stallings 
(2013) points out, much of the ows that arrive in LAC and certainly those funds that 
reach Ecuador and Peru are not so easily dened. Bräutigam (2011) has questioned the 
accuracy of the China Development Bank’s label as a development bank, yet it appears 
that the Chinese government has maintained this label and the bank’s terms for loans 
to developing countries even in the face of criticism. We must rely on the data available 
with the understanding that it overlaps frequently and inconveniently. 
In terms of loans, Peru maintains a fairly even spread from the IDB, World Bank, 
China and the US. Peru has received signicant amounts of ODA from the United 
States in recent years. Chinese loans are a relatively new source of nance and, at 
roughly 22 percent, make up more than double the ODA coming from the US and 
closing in on the larger amounts from the IDB and World Bank, which account for 
roughly a third of the total from major sources of lending. 
Colombia has borrowed mainly from the World Bank and the IDB, while loans 
coming in from the US are less signicant and follow the pattern across the region. In 
other words, they are based on peace and security,3 while democracy, human rights, and 
October 1971. e Hierro Peru mine was purchased by China’s state-owned Shougang 
Company in 1992. Ecuador’s ties with China stand out for the loans-for-oil and other 
lending that ranks it among China’s biggest borrowers within Latin America. Beyond 
trade, Colombia’s relationship with China has been less pronounced (Creutzfeldt, 
2012; Ellis, 2014), although both sides are exploring the negotiation of a bilateral free 
trade agreement.
Peru’s Shougang deal reected a desire to diversify primary exporting partners. While 
Peru has apparently sought diversication in Chinese investments, away from primary 
commodities and into more higher-value production, a review of Chinese investments 
there today falls short of its expectations. Today, the Ecuadorian loans indicate that 
China is willing to be innovative in acquiring resources. ese loans are part of a 
symbiotic bilateral strategy to advance mining, crude extraction, renement and 
delivery and a general upgrade of infrastructure in the small, but remarkably endowed 
country, while allowing for an ambitious public spending scheme. It is worth noting 
that this relationship is dominated by large-scale projects and loans, and that there is a 
certain peculiarity due to the Ecuadorian government’s close involvement in these 
projects accompanied by a crowding out of investors from other countries. 
It has become a commonplace desire throughout the region to attract more investment 
and diversity in Chinese ventures, while China has indicated it will be looking to invest 
signicant sums in the short and medium term. One study estimates that China’s FDI 
outows could reach as high as US$1-2 trillion by 2020 (Rosen & Hanemann, 2012), 
and Latin America should be well positioned to capture a healthy portion of those 
funds. Optimism is tempered by those cautioning against the resource curse, or Dutch 
Disease, but it is unclear what could be done to eectively circumvent the economic 
and geographic realities that lead developing countries down this path. 
Another looming question is, to what extent are Chinese corporate activities, in fact, 
an extension of Beijing’s foreign policy strategy? China’s energy security is a national 
priority and its huge foreign currency reserves, coupled with state ownership of the 
energy and infrastructure rms, make a strong case for a national agenda. However, it 
may be more useful to consider the interdependence of national interests and 
role are evident as illustrated in the examples provided by Economy and Levi in their 
recent analysis of China’s resource quest, indicates that cooperation is preferred (in line 
with the behaviour of a rational state actor) and that new methods of forestalling 
conict are necessary and therefore likely. 
e implications are that the language and the goals laid out in ocial Chinese 
speeches and policy papers are not mere rhetoric, but rmly held and internalized (see 
for instance Song, 2012). Eective analysis of these attitudes should come in part from 
case studies that examine what Chinese cooperation means on the ground in countries 
where it is heavily investing. is is not to say that these approaches are always 
preferred to Western modalities or that there are not contingent and external factors 
that will undermine such intentions, but it does mean that the worldview of Chinese 
actors tasked with engaging developing countries can generate misinterpretation and 
confusion, with the overlapping of aid and investment statistics being just one example 
of this problem. Another critical issue that may arise is the reliance on leadership from 
partners abroad whose policies may appear complementary to the PRC’s vision but 
may be unpopular or problematic from other vantage points.  
at said, by empirically tracking China’s participation in the Andean region we can 
gain greater insights. While the values laid out in the Policy Paper are important to 
consider from the Chinese perspective and approach, what of the Andean experience 
and perspectives? 
We focus on these three Andean countries because they share similar endowment 
factors and have close trade and investment ties with the United States, as well as 
rapidly growing ties with China. At the same time, the cases diverge in terms of 
economic policy choice, with Peru and Colombia both pro-market countries that are 
members of the Pacic Alliance and negotiators for the Trans-Pacic Partnership. e 
embrace of free trade agreements in Colombia and Peru has resulted in remarkably 
open economies, although many critics of neoliberalism question how much this 
benets these countries and their respective populations. Ecuador, by contrast, claims 
to have moved away from neoliberalism and actually shuns FTAs, but critics of the 
current government, including former allies such as ex-ministers Alberto Acosta 
(Energy and Mining) and Fausto Ortiz (Finance), question if this is more rhetorical 
than factual due to such constraints as its historical reliance on foreign capital, 
highlighting the recent dependence on Chinese loans due to the willingness to break 
with traditional lenders such as the IMF and World Bank, by defaulting on its 
sovereign debt. Regardless of economic policy preferences, we suggest that China’s 
trade, aid and investment in these countries has given them greater room to manoeuvre 
in the management of their respective political economies. 
An analysis of case studies within the Andean sub-region of South America allows us to 
gain insights into three dynamic economic cases, all rich in natural resources but with 
distinct development strategies. It further allows for a view of dierent sectors within 
those countries where China is having a profound eect: mining in Peru, petroleum 
and electricity generation in Ecuador, and various commodities in Colombia, as well as 
a signicant manufacturing sector. Finally, by looking at these dierent sectors in LAC, 
we can disaggregate China and understand the considerations of actors from various 
companies that sometimes even compete with one another (González-Vicente, 2013; 
Fornés & Butt Philip, 2012). 
CHINA’S EXPECTATIONS IN THE ANDEAN REGION.
China has looked to LAC from much the same perspective it has engaged with 
Southeast Asia and Africa: as oering a wealth of opportunities for the world’s 
fastest-rising economic power and help for some chronically underdeveloped nations 
in these regions. e Andean sub-region holds rich deposits of oil, gas and minerals, 
but its geographical location renders it a logical gateway for Chinese products into the 
region, as well as regional exports back to China and the Asia Pacic region. 
Reciprocally, political leaders and economic actors in the Andean sub-region have been 
eager for their countries to play this role, most notably Chile and, more recently, Peru 
(Narins, 2012; Myers, 2012; Chen, 2011).
It is in this region where China rst sought a major investment in an iron mine in the 
early 1990s. e PRC’s relations with Peru have been strong ever since the Andean 
nation became the second country in South America after Chile to recognize the PRC 
in November 1971, shortly after the PRC gained its seat at the United Nations in 
US$155 million, less than 1% of inward FDI. e total given by the Chinese Embassy 
in Bogota stands at US$2.3 billion. Our research suggests Chinese capital interests in 
Colombia being over US$ 3 billion. is reects those assets acquired by Chinese 
SOEs in the hydrocarbon sector, which were previously owned by other transnational 
corporations, and reinvestments by Chinese companies with strong sales growth in the country.
Ecuador did not receive much investment from China until around 2009 and has since 
then been receiving ows that largely go to hydroelectric projects, the oil sector and 
copper mines. Most recently, initial nance agreements were reached with the 
Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) for a 30 percent share in the Pacic 
Renery at Manta, which will reportedly satisfy Ecuador’s petroleum needs and allow 
for oil exports to China and Asia (La Renería del Pacíco, 2013).
CHINA’S IMPACT ON DEVELOPMENT IN THE ANDEAN REGION.
Having signed FTAs with the United States, neither Peru nor Colombia is willing or 
able to turn away from Washington along the lines of a more combative Ecuador, 
although all three countries are clearly seeking to diversify their economic and 
diplomatic relations. China is a natural partner, due to the structural complementarity 
of factor endowments between China and all three countries. e question remains, 
however, as to the ability of these countries and the civil societies of which they are 
comprised, to work compatibly with Chinese companies and other PRC representatives 
on the ground in the context of ongoing investments and development projects.
For China to eectively carry out its stated aims in the Andean region, it will have to 
learn how to better broker with the increasingly organized and cohesive grassroots 
networks that have sprung to life around the complex extraction and related 
infrastructure projects that China is promoting. One important example of this is the 
movement to preserve not only indigenous groups but the extraordinarily biodiverse 
forests they have called home for millennia, including the Ecuadorian group Yasunidos 
and the Shuar people in the south of the country mobilizing against Chinese-led 
mining projects. It must also realistically assess the risks and navigate the regulatory 
frameworks now evolving within those governments. Economic considerations weigh 
heavily in government decisions, even when such decisions imply betrayals of trust and 
ideals that helped garner electoral support for national politicians. While citizen 
concerns may not be their top priority, Chinese rms must learn to balance their 
commercial and strategic interests with responsibilities and social realities rarely 
experienced at home. e question remains as to whether Chinese rms can carry o 
complex negotiations and societal intermediation as they seek to deepen their presence 
in the Andean region. An optimistic vision could even see China playing a positive role 
in reshaping the nature of these extractive realities and what they mean for the local 
communities aected by this behaviour. 
Still, the weak record of foreign extractive rms in Peru has been linked to the 
government’s own lax approach to regulation, as exemplied by the dual role of the 
Ministry of Energy and Mines (MINEM) as a promoter of mining and enforcer of 
environmental regulations. Sanborn notes that fears about the behaviour of Chinese 
rms are often generated by their multinational competitors and a media eager to 
sensationalize what a rising China means and that diligent oversight is necessary to 
smoothen the process (Sanborn & Torres, 2009, 351). As an interview with the 
Coordinator for Corporate Aairs for Chinalco in Lima, Peru revealed, Chinese rms 
regularly claim to be moving toward socially responsible action. ere appears to be a 
learning curve, as this company’s Toromocho copper mine project has beneted from 
the negative lessons of the Shougang iron mine, hiring Western executives to deal with 
the concerns of the surrounding communities (Irwin & Gallagher, 2013, 227). 
e learning curve required of Chinese enterprises is still quite steep, however. 
Although many manufacturing and trading rms in Colombia rely on imports from 
China, the perception persists that Chinese industry, along with the political and social 
structures it represents, constitutes a threat to the status quo. is perception has led to 
anti-Chinese demonstrations reminiscent of those in small towns in Mexico, though 
less violently articulated (Hearn, 2012). While some joint ventures have succeeded in 
adapting to local conditions and maintaining a low prole, the new Chinese owners 
(Sinochem) of Emerald Industries in Colombia succeeded in quickly oending the 
local population, leading to poor press and popular resentment. 
In Ecuador, the government is increasingly interested in challenging the role of 
multinationals, using enhanced centralization and oversight to benet as many civic 
groups as possible. Despite these eorts, there are battles brewing over oil and mineral 
concessions around the country and the perception among opposition groups and 
international observers is that Ecuador is merely replacing its dependency on Western 
multinationals and primary commodities with Chinese rms. ere may be some truth 
to these allegations, but in our interviews with activists, government ocials, and 
international critics of the Correa administration, we have found that the specic 
dangers presented by Chinese companies are often exaggerated and there is a similar 
pattern of sensationalism at work as that highlighted by Sanborn in Peru (2009). 
Moreover, the build-up in foreign exchange reserves and primary budget surpluses that 
have emerged as a result has allowed these countries to launch social programs and 
poverty reduction initiatives. ere is, in other words, something in this for everyone, 
including China, although it is incumbent on all stakeholders in this new evolving 
China-LAC scenario to carry their weight and act accordingly. 
CONCLUSION.
is paper illustrates ways in which China’s engagement with the countries of the 
Andean region coincides with that of the larger LAC emerging economies, and how it 
diers. e nature of China’s evolving ties with the three Andean countries discussed 
here ts with the general South American themes of economic complementarities in 
factor endowments and China’s voracious appetite for natural resources to spur its high 
growth model. e dierences lie mainly in the composition of state-society relations 
in the Andean region where civic groups, social movements, and indigenous 
communities have all been recognized as formidable actors on the national political 
stage. is aspect of China-Andean relations is less pronounced in larger more 
industrialized Latin American countries like Argentina, Brazil and Mexico. e 
Andean angle thus adds a new twist to China’s heightened interest in extracting 
primary commodities from the LAC region. 
In short, Chinese investors and ocials, who have not had their feet held closely to the 
re on their own authoritarian home turf, are now being contested. Interestingly, some 
Chinese companies operating in these countries have adopted the Western practice of 
donating to local governments for schools or hospitals, but this contribution to local 
social capital has not earned them much credit (Parish Flannery, 2013). Some scholars 
have argued that Chinese rms may be at a disadvantage precisely because of their lack 
of experience with societal intermediation on the home front, while others argue that 
this is changing (Alden & Hughes, 2009). If we take China’s 2008 Policy Paper at its 
word, the PRC leadership maintains that it will ensure the livelihood of people in 
partnering countries by “complying with local laws and regulations, and adhering to 
fair, transparent public works project contracts, making a commitment to and fullling 
the necessary social responsibility to protect the legitimate rights and interests of local 
employees, paying attention to environmental resource protection, caring for and 
supporting the local community.”
It remains to be seen whether the lofty goals of a new internationalism embedded in 
recent Chinese history can genuinely be achieved given the strength and scale of the 
Chinese economy with its inherent asymmetry and the power of market demands. 
However, such pronouncements should not be overlooked or discarded, as China’s 
dependence on massive primary commodity imports from LAC promises to become a 
permanent feature of China-LAC relations for years to come.  China has every 
incentive to make the relationship work, even if it must do considerably more to bring 
it up to true international standards. 
Certain unsavoury realities persist about the nature of resource extraction and the 
problems it invariably creates. e leadership required to navigate a nation’s way 
through the price uctuations, abundance, corruption, environmental problems, 
indigenous rights, resistance from civil society and diculty involved in institution 
building may lie beyond the realm of possibilities of any one country. It does appear, 
however, that the purported principles of China’s aid, trade, and investment with the 
developing world are sincere and oer an opportunity to the leaders of 
twenty-rst-century South America to set in motion processes and structures that can 
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governance, and education and social services are minor in comparison. Loans from 
China are negligible. 
Ecuador’s credit line received a much needed boost from China after it defaulted on 
$3.2 billion of foreign debt in 2008 following a government audit that found domestic 
laws had been violated, in addition to US Securities and Exchange Commission 
regulations and general principles of international law (Watkins & Anders, 2008). is 
came amidst a rejection of neoliberal policies and a reduced role in the drug 
interdiction scheme, which was the basis for US development assistance and 
preferential treatment in trade agreements. A signicant feature of Chinese loans to 
Ecuador is that they are based on oil (loans-for-oil), with China purchasing the oil on 
the spot market rather than locking in advantageous prices (Gallagher, Irwin & 
Koleski, 2012). 
CHINA’S INVESTMENTS IN THE ANDEAN SUB-REGION.
When it comes to investment, the data is, again, problematic, mainly due to the fact 
that China does not publish this information. For our purposes, investment will 
qualify regardless of being private (FDI) or public. China typically distributes its 
investment through various SOEs, which causes confusion and may be considered 
awkward for various reasons (Dussel Peters, 2012), although it looks and behaves like 
typical investment coming from private foreign rms. As mentioned earlier, there is the 
problem of a conceptual overlap between Chinese lending and investing. 
Peru had been a major destination for Chinese investment, but that trend slowed down 
after 2010. Chinese investments in Peru have primarily gone toward copper and steel 
concessions; overall, Chinese investment stock in Peru was US$796.48 million in 
2012, a 3.5 percent share of total FDI stock in the country. Mining is also the leading 
recipient of FDI in Peru, accounting for nearly 24 percent of capital stock at the end of 
2012 (ProInversion, 2014).
Colombia’s FDI from China is only a fraction of a percent of investment coming into 
the region; here, too, the published gures diverge. According to the Banco de la 
República, the accumulated gure for Chinese investment between 2000 and 2012 was 
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state-owned rms in priority sectors in China as not being so dissimilar from the 
United States: while clearly governed by dierent concerns, “national interests” were 
also cited by the US Congress in 2005 in its decision to prevent the takeover of Unocal 
by CNOOC.
CHINA’S TRADE WITH THE SUB-REGION.
Overall, trade with China has become especially important for the region as a whole 
and for the Andean sub-region in particular. While Peru, Ecuador and Colombia are 
all still dependent on the US market, China does seek to oer something of an 
alternative. As the second largest importer of fuel and minerals, China is increasing its 
presence in the Andean region. Peru leads the way with China as its most important 
partner of the three in bilateral trade (with aggregate gures doubling since the two 
governments signed a free trade agreement in 2009). Colombia has a more diverse 
industry with a strong manufacturing base, and heavily depends on the US market, 
with China accounting for only 3.6 percent of exports. When it comes to trade, 
Ecuador is not a priority for China in terms of volume, yet China sees considerable 
potential here and has taken an active role in the country when it comes to investment 
and loans for oil. 
Overall, China’s gains in imports between 2000 and 2009 have occurred while the US 
has either declined in signicance (Peru and Colombia) or remained static (Ecuador). 
Ecuador has increasingly relied on intra-regional destinations for its goods, while 
China and the United States have become slightly less important as export markets. 
Over the same period, Colombia has sent moderately more of its exports to the Asia 
Pacic, China and the EU, while seeing a slight decline in its exports to LAC and a 
move toward decreasing its dependency on the US market. 
CHINESE AID TO THE SUB-REGION.
Chinese aid to LAC has also been a subject of great speculation, although the 
withholding of some information and a view of aid and investment that diverges 
signicantly from traditional Western methodology is partly to blame for the 
discrepancies. For our purposes, we dene aid as any assistance coming from China 
that may be classied as concessional loans or otherwise designed to improve 
infrastructure or assist in the delivery of basic services to recipient countries. As 
mentioned earlier, it is not entirely clear how much China gives and where it invests 
(Stallings, 2013; Dussel Peters, 2012). e idea that cooperation is a key element of its 
relationship with other developing countries is steeped in a tradition that has been 
briey touched upon above. To dismiss the rhetoric and conceptions put across by 
Chinese development actors and commentators is disingenuous and rearms common 
misconceptions, as Varrall elaborates on in her work on Chinese development experts 
(2013). 
By reminding ourselves of these Chinese perspectives, we can see how Ocial 
Development Assistance (ODA) as dened by the OECD, does not allow for some 
types of “cooperation” between China and LAC to be understood as ODA. As Stallings 
(2013) points out, much of the ows that arrive in LAC and certainly those funds that 
reach Ecuador and Peru are not so easily dened. Bräutigam (2011) has questioned the 
accuracy of the China Development Bank’s label as a development bank, yet it appears 
that the Chinese government has maintained this label and the bank’s terms for loans 
to developing countries even in the face of criticism. We must rely on the data available 
with the understanding that it overlaps frequently and inconveniently. 
In terms of loans, Peru maintains a fairly even spread from the IDB, World Bank, 
China and the US. Peru has received signicant amounts of ODA from the United 
States in recent years. Chinese loans are a relatively new source of nance and, at 
roughly 22 percent, make up more than double the ODA coming from the US and 
closing in on the larger amounts from the IDB and World Bank, which account for 
roughly a third of the total from major sources of lending. 
Colombia has borrowed mainly from the World Bank and the IDB, while loans 
coming in from the US are less signicant and follow the pattern across the region. In 
other words, they are based on peace and security,3 while democracy, human rights, and 
October 1971. e Hierro Peru mine was purchased by China’s state-owned Shougang 
Company in 1992. Ecuador’s ties with China stand out for the loans-for-oil and other 
lending that ranks it among China’s biggest borrowers within Latin America. Beyond 
trade, Colombia’s relationship with China has been less pronounced (Creutzfeldt, 
2012; Ellis, 2014), although both sides are exploring the negotiation of a bilateral free 
trade agreement.
Peru’s Shougang deal reected a desire to diversify primary exporting partners. While 
Peru has apparently sought diversication in Chinese investments, away from primary 
commodities and into more higher-value production, a review of Chinese investments 
there today falls short of its expectations. Today, the Ecuadorian loans indicate that 
China is willing to be innovative in acquiring resources. ese loans are part of a 
symbiotic bilateral strategy to advance mining, crude extraction, renement and 
delivery and a general upgrade of infrastructure in the small, but remarkably endowed 
country, while allowing for an ambitious public spending scheme. It is worth noting 
that this relationship is dominated by large-scale projects and loans, and that there is a 
certain peculiarity due to the Ecuadorian government’s close involvement in these 
projects accompanied by a crowding out of investors from other countries. 
It has become a commonplace desire throughout the region to attract more investment 
and diversity in Chinese ventures, while China has indicated it will be looking to invest 
signicant sums in the short and medium term. One study estimates that China’s FDI 
outows could reach as high as US$1-2 trillion by 2020 (Rosen & Hanemann, 2012), 
and Latin America should be well positioned to capture a healthy portion of those 
funds. Optimism is tempered by those cautioning against the resource curse, or Dutch 
Disease, but it is unclear what could be done to eectively circumvent the economic 
and geographic realities that lead developing countries down this path. 
Another looming question is, to what extent are Chinese corporate activities, in fact, 
an extension of Beijing’s foreign policy strategy? China’s energy security is a national 
priority and its huge foreign currency reserves, coupled with state ownership of the 
energy and infrastructure rms, make a strong case for a national agenda. However, it 
may be more useful to consider the interdependence of national interests and 
role are evident as illustrated in the examples provided by Economy and Levi in their 
recent analysis of China’s resource quest, indicates that cooperation is preferred (in line 
with the behaviour of a rational state actor) and that new methods of forestalling 
conict are necessary and therefore likely. 
e implications are that the language and the goals laid out in ocial Chinese 
speeches and policy papers are not mere rhetoric, but rmly held and internalized (see 
for instance Song, 2012). Eective analysis of these attitudes should come in part from 
case studies that examine what Chinese cooperation means on the ground in countries 
where it is heavily investing. is is not to say that these approaches are always 
preferred to Western modalities or that there are not contingent and external factors 
that will undermine such intentions, but it does mean that the worldview of Chinese 
actors tasked with engaging developing countries can generate misinterpretation and 
confusion, with the overlapping of aid and investment statistics being just one example 
of this problem. Another critical issue that may arise is the reliance on leadership from 
partners abroad whose policies may appear complementary to the PRC’s vision but 
may be unpopular or problematic from other vantage points.  
at said, by empirically tracking China’s participation in the Andean region we can 
gain greater insights. While the values laid out in the Policy Paper are important to 
consider from the Chinese perspective and approach, what of the Andean experience 
and perspectives? 
We focus on these three Andean countries because they share similar endowment 
factors and have close trade and investment ties with the United States, as well as 
rapidly growing ties with China. At the same time, the cases diverge in terms of 
economic policy choice, with Peru and Colombia both pro-market countries that are 
members of the Pacic Alliance and negotiators for the Trans-Pacic Partnership. e 
embrace of free trade agreements in Colombia and Peru has resulted in remarkably 
open economies, although many critics of neoliberalism question how much this 
benets these countries and their respective populations. Ecuador, by contrast, claims 
to have moved away from neoliberalism and actually shuns FTAs, but critics of the 
current government, including former allies such as ex-ministers Alberto Acosta 
(Energy and Mining) and Fausto Ortiz (Finance), question if this is more rhetorical 
than factual due to such constraints as its historical reliance on foreign capital, 
highlighting the recent dependence on Chinese loans due to the willingness to break 
with traditional lenders such as the IMF and World Bank, by defaulting on its 
sovereign debt. Regardless of economic policy preferences, we suggest that China’s 
trade, aid and investment in these countries has given them greater room to manoeuvre 
in the management of their respective political economies. 
An analysis of case studies within the Andean sub-region of South America allows us to 
gain insights into three dynamic economic cases, all rich in natural resources but with 
distinct development strategies. It further allows for a view of dierent sectors within 
those countries where China is having a profound eect: mining in Peru, petroleum 
and electricity generation in Ecuador, and various commodities in Colombia, as well as 
a signicant manufacturing sector. Finally, by looking at these dierent sectors in LAC, 
we can disaggregate China and understand the considerations of actors from various 
companies that sometimes even compete with one another (González-Vicente, 2013; 
Fornés & Butt Philip, 2012). 
CHINA’S EXPECTATIONS IN THE ANDEAN REGION.
China has looked to LAC from much the same perspective it has engaged with 
Southeast Asia and Africa: as oering a wealth of opportunities for the world’s 
fastest-rising economic power and help for some chronically underdeveloped nations 
in these regions. e Andean sub-region holds rich deposits of oil, gas and minerals, 
but its geographical location renders it a logical gateway for Chinese products into the 
region, as well as regional exports back to China and the Asia Pacic region. 
Reciprocally, political leaders and economic actors in the Andean sub-region have been 
eager for their countries to play this role, most notably Chile and, more recently, Peru 
(Narins, 2012; Myers, 2012; Chen, 2011).
It is in this region where China rst sought a major investment in an iron mine in the 
early 1990s. e PRC’s relations with Peru have been strong ever since the Andean 
nation became the second country in South America after Chile to recognize the PRC 
in November 1971, shortly after the PRC gained its seat at the United Nations in 
US$155 million, less than 1% of inward FDI. e total given by the Chinese Embassy 
in Bogota stands at US$2.3 billion. Our research suggests Chinese capital interests in 
Colombia being over US$ 3 billion. is reects those assets acquired by Chinese 
SOEs in the hydrocarbon sector, which were previously owned by other transnational 
corporations, and reinvestments by Chinese companies with strong sales growth in the country.
Ecuador did not receive much investment from China until around 2009 and has since 
then been receiving ows that largely go to hydroelectric projects, the oil sector and 
copper mines. Most recently, initial nance agreements were reached with the 
Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) for a 30 percent share in the Pacic 
Renery at Manta, which will reportedly satisfy Ecuador’s petroleum needs and allow 
for oil exports to China and Asia (La Renería del Pacíco, 2013).
CHINA’S IMPACT ON DEVELOPMENT IN THE ANDEAN REGION.
Having signed FTAs with the United States, neither Peru nor Colombia is willing or 
able to turn away from Washington along the lines of a more combative Ecuador, 
although all three countries are clearly seeking to diversify their economic and 
diplomatic relations. China is a natural partner, due to the structural complementarity 
of factor endowments between China and all three countries. e question remains, 
however, as to the ability of these countries and the civil societies of which they are 
comprised, to work compatibly with Chinese companies and other PRC representatives 
on the ground in the context of ongoing investments and development projects.
For China to eectively carry out its stated aims in the Andean region, it will have to 
learn how to better broker with the increasingly organized and cohesive grassroots 
networks that have sprung to life around the complex extraction and related 
infrastructure projects that China is promoting. One important example of this is the 
movement to preserve not only indigenous groups but the extraordinarily biodiverse 
forests they have called home for millennia, including the Ecuadorian group Yasunidos 
and the Shuar people in the south of the country mobilizing against Chinese-led 
mining projects. It must also realistically assess the risks and navigate the regulatory 
frameworks now evolving within those governments. Economic considerations weigh 
heavily in government decisions, even when such decisions imply betrayals of trust and 
ideals that helped garner electoral support for national politicians. While citizen 
concerns may not be their top priority, Chinese rms must learn to balance their 
commercial and strategic interests with responsibilities and social realities rarely 
experienced at home. e question remains as to whether Chinese rms can carry o 
complex negotiations and societal intermediation as they seek to deepen their presence 
in the Andean region. An optimistic vision could even see China playing a positive role 
in reshaping the nature of these extractive realities and what they mean for the local 
communities aected by this behaviour. 
Still, the weak record of foreign extractive rms in Peru has been linked to the 
government’s own lax approach to regulation, as exemplied by the dual role of the 
Ministry of Energy and Mines (MINEM) as a promoter of mining and enforcer of 
environmental regulations. Sanborn notes that fears about the behaviour of Chinese 
rms are often generated by their multinational competitors and a media eager to 
sensationalize what a rising China means and that diligent oversight is necessary to 
smoothen the process (Sanborn & Torres, 2009, 351). As an interview with the 
Coordinator for Corporate Aairs for Chinalco in Lima, Peru revealed, Chinese rms 
regularly claim to be moving toward socially responsible action. ere appears to be a 
learning curve, as this company’s Toromocho copper mine project has beneted from 
the negative lessons of the Shougang iron mine, hiring Western executives to deal with 
the concerns of the surrounding communities (Irwin & Gallagher, 2013, 227). 
e learning curve required of Chinese enterprises is still quite steep, however. 
Although many manufacturing and trading rms in Colombia rely on imports from 
China, the perception persists that Chinese industry, along with the political and social 
structures it represents, constitutes a threat to the status quo. is perception has led to 
anti-Chinese demonstrations reminiscent of those in small towns in Mexico, though 
less violently articulated (Hearn, 2012). While some joint ventures have succeeded in 
adapting to local conditions and maintaining a low prole, the new Chinese owners 
(Sinochem) of Emerald Industries in Colombia succeeded in quickly oending the 
local population, leading to poor press and popular resentment. 
In Ecuador, the government is increasingly interested in challenging the role of 
multinationals, using enhanced centralization and oversight to benet as many civic 
groups as possible. Despite these eorts, there are battles brewing over oil and mineral 
concessions around the country and the perception among opposition groups and 
international observers is that Ecuador is merely replacing its dependency on Western 
multinationals and primary commodities with Chinese rms. ere may be some truth 
to these allegations, but in our interviews with activists, government ocials, and 
international critics of the Correa administration, we have found that the specic 
dangers presented by Chinese companies are often exaggerated and there is a similar 
pattern of sensationalism at work as that highlighted by Sanborn in Peru (2009). 
Moreover, the build-up in foreign exchange reserves and primary budget surpluses that 
have emerged as a result has allowed these countries to launch social programs and 
poverty reduction initiatives. ere is, in other words, something in this for everyone, 
including China, although it is incumbent on all stakeholders in this new evolving 
China-LAC scenario to carry their weight and act accordingly. 
CONCLUSION.
is paper illustrates ways in which China’s engagement with the countries of the 
Andean region coincides with that of the larger LAC emerging economies, and how it 
diers. e nature of China’s evolving ties with the three Andean countries discussed 
here ts with the general South American themes of economic complementarities in 
factor endowments and China’s voracious appetite for natural resources to spur its high 
growth model. e dierences lie mainly in the composition of state-society relations 
in the Andean region where civic groups, social movements, and indigenous 
communities have all been recognized as formidable actors on the national political 
stage. is aspect of China-Andean relations is less pronounced in larger more 
industrialized Latin American countries like Argentina, Brazil and Mexico. e 
Andean angle thus adds a new twist to China’s heightened interest in extracting 
primary commodities from the LAC region. 
In short, Chinese investors and ocials, who have not had their feet held closely to the 
re on their own authoritarian home turf, are now being contested. Interestingly, some 
Chinese companies operating in these countries have adopted the Western practice of 
donating to local governments for schools or hospitals, but this contribution to local 
social capital has not earned them much credit (Parish Flannery, 2013). Some scholars 
have argued that Chinese rms may be at a disadvantage precisely because of their lack 
of experience with societal intermediation on the home front, while others argue that 
this is changing (Alden & Hughes, 2009). If we take China’s 2008 Policy Paper at its 
word, the PRC leadership maintains that it will ensure the livelihood of people in 
partnering countries by “complying with local laws and regulations, and adhering to 
fair, transparent public works project contracts, making a commitment to and fullling 
the necessary social responsibility to protect the legitimate rights and interests of local 
employees, paying attention to environmental resource protection, caring for and 
supporting the local community.”
It remains to be seen whether the lofty goals of a new internationalism embedded in 
recent Chinese history can genuinely be achieved given the strength and scale of the 
Chinese economy with its inherent asymmetry and the power of market demands. 
However, such pronouncements should not be overlooked or discarded, as China’s 
dependence on massive primary commodity imports from LAC promises to become a 
permanent feature of China-LAC relations for years to come.  China has every 
incentive to make the relationship work, even if it must do considerably more to bring 
it up to true international standards. 
Certain unsavoury realities persist about the nature of resource extraction and the 
problems it invariably creates. e leadership required to navigate a nation’s way 
through the price uctuations, abundance, corruption, environmental problems, 
indigenous rights, resistance from civil society and diculty involved in institution 
building may lie beyond the realm of possibilities of any one country. It does appear, 
however, that the purported principles of China’s aid, trade, and investment with the 
developing world are sincere and oer an opportunity to the leaders of 
twenty-rst-century South America to set in motion processes and structures that can 




Alden, C. & Hughes C.R. 2009. Harmony and Discord in China’s Africa Strategy: Some Implications for Foreign Policy. China 
Quarterly, 199, 563-584.
Anders, S. & Watkins, N. 2008, December 15. Ecuador’s Debt Default. Foreign Policy in Focus. Retrieved from 
www.ips-dc.org/articles/ecuadors_debt_default_exposing_a_gap_in_the_global_ nancial_architecture. 
Bräutigam, D. 2011, January 15. Has China’s Export Financing Met Its Match? China in Africa: e Real Story blog. Retrieved 
from www.chinaafricarealstory.com/2011/01/has-chinas-export-nancing-met-its.html.
Chen, W.H. & Li, X.K. 2011, June 10. Xi Visits ‘Gateway to Latin America’. China Daily. Retrieved from 
http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/epaper/2011-06/10/content_12672857.htm.
China, People’s Republic of. 1964. Eight Principles. Retrieved from 
http://english.gov.cn/ocial/2011-04/21/content_1849913_10.htm.
China, People’s Republic of 1964. Eight Principles. Retrieved from 
http://english.gov.cn/ocial/2011-04/21/content_1849913_10.htm.
Creutzfeldt, B. ed. 2012. China en América Latina: reexiones sobre las relaciones transpacícas. Bogotá: Universidad Externado 
de Colombia. 
Dussel Peters, E. 2012, November. Chinese FDI in Latin America: Does Ownership Matter? Discussion Paper No. 33, Working 
Group on Trade and Environment in the Americas, Tufts University.
Ellis, E. 2014. China on the Ground in Latin America: Challenges for the Chinese and Impacts on the Region. New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan. 
Fornés, G. and Butt Philip, A. 2012. e China-Latin America Axis: Emerging Markets and the Future of Globalisation. New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Gallagher, K.P., Irwin, A. & Koleski, K. 2012, February. e New Banks in Town: Chinese Finance in Latin America. 
Inter-American Dialogue. Retrieved from http://ase.tufts.edu/gdae/Pubs/rp/GallagherChineseFinanceLatinAmericaBrief.pdf.
González-Vicente, R. 2013. Development Dynamics of Chinese Resource-Based Investment in Peru and Ecuador, Latin 
American Politics and Society, 55 (1). 
Hearn, A. 2012. Harnessing the Dragon: Overseas Chinese Entrepreneurs in Mexico and Cuba. In. 
Strauss, J.C. & Armony, A.C., eds. From the Great Wall to the New World. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 111-133.
Irwin, A. & Gallagher, K. 2013. Chinese Mining in Latin America: A Comparative Perspective. e Journal of Environment 
Development, 22, 2, 207-234. 
La Renería del Pacíco estará lista en cuatro años. 2013, July 1. El Telégrafo. Retrieved from 
www.telegrafo.com.ec/economia/item/la-reneria-del-pacico-estara-lista-en-cuatro-anos.html.
Myers, M. 2012, September 21. Chinese Trade and Investment in Latin America: Perspectives from Colombia and Ecuador. 
Inter-American Dialogue. Retrieved from www.thedialogue.org/page.cfm?pageID=32&pubID=3098.
Narins, T.P. 2012. China’s Eye on Ecuador: What Chinese Trade with Ecuador Reveals about China’s Economic Expansion in 
South America. e Global Studies Journal, 4 (2). 
OECD 2007. ODA Casebook on Conict, Peace and Security Activities. Retrieved from 
www.oecd.org/dac/incaf/39967978.pdf. 
Parish Flannery, N. 2013, September 12. How China’s Relations with Peru Explains its Approach to Diplomacy. e Atlantic. 
Retrieved from 
www.theatlantic.com/china/archive/2013/09/how-chinas-relations-with-peru-explain-its-approach-to-diplomacy/279618/.
Pashakhanlou, A. H. 2013. "Back to the Drawing Board: A Critique of Oensive Realism." International Relations 27 
(2):202-225.
Rosen, D.H. and Hanemann, T. 2011. An American Open Door?: Maximizing the Benets of Chinese Foreign Direct 
Investment. Asia Society Special Report. Retrieved from http://asiasociety.org/les/pdf/AnAmericanOpenDoor_FINAL.pdf.
Sanborn, C.A. & Torres, V. 2009. La economía china y las industrias extractivas: desafíos para el Perú. Lima: Centro de 
Investigaciones de la Universidad del Pacíco. 
Song, X.P. 2012. Elementos fundamentales del marco teórico de la política exterior de China. In B. Creutzfeldt, ed. China en 
América Latina: reexiones sobre las relaciones transpacícas. Bogotá: Universidad Externado de Colombia, 87-100.
Stallings, B. 2013, August 5. Chinese Aid to Latin America: Trying to Win Friends and Inuence People. Paper presented at a 
workshop on China-Latin American Relations. University of Southern California, Los Angeles.




Doctoral Candidate, Institute of China Asia Pacic Studies.
National Sun Yat-sen University, Kaohsiung, Taiwan.
ajchimienti@gmail.com
Benjamin Creutzfeldt.
Lecturer in Contemporary China Studies.
CESA School of Business, Bogota, Colombia.
benjamin.cr@cesa.edu.co
governance, and education and social services are minor in comparison. Loans from 
China are negligible. 
Ecuador’s credit line received a much needed boost from China after it defaulted on 
$3.2 billion of foreign debt in 2008 following a government audit that found domestic 
laws had been violated, in addition to US Securities and Exchange Commission 
regulations and general principles of international law (Watkins & Anders, 2008). is 
came amidst a rejection of neoliberal policies and a reduced role in the drug 
interdiction scheme, which was the basis for US development assistance and 
preferential treatment in trade agreements. A signicant feature of Chinese loans to 
Ecuador is that they are based on oil (loans-for-oil), with China purchasing the oil on 
the spot market rather than locking in advantageous prices (Gallagher, Irwin & 
Koleski, 2012). 
CHINA’S INVESTMENTS IN THE ANDEAN SUB-REGION.
When it comes to investment, the data is, again, problematic, mainly due to the fact 
that China does not publish this information. For our purposes, investment will 
qualify regardless of being private (FDI) or public. China typically distributes its 
investment through various SOEs, which causes confusion and may be considered 
awkward for various reasons (Dussel Peters, 2012), although it looks and behaves like 
typical investment coming from private foreign rms. As mentioned earlier, there is the 
problem of a conceptual overlap between Chinese lending and investing. 
Peru had been a major destination for Chinese investment, but that trend slowed down 
after 2010. Chinese investments in Peru have primarily gone toward copper and steel 
concessions; overall, Chinese investment stock in Peru was US$796.48 million in 
2012, a 3.5 percent share of total FDI stock in the country. Mining is also the leading 
recipient of FDI in Peru, accounting for nearly 24 percent of capital stock at the end of 
2012 (ProInversion, 2014).
Colombia’s FDI from China is only a fraction of a percent of investment coming into 
the region; here, too, the published gures diverge. According to the Banco de la 
República, the accumulated gure for Chinese investment between 2000 and 2012 was 
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state-owned rms in priority sectors in China as not being so dissimilar from the 
United States: while clearly governed by dierent concerns, “national interests” were 
also cited by the US Congress in 2005 in its decision to prevent the takeover of Unocal 
by CNOOC.
CHINA’S TRADE WITH THE SUB-REGION.
Overall, trade with China has become especially important for the region as a whole 
and for the Andean sub-region in particular. While Peru, Ecuador and Colombia are 
all still dependent on the US market, China does seek to oer something of an 
alternative. As the second largest importer of fuel and minerals, China is increasing its 
presence in the Andean region. Peru leads the way with China as its most important 
partner of the three in bilateral trade (with aggregate gures doubling since the two 
governments signed a free trade agreement in 2009). Colombia has a more diverse 
industry with a strong manufacturing base, and heavily depends on the US market, 
with China accounting for only 3.6 percent of exports. When it comes to trade, 
Ecuador is not a priority for China in terms of volume, yet China sees considerable 
potential here and has taken an active role in the country when it comes to investment 
and loans for oil. 
Overall, China’s gains in imports between 2000 and 2009 have occurred while the US 
has either declined in signicance (Peru and Colombia) or remained static (Ecuador). 
Ecuador has increasingly relied on intra-regional destinations for its goods, while 
China and the United States have become slightly less important as export markets. 
Over the same period, Colombia has sent moderately more of its exports to the Asia 
Pacic, China and the EU, while seeing a slight decline in its exports to LAC and a 
move toward decreasing its dependency on the US market. 
CHINESE AID TO THE SUB-REGION.
Chinese aid to LAC has also been a subject of great speculation, although the 
withholding of some information and a view of aid and investment that diverges 
signicantly from traditional Western methodology is partly to blame for the 
discrepancies. For our purposes, we dene aid as any assistance coming from China 
that may be classied as concessional loans or otherwise designed to improve 
infrastructure or assist in the delivery of basic services to recipient countries. As 
mentioned earlier, it is not entirely clear how much China gives and where it invests 
(Stallings, 2013; Dussel Peters, 2012). e idea that cooperation is a key element of its 
relationship with other developing countries is steeped in a tradition that has been 
briey touched upon above. To dismiss the rhetoric and conceptions put across by 
Chinese development actors and commentators is disingenuous and rearms common 
misconceptions, as Varrall elaborates on in her work on Chinese development experts 
(2013). 
By reminding ourselves of these Chinese perspectives, we can see how Ocial 
Development Assistance (ODA) as dened by the OECD, does not allow for some 
types of “cooperation” between China and LAC to be understood as ODA. As Stallings 
(2013) points out, much of the ows that arrive in LAC and certainly those funds that 
reach Ecuador and Peru are not so easily dened. Bräutigam (2011) has questioned the 
accuracy of the China Development Bank’s label as a development bank, yet it appears 
that the Chinese government has maintained this label and the bank’s terms for loans 
to developing countries even in the face of criticism. We must rely on the data available 
with the understanding that it overlaps frequently and inconveniently. 
In terms of loans, Peru maintains a fairly even spread from the IDB, World Bank, 
China and the US. Peru has received signicant amounts of ODA from the United 
States in recent years. Chinese loans are a relatively new source of nance and, at 
roughly 22 percent, make up more than double the ODA coming from the US and 
closing in on the larger amounts from the IDB and World Bank, which account for 
roughly a third of the total from major sources of lending. 
Colombia has borrowed mainly from the World Bank and the IDB, while loans 
coming in from the US are less signicant and follow the pattern across the region. In 
other words, they are based on peace and security,3 while democracy, human rights, and 
October 1971. e Hierro Peru mine was purchased by China’s state-owned Shougang 
Company in 1992. Ecuador’s ties with China stand out for the loans-for-oil and other 
lending that ranks it among China’s biggest borrowers within Latin America. Beyond 
trade, Colombia’s relationship with China has been less pronounced (Creutzfeldt, 
2012; Ellis, 2014), although both sides are exploring the negotiation of a bilateral free 
trade agreement.
Peru’s Shougang deal reected a desire to diversify primary exporting partners. While 
Peru has apparently sought diversication in Chinese investments, away from primary 
commodities and into more higher-value production, a review of Chinese investments 
there today falls short of its expectations. Today, the Ecuadorian loans indicate that 
China is willing to be innovative in acquiring resources. ese loans are part of a 
symbiotic bilateral strategy to advance mining, crude extraction, renement and 
delivery and a general upgrade of infrastructure in the small, but remarkably endowed 
country, while allowing for an ambitious public spending scheme. It is worth noting 
that this relationship is dominated by large-scale projects and loans, and that there is a 
certain peculiarity due to the Ecuadorian government’s close involvement in these 
projects accompanied by a crowding out of investors from other countries. 
It has become a commonplace desire throughout the region to attract more investment 
and diversity in Chinese ventures, while China has indicated it will be looking to invest 
signicant sums in the short and medium term. One study estimates that China’s FDI 
outows could reach as high as US$1-2 trillion by 2020 (Rosen & Hanemann, 2012), 
and Latin America should be well positioned to capture a healthy portion of those 
funds. Optimism is tempered by those cautioning against the resource curse, or Dutch 
Disease, but it is unclear what could be done to eectively circumvent the economic 
and geographic realities that lead developing countries down this path. 
Another looming question is, to what extent are Chinese corporate activities, in fact, 
an extension of Beijing’s foreign policy strategy? China’s energy security is a national 
priority and its huge foreign currency reserves, coupled with state ownership of the 
energy and infrastructure rms, make a strong case for a national agenda. However, it 
may be more useful to consider the interdependence of national interests and 
role are evident as illustrated in the examples provided by Economy and Levi in their 
recent analysis of China’s resource quest, indicates that cooperation is preferred (in line 
with the behaviour of a rational state actor) and that new methods of forestalling 
conict are necessary and therefore likely. 
e implications are that the language and the goals laid out in ocial Chinese 
speeches and policy papers are not mere rhetoric, but rmly held and internalized (see 
for instance Song, 2012). Eective analysis of these attitudes should come in part from 
case studies that examine what Chinese cooperation means on the ground in countries 
where it is heavily investing. is is not to say that these approaches are always 
preferred to Western modalities or that there are not contingent and external factors 
that will undermine such intentions, but it does mean that the worldview of Chinese 
actors tasked with engaging developing countries can generate misinterpretation and 
confusion, with the overlapping of aid and investment statistics being just one example 
of this problem. Another critical issue that may arise is the reliance on leadership from 
partners abroad whose policies may appear complementary to the PRC’s vision but 
may be unpopular or problematic from other vantage points.  
at said, by empirically tracking China’s participation in the Andean region we can 
gain greater insights. While the values laid out in the Policy Paper are important to 
consider from the Chinese perspective and approach, what of the Andean experience 
and perspectives? 
We focus on these three Andean countries because they share similar endowment 
factors and have close trade and investment ties with the United States, as well as 
rapidly growing ties with China. At the same time, the cases diverge in terms of 
economic policy choice, with Peru and Colombia both pro-market countries that are 
members of the Pacic Alliance and negotiators for the Trans-Pacic Partnership. e 
embrace of free trade agreements in Colombia and Peru has resulted in remarkably 
open economies, although many critics of neoliberalism question how much this 
benets these countries and their respective populations. Ecuador, by contrast, claims 
to have moved away from neoliberalism and actually shuns FTAs, but critics of the 
current government, including former allies such as ex-ministers Alberto Acosta 
(Energy and Mining) and Fausto Ortiz (Finance), question if this is more rhetorical 
than factual due to such constraints as its historical reliance on foreign capital, 
highlighting the recent dependence on Chinese loans due to the willingness to break 
with traditional lenders such as the IMF and World Bank, by defaulting on its 
sovereign debt. Regardless of economic policy preferences, we suggest that China’s 
trade, aid and investment in these countries has given them greater room to manoeuvre 
in the management of their respective political economies. 
An analysis of case studies within the Andean sub-region of South America allows us to 
gain insights into three dynamic economic cases, all rich in natural resources but with 
distinct development strategies. It further allows for a view of dierent sectors within 
those countries where China is having a profound eect: mining in Peru, petroleum 
and electricity generation in Ecuador, and various commodities in Colombia, as well as 
a signicant manufacturing sector. Finally, by looking at these dierent sectors in LAC, 
we can disaggregate China and understand the considerations of actors from various 
companies that sometimes even compete with one another (González-Vicente, 2013; 
Fornés & Butt Philip, 2012). 
CHINA’S EXPECTATIONS IN THE ANDEAN REGION.
China has looked to LAC from much the same perspective it has engaged with 
Southeast Asia and Africa: as oering a wealth of opportunities for the world’s 
fastest-rising economic power and help for some chronically underdeveloped nations 
in these regions. e Andean sub-region holds rich deposits of oil, gas and minerals, 
but its geographical location renders it a logical gateway for Chinese products into the 
region, as well as regional exports back to China and the Asia Pacic region. 
Reciprocally, political leaders and economic actors in the Andean sub-region have been 
eager for their countries to play this role, most notably Chile and, more recently, Peru 
(Narins, 2012; Myers, 2012; Chen, 2011).
It is in this region where China rst sought a major investment in an iron mine in the 
early 1990s. e PRC’s relations with Peru have been strong ever since the Andean 
nation became the second country in South America after Chile to recognize the PRC 
in November 1971, shortly after the PRC gained its seat at the United Nations in 
US$155 million, less than 1% of inward FDI. e total given by the Chinese Embassy 
in Bogota stands at US$2.3 billion. Our research suggests Chinese capital interests in 
Colombia being over US$ 3 billion. is reects those assets acquired by Chinese 
SOEs in the hydrocarbon sector, which were previously owned by other transnational 
corporations, and reinvestments by Chinese companies with strong sales growth in the country.
Ecuador did not receive much investment from China until around 2009 and has since 
then been receiving ows that largely go to hydroelectric projects, the oil sector and 
copper mines. Most recently, initial nance agreements were reached with the 
Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) for a 30 percent share in the Pacic 
Renery at Manta, which will reportedly satisfy Ecuador’s petroleum needs and allow 
for oil exports to China and Asia (La Renería del Pacíco, 2013).
CHINA’S IMPACT ON DEVELOPMENT IN THE ANDEAN REGION.
Having signed FTAs with the United States, neither Peru nor Colombia is willing or 
able to turn away from Washington along the lines of a more combative Ecuador, 
although all three countries are clearly seeking to diversify their economic and 
diplomatic relations. China is a natural partner, due to the structural complementarity 
of factor endowments between China and all three countries. e question remains, 
however, as to the ability of these countries and the civil societies of which they are 
comprised, to work compatibly with Chinese companies and other PRC representatives 
on the ground in the context of ongoing investments and development projects.
For China to eectively carry out its stated aims in the Andean region, it will have to 
learn how to better broker with the increasingly organized and cohesive grassroots 
networks that have sprung to life around the complex extraction and related 
infrastructure projects that China is promoting. One important example of this is the 
movement to preserve not only indigenous groups but the extraordinarily biodiverse 
forests they have called home for millennia, including the Ecuadorian group Yasunidos 
and the Shuar people in the south of the country mobilizing against Chinese-led 
mining projects. It must also realistically assess the risks and navigate the regulatory 
frameworks now evolving within those governments. Economic considerations weigh 
heavily in government decisions, even when such decisions imply betrayals of trust and 
ideals that helped garner electoral support for national politicians. While citizen 
concerns may not be their top priority, Chinese rms must learn to balance their 
commercial and strategic interests with responsibilities and social realities rarely 
experienced at home. e question remains as to whether Chinese rms can carry o 
complex negotiations and societal intermediation as they seek to deepen their presence 
in the Andean region. An optimistic vision could even see China playing a positive role 
in reshaping the nature of these extractive realities and what they mean for the local 
communities aected by this behaviour. 
Still, the weak record of foreign extractive rms in Peru has been linked to the 
government’s own lax approach to regulation, as exemplied by the dual role of the 
Ministry of Energy and Mines (MINEM) as a promoter of mining and enforcer of 
environmental regulations. Sanborn notes that fears about the behaviour of Chinese 
rms are often generated by their multinational competitors and a media eager to 
sensationalize what a rising China means and that diligent oversight is necessary to 
smoothen the process (Sanborn & Torres, 2009, 351). As an interview with the 
Coordinator for Corporate Aairs for Chinalco in Lima, Peru revealed, Chinese rms 
regularly claim to be moving toward socially responsible action. ere appears to be a 
learning curve, as this company’s Toromocho copper mine project has beneted from 
the negative lessons of the Shougang iron mine, hiring Western executives to deal with 
the concerns of the surrounding communities (Irwin & Gallagher, 2013, 227). 
e learning curve required of Chinese enterprises is still quite steep, however. 
Although many manufacturing and trading rms in Colombia rely on imports from 
China, the perception persists that Chinese industry, along with the political and social 
structures it represents, constitutes a threat to the status quo. is perception has led to 
anti-Chinese demonstrations reminiscent of those in small towns in Mexico, though 
less violently articulated (Hearn, 2012). While some joint ventures have succeeded in 
adapting to local conditions and maintaining a low prole, the new Chinese owners 
(Sinochem) of Emerald Industries in Colombia succeeded in quickly oending the 
local population, leading to poor press and popular resentment. 
In Ecuador, the government is increasingly interested in challenging the role of 
multinationals, using enhanced centralization and oversight to benet as many civic 
groups as possible. Despite these eorts, there are battles brewing over oil and mineral 
concessions around the country and the perception among opposition groups and 
international observers is that Ecuador is merely replacing its dependency on Western 
multinationals and primary commodities with Chinese rms. ere may be some truth 
to these allegations, but in our interviews with activists, government ocials, and 
international critics of the Correa administration, we have found that the specic 
dangers presented by Chinese companies are often exaggerated and there is a similar 
pattern of sensationalism at work as that highlighted by Sanborn in Peru (2009). 
Moreover, the build-up in foreign exchange reserves and primary budget surpluses that 
have emerged as a result has allowed these countries to launch social programs and 
poverty reduction initiatives. ere is, in other words, something in this for everyone, 
including China, although it is incumbent on all stakeholders in this new evolving 
China-LAC scenario to carry their weight and act accordingly. 
CONCLUSION.
is paper illustrates ways in which China’s engagement with the countries of the 
Andean region coincides with that of the larger LAC emerging economies, and how it 
diers. e nature of China’s evolving ties with the three Andean countries discussed 
here ts with the general South American themes of economic complementarities in 
factor endowments and China’s voracious appetite for natural resources to spur its high 
growth model. e dierences lie mainly in the composition of state-society relations 
in the Andean region where civic groups, social movements, and indigenous 
communities have all been recognized as formidable actors on the national political 
stage. is aspect of China-Andean relations is less pronounced in larger more 
industrialized Latin American countries like Argentina, Brazil and Mexico. e 
Andean angle thus adds a new twist to China’s heightened interest in extracting 
primary commodities from the LAC region. 
In short, Chinese investors and ocials, who have not had their feet held closely to the 
re on their own authoritarian home turf, are now being contested. Interestingly, some 
Chinese companies operating in these countries have adopted the Western practice of 
donating to local governments for schools or hospitals, but this contribution to local 
social capital has not earned them much credit (Parish Flannery, 2013). Some scholars 
have argued that Chinese rms may be at a disadvantage precisely because of their lack 
of experience with societal intermediation on the home front, while others argue that 
this is changing (Alden & Hughes, 2009). If we take China’s 2008 Policy Paper at its 
word, the PRC leadership maintains that it will ensure the livelihood of people in 
partnering countries by “complying with local laws and regulations, and adhering to 
fair, transparent public works project contracts, making a commitment to and fullling 
the necessary social responsibility to protect the legitimate rights and interests of local 
employees, paying attention to environmental resource protection, caring for and 
supporting the local community.”
It remains to be seen whether the lofty goals of a new internationalism embedded in 
recent Chinese history can genuinely be achieved given the strength and scale of the 
Chinese economy with its inherent asymmetry and the power of market demands. 
However, such pronouncements should not be overlooked or discarded, as China’s 
dependence on massive primary commodity imports from LAC promises to become a 
permanent feature of China-LAC relations for years to come.  China has every 
incentive to make the relationship work, even if it must do considerably more to bring 
it up to true international standards. 
Certain unsavoury realities persist about the nature of resource extraction and the 
problems it invariably creates. e leadership required to navigate a nation’s way 
through the price uctuations, abundance, corruption, environmental problems, 
indigenous rights, resistance from civil society and diculty involved in institution 
building may lie beyond the realm of possibilities of any one country. It does appear, 
however, that the purported principles of China’s aid, trade, and investment with the 
developing world are sincere and oer an opportunity to the leaders of 
twenty-rst-century South America to set in motion processes and structures that can 
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governance, and education and social services are minor in comparison. Loans from 
China are negligible. 
Ecuador’s credit line received a much needed boost from China after it defaulted on 
$3.2 billion of foreign debt in 2008 following a government audit that found domestic 
laws had been violated, in addition to US Securities and Exchange Commission 
regulations and general principles of international law (Watkins & Anders, 2008). is 
came amidst a rejection of neoliberal policies and a reduced role in the drug 
interdiction scheme, which was the basis for US development assistance and 
preferential treatment in trade agreements. A signicant feature of Chinese loans to 
Ecuador is that they are based on oil (loans-for-oil), with China purchasing the oil on 
the spot market rather than locking in advantageous prices (Gallagher, Irwin & 
Koleski, 2012). 
CHINA’S INVESTMENTS IN THE ANDEAN SUB-REGION.
When it comes to investment, the data is, again, problematic, mainly due to the fact 
that China does not publish this information. For our purposes, investment will 
qualify regardless of being private (FDI) or public. China typically distributes its 
investment through various SOEs, which causes confusion and may be considered 
awkward for various reasons (Dussel Peters, 2012), although it looks and behaves like 
typical investment coming from private foreign rms. As mentioned earlier, there is the 
problem of a conceptual overlap between Chinese lending and investing. 
Peru had been a major destination for Chinese investment, but that trend slowed down 
after 2010. Chinese investments in Peru have primarily gone toward copper and steel 
concessions; overall, Chinese investment stock in Peru was US$796.48 million in 
2012, a 3.5 percent share of total FDI stock in the country. Mining is also the leading 
recipient of FDI in Peru, accounting for nearly 24 percent of capital stock at the end of 
2012 (ProInversion, 2014).
Colombia’s FDI from China is only a fraction of a percent of investment coming into 
the region; here, too, the published gures diverge. According to the Banco de la 
República, the accumulated gure for Chinese investment between 2000 and 2012 was 
3. Although military aid cannot strictly be considered ODA, some peace and security initiatives, such as those related to the 
US-funded Plan Colombia, have sometimes been categorized as ODA. See the OECD “ODA Casebook on Conict, Peace & 
Security Activities” 2007, www.oecd.org/dac/incaf/39967978.pdf.
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state-owned rms in priority sectors in China as not being so dissimilar from the 
United States: while clearly governed by dierent concerns, “national interests” were 
also cited by the US Congress in 2005 in its decision to prevent the takeover of Unocal 
by CNOOC.
CHINA’S TRADE WITH THE SUB-REGION.
Overall, trade with China has become especially important for the region as a whole 
and for the Andean sub-region in particular. While Peru, Ecuador and Colombia are 
all still dependent on the US market, China does seek to oer something of an 
alternative. As the second largest importer of fuel and minerals, China is increasing its 
presence in the Andean region. Peru leads the way with China as its most important 
partner of the three in bilateral trade (with aggregate gures doubling since the two 
governments signed a free trade agreement in 2009). Colombia has a more diverse 
industry with a strong manufacturing base, and heavily depends on the US market, 
with China accounting for only 3.6 percent of exports. When it comes to trade, 
Ecuador is not a priority for China in terms of volume, yet China sees considerable 
potential here and has taken an active role in the country when it comes to investment 
and loans for oil. 
Overall, China’s gains in imports between 2000 and 2009 have occurred while the US 
has either declined in signicance (Peru and Colombia) or remained static (Ecuador). 
Ecuador has increasingly relied on intra-regional destinations for its goods, while 
China and the United States have become slightly less important as export markets. 
Over the same period, Colombia has sent moderately more of its exports to the Asia 
Pacic, China and the EU, while seeing a slight decline in its exports to LAC and a 
move toward decreasing its dependency on the US market. 
CHINESE AID TO THE SUB-REGION.
Chinese aid to LAC has also been a subject of great speculation, although the 
withholding of some information and a view of aid and investment that diverges 
signicantly from traditional Western methodology is partly to blame for the 
discrepancies. For our purposes, we dene aid as any assistance coming from China 
that may be classied as concessional loans or otherwise designed to improve 
infrastructure or assist in the delivery of basic services to recipient countries. As 
mentioned earlier, it is not entirely clear how much China gives and where it invests 
(Stallings, 2013; Dussel Peters, 2012). e idea that cooperation is a key element of its 
relationship with other developing countries is steeped in a tradition that has been 
briey touched upon above. To dismiss the rhetoric and conceptions put across by 
Chinese development actors and commentators is disingenuous and rearms common 
misconceptions, as Varrall elaborates on in her work on Chinese development experts 
(2013). 
By reminding ourselves of these Chinese perspectives, we can see how Ocial 
Development Assistance (ODA) as dened by the OECD, does not allow for some 
types of “cooperation” between China and LAC to be understood as ODA. As Stallings 
(2013) points out, much of the ows that arrive in LAC and certainly those funds that 
reach Ecuador and Peru are not so easily dened. Bräutigam (2011) has questioned the 
accuracy of the China Development Bank’s label as a development bank, yet it appears 
that the Chinese government has maintained this label and the bank’s terms for loans 
to developing countries even in the face of criticism. We must rely on the data available 
with the understanding that it overlaps frequently and inconveniently. 
In terms of loans, Peru maintains a fairly even spread from the IDB, World Bank, 
China and the US. Peru has received signicant amounts of ODA from the United 
States in recent years. Chinese loans are a relatively new source of nance and, at 
roughly 22 percent, make up more than double the ODA coming from the US and 
closing in on the larger amounts from the IDB and World Bank, which account for 
roughly a third of the total from major sources of lending. 
Colombia has borrowed mainly from the World Bank and the IDB, while loans 
coming in from the US are less signicant and follow the pattern across the region. In 
other words, they are based on peace and security,3 while democracy, human rights, and 
October 1971. e Hierro Peru mine was purchased by China’s state-owned Shougang 
Company in 1992. Ecuador’s ties with China stand out for the loans-for-oil and other 
lending that ranks it among China’s biggest borrowers within Latin America. Beyond 
trade, Colombia’s relationship with China has been less pronounced (Creutzfeldt, 
2012; Ellis, 2014), although both sides are exploring the negotiation of a bilateral free 
trade agreement.
Peru’s Shougang deal reected a desire to diversify primary exporting partners. While 
Peru has apparently sought diversication in Chinese investments, away from primary 
commodities and into more higher-value production, a review of Chinese investments 
there today falls short of its expectations. Today, the Ecuadorian loans indicate that 
China is willing to be innovative in acquiring resources. ese loans are part of a 
symbiotic bilateral strategy to advance mining, crude extraction, renement and 
delivery and a general upgrade of infrastructure in the small, but remarkably endowed 
country, while allowing for an ambitious public spending scheme. It is worth noting 
that this relationship is dominated by large-scale projects and loans, and that there is a 
certain peculiarity due to the Ecuadorian government’s close involvement in these 
projects accompanied by a crowding out of investors from other countries. 
It has become a commonplace desire throughout the region to attract more investment 
and diversity in Chinese ventures, while China has indicated it will be looking to invest 
signicant sums in the short and medium term. One study estimates that China’s FDI 
outows could reach as high as US$1-2 trillion by 2020 (Rosen & Hanemann, 2012), 
and Latin America should be well positioned to capture a healthy portion of those 
funds. Optimism is tempered by those cautioning against the resource curse, or Dutch 
Disease, but it is unclear what could be done to eectively circumvent the economic 
and geographic realities that lead developing countries down this path. 
Another looming question is, to what extent are Chinese corporate activities, in fact, 
an extension of Beijing’s foreign policy strategy? China’s energy security is a national 
priority and its huge foreign currency reserves, coupled with state ownership of the 
energy and infrastructure rms, make a strong case for a national agenda. However, it 
may be more useful to consider the interdependence of national interests and 
role are evident as illustrated in the examples provided by Economy and Levi in their 
recent analysis of China’s resource quest, indicates that cooperation is preferred (in line 
with the behaviour of a rational state actor) and that new methods of forestalling 
conict are necessary and therefore likely. 
e implications are that the language and the goals laid out in ocial Chinese 
speeches and policy papers are not mere rhetoric, but rmly held and internalized (see 
for instance Song, 2012). Eective analysis of these attitudes should come in part from 
case studies that examine what Chinese cooperation means on the ground in countries 
where it is heavily investing. is is not to say that these approaches are always 
preferred to Western modalities or that there are not contingent and external factors 
that will undermine such intentions, but it does mean that the worldview of Chinese 
actors tasked with engaging developing countries can generate misinterpretation and 
confusion, with the overlapping of aid and investment statistics being just one example 
of this problem. Another critical issue that may arise is the reliance on leadership from 
partners abroad whose policies may appear complementary to the PRC’s vision but 
may be unpopular or problematic from other vantage points.  
at said, by empirically tracking China’s participation in the Andean region we can 
gain greater insights. While the values laid out in the Policy Paper are important to 
consider from the Chinese perspective and approach, what of the Andean experience 
and perspectives? 
We focus on these three Andean countries because they share similar endowment 
factors and have close trade and investment ties with the United States, as well as 
rapidly growing ties with China. At the same time, the cases diverge in terms of 
economic policy choice, with Peru and Colombia both pro-market countries that are 
members of the Pacic Alliance and negotiators for the Trans-Pacic Partnership. e 
embrace of free trade agreements in Colombia and Peru has resulted in remarkably 
open economies, although many critics of neoliberalism question how much this 
benets these countries and their respective populations. Ecuador, by contrast, claims 
to have moved away from neoliberalism and actually shuns FTAs, but critics of the 
current government, including former allies such as ex-ministers Alberto Acosta 
(Energy and Mining) and Fausto Ortiz (Finance), question if this is more rhetorical 
than factual due to such constraints as its historical reliance on foreign capital, 
highlighting the recent dependence on Chinese loans due to the willingness to break 
with traditional lenders such as the IMF and World Bank, by defaulting on its 
sovereign debt. Regardless of economic policy preferences, we suggest that China’s 
trade, aid and investment in these countries has given them greater room to manoeuvre 
in the management of their respective political economies. 
An analysis of case studies within the Andean sub-region of South America allows us to 
gain insights into three dynamic economic cases, all rich in natural resources but with 
distinct development strategies. It further allows for a view of dierent sectors within 
those countries where China is having a profound eect: mining in Peru, petroleum 
and electricity generation in Ecuador, and various commodities in Colombia, as well as 
a signicant manufacturing sector. Finally, by looking at these dierent sectors in LAC, 
we can disaggregate China and understand the considerations of actors from various 
companies that sometimes even compete with one another (González-Vicente, 2013; 
Fornés & Butt Philip, 2012). 
CHINA’S EXPECTATIONS IN THE ANDEAN REGION.
China has looked to LAC from much the same perspective it has engaged with 
Southeast Asia and Africa: as oering a wealth of opportunities for the world’s 
fastest-rising economic power and help for some chronically underdeveloped nations 
in these regions. e Andean sub-region holds rich deposits of oil, gas and minerals, 
but its geographical location renders it a logical gateway for Chinese products into the 
region, as well as regional exports back to China and the Asia Pacic region. 
Reciprocally, political leaders and economic actors in the Andean sub-region have been 
eager for their countries to play this role, most notably Chile and, more recently, Peru 
(Narins, 2012; Myers, 2012; Chen, 2011).
It is in this region where China rst sought a major investment in an iron mine in the 
early 1990s. e PRC’s relations with Peru have been strong ever since the Andean 
nation became the second country in South America after Chile to recognize the PRC 
in November 1971, shortly after the PRC gained its seat at the United Nations in 
US$155 million, less than 1% of inward FDI. e total given by the Chinese Embassy 
in Bogota stands at US$2.3 billion. Our research suggests Chinese capital interests in 
Colombia being over US$ 3 billion. is reects those assets acquired by Chinese 
SOEs in the hydrocarbon sector, which were previously owned by other transnational 
corporations, and reinvestments by Chinese companies with strong sales growth in the country.
Ecuador did not receive much investment from China until around 2009 and has since 
then been receiving ows that largely go to hydroelectric projects, the oil sector and 
copper mines. Most recently, initial nance agreements were reached with the 
Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) for a 30 percent share in the Pacic 
Renery at Manta, which will reportedly satisfy Ecuador’s petroleum needs and allow 
for oil exports to China and Asia (La Renería del Pacíco, 2013).
CHINA’S IMPACT ON DEVELOPMENT IN THE ANDEAN REGION.
Having signed FTAs with the United States, neither Peru nor Colombia is willing or 
able to turn away from Washington along the lines of a more combative Ecuador, 
although all three countries are clearly seeking to diversify their economic and 
diplomatic relations. China is a natural partner, due to the structural complementarity 
of factor endowments between China and all three countries. e question remains, 
however, as to the ability of these countries and the civil societies of which they are 
comprised, to work compatibly with Chinese companies and other PRC representatives 
on the ground in the context of ongoing investments and development projects.
For China to eectively carry out its stated aims in the Andean region, it will have to 
learn how to better broker with the increasingly organized and cohesive grassroots 
networks that have sprung to life around the complex extraction and related 
infrastructure projects that China is promoting. One important example of this is the 
movement to preserve not only indigenous groups but the extraordinarily biodiverse 
forests they have called home for millennia, including the Ecuadorian group Yasunidos 
and the Shuar people in the south of the country mobilizing against Chinese-led 
mining projects. It must also realistically assess the risks and navigate the regulatory 
frameworks now evolving within those governments. Economic considerations weigh 
heavily in government decisions, even when such decisions imply betrayals of trust and 
ideals that helped garner electoral support for national politicians. While citizen 
concerns may not be their top priority, Chinese rms must learn to balance their 
commercial and strategic interests with responsibilities and social realities rarely 
experienced at home. e question remains as to whether Chinese rms can carry o 
complex negotiations and societal intermediation as they seek to deepen their presence 
in the Andean region. An optimistic vision could even see China playing a positive role 
in reshaping the nature of these extractive realities and what they mean for the local 
communities aected by this behaviour. 
Still, the weak record of foreign extractive rms in Peru has been linked to the 
government’s own lax approach to regulation, as exemplied by the dual role of the 
Ministry of Energy and Mines (MINEM) as a promoter of mining and enforcer of 
environmental regulations. Sanborn notes that fears about the behaviour of Chinese 
rms are often generated by their multinational competitors and a media eager to 
sensationalize what a rising China means and that diligent oversight is necessary to 
smoothen the process (Sanborn & Torres, 2009, 351). As an interview with the 
Coordinator for Corporate Aairs for Chinalco in Lima, Peru revealed, Chinese rms 
regularly claim to be moving toward socially responsible action. ere appears to be a 
learning curve, as this company’s Toromocho copper mine project has beneted from 
the negative lessons of the Shougang iron mine, hiring Western executives to deal with 
the concerns of the surrounding communities (Irwin & Gallagher, 2013, 227). 
e learning curve required of Chinese enterprises is still quite steep, however. 
Although many manufacturing and trading rms in Colombia rely on imports from 
China, the perception persists that Chinese industry, along with the political and social 
structures it represents, constitutes a threat to the status quo. is perception has led to 
anti-Chinese demonstrations reminiscent of those in small towns in Mexico, though 
less violently articulated (Hearn, 2012). While some joint ventures have succeeded in 
adapting to local conditions and maintaining a low prole, the new Chinese owners 
(Sinochem) of Emerald Industries in Colombia succeeded in quickly oending the 
local population, leading to poor press and popular resentment. 
In Ecuador, the government is increasingly interested in challenging the role of 
multinationals, using enhanced centralization and oversight to benet as many civic 
groups as possible. Despite these eorts, there are battles brewing over oil and mineral 
concessions around the country and the perception among opposition groups and 
international observers is that Ecuador is merely replacing its dependency on Western 
multinationals and primary commodities with Chinese rms. ere may be some truth 
to these allegations, but in our interviews with activists, government ocials, and 
international critics of the Correa administration, we have found that the specic 
dangers presented by Chinese companies are often exaggerated and there is a similar 
pattern of sensationalism at work as that highlighted by Sanborn in Peru (2009). 
Moreover, the build-up in foreign exchange reserves and primary budget surpluses that 
have emerged as a result has allowed these countries to launch social programs and 
poverty reduction initiatives. ere is, in other words, something in this for everyone, 
including China, although it is incumbent on all stakeholders in this new evolving 
China-LAC scenario to carry their weight and act accordingly. 
CONCLUSION.
is paper illustrates ways in which China’s engagement with the countries of the 
Andean region coincides with that of the larger LAC emerging economies, and how it 
diers. e nature of China’s evolving ties with the three Andean countries discussed 
here ts with the general South American themes of economic complementarities in 
factor endowments and China’s voracious appetite for natural resources to spur its high 
growth model. e dierences lie mainly in the composition of state-society relations 
in the Andean region where civic groups, social movements, and indigenous 
communities have all been recognized as formidable actors on the national political 
stage. is aspect of China-Andean relations is less pronounced in larger more 
industrialized Latin American countries like Argentina, Brazil and Mexico. e 
Andean angle thus adds a new twist to China’s heightened interest in extracting 
primary commodities from the LAC region. 
In short, Chinese investors and ocials, who have not had their feet held closely to the 
re on their own authoritarian home turf, are now being contested. Interestingly, some 
Chinese companies operating in these countries have adopted the Western practice of 
donating to local governments for schools or hospitals, but this contribution to local 
social capital has not earned them much credit (Parish Flannery, 2013). Some scholars 
have argued that Chinese rms may be at a disadvantage precisely because of their lack 
of experience with societal intermediation on the home front, while others argue that 
this is changing (Alden & Hughes, 2009). If we take China’s 2008 Policy Paper at its 
word, the PRC leadership maintains that it will ensure the livelihood of people in 
partnering countries by “complying with local laws and regulations, and adhering to 
fair, transparent public works project contracts, making a commitment to and fullling 
the necessary social responsibility to protect the legitimate rights and interests of local 
employees, paying attention to environmental resource protection, caring for and 
supporting the local community.”
It remains to be seen whether the lofty goals of a new internationalism embedded in 
recent Chinese history can genuinely be achieved given the strength and scale of the 
Chinese economy with its inherent asymmetry and the power of market demands. 
However, such pronouncements should not be overlooked or discarded, as China’s 
dependence on massive primary commodity imports from LAC promises to become a 
permanent feature of China-LAC relations for years to come.  China has every 
incentive to make the relationship work, even if it must do considerably more to bring 
it up to true international standards. 
Certain unsavoury realities persist about the nature of resource extraction and the 
problems it invariably creates. e leadership required to navigate a nation’s way 
through the price uctuations, abundance, corruption, environmental problems, 
indigenous rights, resistance from civil society and diculty involved in institution 
building may lie beyond the realm of possibilities of any one country. It does appear, 
however, that the purported principles of China’s aid, trade, and investment with the 
developing world are sincere and oer an opportunity to the leaders of 
twenty-rst-century South America to set in motion processes and structures that can 




Alden, C. & Hughes C.R. 2009. Harmony and Discord in China’s Africa Strategy: Some Implications for Foreign Policy. China 
Quarterly, 199, 563-584.
Anders, S. & Watkins, N. 2008, December 15. Ecuador’s Debt Default. Foreign Policy in Focus. Retrieved from 
www.ips-dc.org/articles/ecuadors_debt_default_exposing_a_gap_in_the_global_ nancial_architecture. 
Bräutigam, D. 2011, January 15. Has China’s Export Financing Met Its Match? China in Africa: e Real Story blog. Retrieved 
from www.chinaafricarealstory.com/2011/01/has-chinas-export-nancing-met-its.html.
Chen, W.H. & Li, X.K. 2011, June 10. Xi Visits ‘Gateway to Latin America’. China Daily. Retrieved from 
http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/epaper/2011-06/10/content_12672857.htm.
China, People’s Republic of. 1964. Eight Principles. Retrieved from 
http://english.gov.cn/ocial/2011-04/21/content_1849913_10.htm.
China, People’s Republic of 1964. Eight Principles. Retrieved from 
http://english.gov.cn/ocial/2011-04/21/content_1849913_10.htm.
Creutzfeldt, B. ed. 2012. China en América Latina: reexiones sobre las relaciones transpacícas. Bogotá: Universidad Externado 
de Colombia. 
Dussel Peters, E. 2012, November. Chinese FDI in Latin America: Does Ownership Matter? Discussion Paper No. 33, Working 
Group on Trade and Environment in the Americas, Tufts University.
Ellis, E. 2014. China on the Ground in Latin America: Challenges for the Chinese and Impacts on the Region. New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan. 
Fornés, G. and Butt Philip, A. 2012. e China-Latin America Axis: Emerging Markets and the Future of Globalisation. New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Gallagher, K.P., Irwin, A. & Koleski, K. 2012, February. e New Banks in Town: Chinese Finance in Latin America. 
Inter-American Dialogue. Retrieved from http://ase.tufts.edu/gdae/Pubs/rp/GallagherChineseFinanceLatinAmericaBrief.pdf.
González-Vicente, R. 2013. Development Dynamics of Chinese Resource-Based Investment in Peru and Ecuador, Latin 
American Politics and Society, 55 (1). 
Hearn, A. 2012. Harnessing the Dragon: Overseas Chinese Entrepreneurs in Mexico and Cuba. In. 
Strauss, J.C. & Armony, A.C., eds. From the Great Wall to the New World. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 111-133.
Irwin, A. & Gallagher, K. 2013. Chinese Mining in Latin America: A Comparative Perspective. e Journal of Environment 
Development, 22, 2, 207-234. 
La Renería del Pacíco estará lista en cuatro años. 2013, July 1. El Telégrafo. Retrieved from 
www.telegrafo.com.ec/economia/item/la-reneria-del-pacico-estara-lista-en-cuatro-anos.html.
Myers, M. 2012, September 21. Chinese Trade and Investment in Latin America: Perspectives from Colombia and Ecuador. 
Inter-American Dialogue. Retrieved from www.thedialogue.org/page.cfm?pageID=32&pubID=3098.
Narins, T.P. 2012. China’s Eye on Ecuador: What Chinese Trade with Ecuador Reveals about China’s Economic Expansion in 
South America. e Global Studies Journal, 4 (2). 
OECD 2007. ODA Casebook on Conict, Peace and Security Activities. Retrieved from 
www.oecd.org/dac/incaf/39967978.pdf. 
Parish Flannery, N. 2013, September 12. How China’s Relations with Peru Explains its Approach to Diplomacy. e Atlantic. 
Retrieved from 
www.theatlantic.com/china/archive/2013/09/how-chinas-relations-with-peru-explain-its-approach-to-diplomacy/279618/.
Pashakhanlou, A. H. 2013. "Back to the Drawing Board: A Critique of Oensive Realism." International Relations 27 
(2):202-225.
Rosen, D.H. and Hanemann, T. 2011. An American Open Door?: Maximizing the Benets of Chinese Foreign Direct 
Investment. Asia Society Special Report. Retrieved from http://asiasociety.org/les/pdf/AnAmericanOpenDoor_FINAL.pdf.
Sanborn, C.A. & Torres, V. 2009. La economía china y las industrias extractivas: desafíos para el Perú. Lima: Centro de 
Investigaciones de la Universidad del Pacíco. 
Song, X.P. 2012. Elementos fundamentales del marco teórico de la política exterior de China. In B. Creutzfeldt, ed. China en 
América Latina: reexiones sobre las relaciones transpacícas. Bogotá: Universidad Externado de Colombia, 87-100.
Stallings, B. 2013, August 5. Chinese Aid to Latin America: Trying to Win Friends and Inuence People. Paper presented at a 
workshop on China-Latin American Relations. University of Southern California, Los Angeles.




Doctoral Candidate, Institute of China Asia Pacic Studies.
National Sun Yat-sen University, Kaohsiung, Taiwan.
ajchimienti@gmail.com
Benjamin Creutzfeldt.
Lecturer in Contemporary China Studies.
CESA School of Business, Bogota, Colombia.
benjamin.cr@cesa.edu.co
governance, and education and social services are minor in comparison. Loans from 
China are negligible. 
Ecuador’s credit line received a much needed boost from China after it defaulted on 
$3.2 billion of foreign debt in 2008 following a government audit that found domestic 
laws had been violated, in addition to US Securities and Exchange Commission 
regulations and general principles of international law (Watkins & Anders, 2008). is 
came amidst a rejection of neoliberal policies and a reduced role in the drug 
interdiction scheme, which was the basis for US development assistance and 
preferential treatment in trade agreements. A signicant feature of Chinese loans to 
Ecuador is that they are based on oil (loans-for-oil), with China purchasing the oil on 
the spot market rather than locking in advantageous prices (Gallagher, Irwin & 
Koleski, 2012). 
CHINA’S INVESTMENTS IN THE ANDEAN SUB-REGION.
When it comes to investment, the data is, again, problematic, mainly due to the fact 
that China does not publish this information. For our purposes, investment will 
qualify regardless of being private (FDI) or public. China typically distributes its 
investment through various SOEs, which causes confusion and may be considered 
awkward for various reasons (Dussel Peters, 2012), although it looks and behaves like 
typical investment coming from private foreign rms. As mentioned earlier, there is the 
problem of a conceptual overlap between Chinese lending and investing. 
Peru had been a major destination for Chinese investment, but that trend slowed down 
after 2010. Chinese investments in Peru have primarily gone toward copper and steel 
concessions; overall, Chinese investment stock in Peru was US$796.48 million in 
2012, a 3.5 percent share of total FDI stock in the country. Mining is also the leading 
recipient of FDI in Peru, accounting for nearly 24 percent of capital stock at the end of 
2012 (ProInversion, 2014).
Colombia’s FDI from China is only a fraction of a percent of investment coming into 
the region; here, too, the published gures diverge. According to the Banco de la 
República, the accumulated gure for Chinese investment between 2000 and 2012 was 
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state-owned rms in priority sectors in China as not being so dissimilar from the 
United States: while clearly governed by dierent concerns, “national interests” were 
also cited by the US Congress in 2005 in its decision to prevent the takeover of Unocal 
by CNOOC.
CHINA’S TRADE WITH THE SUB-REGION.
Overall, trade with China has become especially important for the region as a whole 
and for the Andean sub-region in particular. While Peru, Ecuador and Colombia are 
all still dependent on the US market, China does seek to oer something of an 
alternative. As the second largest importer of fuel and minerals, China is increasing its 
presence in the Andean region. Peru leads the way with China as its most important 
partner of the three in bilateral trade (with aggregate gures doubling since the two 
governments signed a free trade agreement in 2009). Colombia has a more diverse 
industry with a strong manufacturing base, and heavily depends on the US market, 
with China accounting for only 3.6 percent of exports. When it comes to trade, 
Ecuador is not a priority for China in terms of volume, yet China sees considerable 
potential here and has taken an active role in the country when it comes to investment 
and loans for oil. 
Overall, China’s gains in imports between 2000 and 2009 have occurred while the US 
has either declined in signicance (Peru and Colombia) or remained static (Ecuador). 
Ecuador has increasingly relied on intra-regional destinations for its goods, while 
China and the United States have become slightly less important as export markets. 
Over the same period, Colombia has sent moderately more of its exports to the Asia 
Pacic, China and the EU, while seeing a slight decline in its exports to LAC and a 
move toward decreasing its dependency on the US market. 
CHINESE AID TO THE SUB-REGION.
Chinese aid to LAC has also been a subject of great speculation, although the 
withholding of some information and a view of aid and investment that diverges 
signicantly from traditional Western methodology is partly to blame for the 
discrepancies. For our purposes, we dene aid as any assistance coming from China 
that may be classied as concessional loans or otherwise designed to improve 
infrastructure or assist in the delivery of basic services to recipient countries. As 
mentioned earlier, it is not entirely clear how much China gives and where it invests 
(Stallings, 2013; Dussel Peters, 2012). e idea that cooperation is a key element of its 
relationship with other developing countries is steeped in a tradition that has been 
briey touched upon above. To dismiss the rhetoric and conceptions put across by 
Chinese development actors and commentators is disingenuous and rearms common 
misconceptions, as Varrall elaborates on in her work on Chinese development experts 
(2013). 
By reminding ourselves of these Chinese perspectives, we can see how Ocial 
Development Assistance (ODA) as dened by the OECD, does not allow for some 
types of “cooperation” between China and LAC to be understood as ODA. As Stallings 
(2013) points out, much of the ows that arrive in LAC and certainly those funds that 
reach Ecuador and Peru are not so easily dened. Bräutigam (2011) has questioned the 
accuracy of the China Development Bank’s label as a development bank, yet it appears 
that the Chinese government has maintained this label and the bank’s terms for loans 
to developing countries even in the face of criticism. We must rely on the data available 
with the understanding that it overlaps frequently and inconveniently. 
In terms of loans, Peru maintains a fairly even spread from the IDB, World Bank, 
China and the US. Peru has received signicant amounts of ODA from the United 
States in recent years. Chinese loans are a relatively new source of nance and, at 
roughly 22 percent, make up more than double the ODA coming from the US and 
closing in on the larger amounts from the IDB and World Bank, which account for 
roughly a third of the total from major sources of lending. 
Colombia has borrowed mainly from the World Bank and the IDB, while loans 
coming in from the US are less signicant and follow the pattern across the region. In 
other words, they are based on peace and security,3 while democracy, human rights, and 
October 1971. e Hierro Peru mine was purchased by China’s state-owned Shougang 
Company in 1992. Ecuador’s ties with China stand out for the loans-for-oil and other 
lending that ranks it among China’s biggest borrowers within Latin America. Beyond 
trade, Colombia’s relationship with China has been less pronounced (Creutzfeldt, 
2012; Ellis, 2014), although both sides are exploring the negotiation of a bilateral free 
trade agreement.
Peru’s Shougang deal reected a desire to diversify primary exporting partners. While 
Peru has apparently sought diversication in Chinese investments, away from primary 
commodities and into more higher-value production, a review of Chinese investments 
there today falls short of its expectations. Today, the Ecuadorian loans indicate that 
China is willing to be innovative in acquiring resources. ese loans are part of a 
symbiotic bilateral strategy to advance mining, crude extraction, renement and 
delivery and a general upgrade of infrastructure in the small, but remarkably endowed 
country, while allowing for an ambitious public spending scheme. It is worth noting 
that this relationship is dominated by large-scale projects and loans, and that there is a 
certain peculiarity due to the Ecuadorian government’s close involvement in these 
projects accompanied by a crowding out of investors from other countries. 
It has become a commonplace desire throughout the region to attract more investment 
and diversity in Chinese ventures, while China has indicated it will be looking to invest 
signicant sums in the short and medium term. One study estimates that China’s FDI 
outows could reach as high as US$1-2 trillion by 2020 (Rosen & Hanemann, 2012), 
and Latin America should be well positioned to capture a healthy portion of those 
funds. Optimism is tempered by those cautioning against the resource curse, or Dutch 
Disease, but it is unclear what could be done to eectively circumvent the economic 
and geographic realities that lead developing countries down this path. 
Another looming question is, to what extent are Chinese corporate activities, in fact, 
an extension of Beijing’s foreign policy strategy? China’s energy security is a national 
priority and its huge foreign currency reserves, coupled with state ownership of the 
energy and infrastructure rms, make a strong case for a national agenda. However, it 
may be more useful to consider the interdependence of national interests and 
role are evident as illustrated in the examples provided by Economy and Levi in their 
recent analysis of China’s resource quest, indicates that cooperation is preferred (in line 
with the behaviour of a rational state actor) and that new methods of forestalling 
conict are necessary and therefore likely. 
e implications are that the language and the goals laid out in ocial Chinese 
speeches and policy papers are not mere rhetoric, but rmly held and internalized (see 
for instance Song, 2012). Eective analysis of these attitudes should come in part from 
case studies that examine what Chinese cooperation means on the ground in countries 
where it is heavily investing. is is not to say that these approaches are always 
preferred to Western modalities or that there are not contingent and external factors 
that will undermine such intentions, but it does mean that the worldview of Chinese 
actors tasked with engaging developing countries can generate misinterpretation and 
confusion, with the overlapping of aid and investment statistics being just one example 
of this problem. Another critical issue that may arise is the reliance on leadership from 
partners abroad whose policies may appear complementary to the PRC’s vision but 
may be unpopular or problematic from other vantage points.  
at said, by empirically tracking China’s participation in the Andean region we can 
gain greater insights. While the values laid out in the Policy Paper are important to 
consider from the Chinese perspective and approach, what of the Andean experience 
and perspectives? 
We focus on these three Andean countries because they share similar endowment 
factors and have close trade and investment ties with the United States, as well as 
rapidly growing ties with China. At the same time, the cases diverge in terms of 
economic policy choice, with Peru and Colombia both pro-market countries that are 
members of the Pacic Alliance and negotiators for the Trans-Pacic Partnership. e 
embrace of free trade agreements in Colombia and Peru has resulted in remarkably 
open economies, although many critics of neoliberalism question how much this 
benets these countries and their respective populations. Ecuador, by contrast, claims 
to have moved away from neoliberalism and actually shuns FTAs, but critics of the 
current government, including former allies such as ex-ministers Alberto Acosta 
(Energy and Mining) and Fausto Ortiz (Finance), question if this is more rhetorical 
than factual due to such constraints as its historical reliance on foreign capital, 
highlighting the recent dependence on Chinese loans due to the willingness to break 
with traditional lenders such as the IMF and World Bank, by defaulting on its 
sovereign debt. Regardless of economic policy preferences, we suggest that China’s 
trade, aid and investment in these countries has given them greater room to manoeuvre 
in the management of their respective political economies. 
An analysis of case studies within the Andean sub-region of South America allows us to 
gain insights into three dynamic economic cases, all rich in natural resources but with 
distinct development strategies. It further allows for a view of dierent sectors within 
those countries where China is having a profound eect: mining in Peru, petroleum 
and electricity generation in Ecuador, and various commodities in Colombia, as well as 
a signicant manufacturing sector. Finally, by looking at these dierent sectors in LAC, 
we can disaggregate China and understand the considerations of actors from various 
companies that sometimes even compete with one another (González-Vicente, 2013; 
Fornés & Butt Philip, 2012). 
CHINA’S EXPECTATIONS IN THE ANDEAN REGION.
China has looked to LAC from much the same perspective it has engaged with 
Southeast Asia and Africa: as oering a wealth of opportunities for the world’s 
fastest-rising economic power and help for some chronically underdeveloped nations 
in these regions. e Andean sub-region holds rich deposits of oil, gas and minerals, 
but its geographical location renders it a logical gateway for Chinese products into the 
region, as well as regional exports back to China and the Asia Pacic region. 
Reciprocally, political leaders and economic actors in the Andean sub-region have been 
eager for their countries to play this role, most notably Chile and, more recently, Peru 
(Narins, 2012; Myers, 2012; Chen, 2011).
It is in this region where China rst sought a major investment in an iron mine in the 
early 1990s. e PRC’s relations with Peru have been strong ever since the Andean 
nation became the second country in South America after Chile to recognize the PRC 
in November 1971, shortly after the PRC gained its seat at the United Nations in 
US$155 million, less than 1% of inward FDI. e total given by the Chinese Embassy 
in Bogota stands at US$2.3 billion. Our research suggests Chinese capital interests in 
Colombia being over US$ 3 billion. is reects those assets acquired by Chinese 
SOEs in the hydrocarbon sector, which were previously owned by other transnational 
corporations, and reinvestments by Chinese companies with strong sales growth in the country.
Ecuador did not receive much investment from China until around 2009 and has since 
then been receiving ows that largely go to hydroelectric projects, the oil sector and 
copper mines. Most recently, initial nance agreements were reached with the 
Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) for a 30 percent share in the Pacic 
Renery at Manta, which will reportedly satisfy Ecuador’s petroleum needs and allow 
for oil exports to China and Asia (La Renería del Pacíco, 2013).
CHINA’S IMPACT ON DEVELOPMENT IN THE ANDEAN REGION.
Having signed FTAs with the United States, neither Peru nor Colombia is willing or 
able to turn away from Washington along the lines of a more combative Ecuador, 
although all three countries are clearly seeking to diversify their economic and 
diplomatic relations. China is a natural partner, due to the structural complementarity 
of factor endowments between China and all three countries. e question remains, 
however, as to the ability of these countries and the civil societies of which they are 
comprised, to work compatibly with Chinese companies and other PRC representatives 
on the ground in the context of ongoing investments and development projects.
For China to eectively carry out its stated aims in the Andean region, it will have to 
learn how to better broker with the increasingly organized and cohesive grassroots 
networks that have sprung to life around the complex extraction and related 
infrastructure projects that China is promoting. One important example of this is the 
movement to preserve not only indigenous groups but the extraordinarily biodiverse 
forests they have called home for millennia, including the Ecuadorian group Yasunidos 
and the Shuar people in the south of the country mobilizing against Chinese-led 
mining projects. It must also realistically assess the risks and navigate the regulatory 
frameworks now evolving within those governments. Economic considerations weigh 
heavily in government decisions, even when such decisions imply betrayals of trust and 
ideals that helped garner electoral support for national politicians. While citizen 
concerns may not be their top priority, Chinese rms must learn to balance their 
commercial and strategic interests with responsibilities and social realities rarely 
experienced at home. e question remains as to whether Chinese rms can carry o 
complex negotiations and societal intermediation as they seek to deepen their presence 
in the Andean region. An optimistic vision could even see China playing a positive role 
in reshaping the nature of these extractive realities and what they mean for the local 
communities aected by this behaviour. 
Still, the weak record of foreign extractive rms in Peru has been linked to the 
government’s own lax approach to regulation, as exemplied by the dual role of the 
Ministry of Energy and Mines (MINEM) as a promoter of mining and enforcer of 
environmental regulations. Sanborn notes that fears about the behaviour of Chinese 
rms are often generated by their multinational competitors and a media eager to 
sensationalize what a rising China means and that diligent oversight is necessary to 
smoothen the process (Sanborn & Torres, 2009, 351). As an interview with the 
Coordinator for Corporate Aairs for Chinalco in Lima, Peru revealed, Chinese rms 
regularly claim to be moving toward socially responsible action. ere appears to be a 
learning curve, as this company’s Toromocho copper mine project has beneted from 
the negative lessons of the Shougang iron mine, hiring Western executives to deal with 
the concerns of the surrounding communities (Irwin & Gallagher, 2013, 227). 
e learning curve required of Chinese enterprises is still quite steep, however. 
Although many manufacturing and trading rms in Colombia rely on imports from 
China, the perception persists that Chinese industry, along with the political and social 
structures it represents, constitutes a threat to the status quo. is perception has led to 
anti-Chinese demonstrations reminiscent of those in small towns in Mexico, though 
less violently articulated (Hearn, 2012). While some joint ventures have succeeded in 
adapting to local conditions and maintaining a low prole, the new Chinese owners 
(Sinochem) of Emerald Industries in Colombia succeeded in quickly oending the 
local population, leading to poor press and popular resentment. 
In Ecuador, the government is increasingly interested in challenging the role of 
multinationals, using enhanced centralization and oversight to benet as many civic 
groups as possible. Despite these eorts, there are battles brewing over oil and mineral 
concessions around the country and the perception among opposition groups and 
international observers is that Ecuador is merely replacing its dependency on Western 
multinationals and primary commodities with Chinese rms. ere may be some truth 
to these allegations, but in our interviews with activists, government ocials, and 
international critics of the Correa administration, we have found that the specic 
dangers presented by Chinese companies are often exaggerated and there is a similar 
pattern of sensationalism at work as that highlighted by Sanborn in Peru (2009). 
Moreover, the build-up in foreign exchange reserves and primary budget surpluses that 
have emerged as a result has allowed these countries to launch social programs and 
poverty reduction initiatives. ere is, in other words, something in this for everyone, 
including China, although it is incumbent on all stakeholders in this new evolving 
China-LAC scenario to carry their weight and act accordingly. 
CONCLUSION.
is paper illustrates ways in which China’s engagement with the countries of the 
Andean region coincides with that of the larger LAC emerging economies, and how it 
diers. e nature of China’s evolving ties with the three Andean countries discussed 
here ts with the general South American themes of economic complementarities in 
factor endowments and China’s voracious appetite for natural resources to spur its high 
growth model. e dierences lie mainly in the composition of state-society relations 
in the Andean region where civic groups, social movements, and indigenous 
communities have all been recognized as formidable actors on the national political 
stage. is aspect of China-Andean relations is less pronounced in larger more 
industrialized Latin American countries like Argentina, Brazil and Mexico. e 
Andean angle thus adds a new twist to China’s heightened interest in extracting 
primary commodities from the LAC region. 
In short, Chinese investors and ocials, who have not had their feet held closely to the 
re on their own authoritarian home turf, are now being contested. Interestingly, some 
Chinese companies operating in these countries have adopted the Western practice of 
donating to local governments for schools or hospitals, but this contribution to local 
social capital has not earned them much credit (Parish Flannery, 2013). Some scholars 
have argued that Chinese rms may be at a disadvantage precisely because of their lack 
of experience with societal intermediation on the home front, while others argue that 
this is changing (Alden & Hughes, 2009). If we take China’s 2008 Policy Paper at its 
word, the PRC leadership maintains that it will ensure the livelihood of people in 
partnering countries by “complying with local laws and regulations, and adhering to 
fair, transparent public works project contracts, making a commitment to and fullling 
the necessary social responsibility to protect the legitimate rights and interests of local 
employees, paying attention to environmental resource protection, caring for and 
supporting the local community.”
It remains to be seen whether the lofty goals of a new internationalism embedded in 
recent Chinese history can genuinely be achieved given the strength and scale of the 
Chinese economy with its inherent asymmetry and the power of market demands. 
However, such pronouncements should not be overlooked or discarded, as China’s 
dependence on massive primary commodity imports from LAC promises to become a 
permanent feature of China-LAC relations for years to come.  China has every 
incentive to make the relationship work, even if it must do considerably more to bring 
it up to true international standards. 
Certain unsavoury realities persist about the nature of resource extraction and the 
problems it invariably creates. e leadership required to navigate a nation’s way 
through the price uctuations, abundance, corruption, environmental problems, 
indigenous rights, resistance from civil society and diculty involved in institution 
building may lie beyond the realm of possibilities of any one country. It does appear, 
however, that the purported principles of China’s aid, trade, and investment with the 
developing world are sincere and oer an opportunity to the leaders of 
twenty-rst-century South America to set in motion processes and structures that can 
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governance, and education and social services are minor in comparison. Loans from 
China are negligible. 
Ecuador’s credit line received a much needed boost from China after it defaulted on 
$3.2 billion of foreign debt in 2008 following a government audit that found domestic 
laws had been violated, in addition to US Securities and Exchange Commission 
regulations and general principles of international law (Watkins & Anders, 2008). is 
came amidst a rejection of neoliberal policies and a reduced role in the drug 
interdiction scheme, which was the basis for US development assistance and 
preferential treatment in trade agreements. A signicant feature of Chinese loans to 
Ecuador is that they are based on oil (loans-for-oil), with China purchasing the oil on 
the spot market rather than locking in advantageous prices (Gallagher, Irwin & 
Koleski, 2012). 
CHINA’S INVESTMENTS IN THE ANDEAN SUB-REGION.
When it comes to investment, the data is, again, problematic, mainly due to the fact 
that China does not publish this information. For our purposes, investment will 
qualify regardless of being private (FDI) or public. China typically distributes its 
investment through various SOEs, which causes confusion and may be considered 
awkward for various reasons (Dussel Peters, 2012), although it looks and behaves like 
typical investment coming from private foreign rms. As mentioned earlier, there is the 
problem of a conceptual overlap between Chinese lending and investing. 
Peru had been a major destination for Chinese investment, but that trend slowed down 
after 2010. Chinese investments in Peru have primarily gone toward copper and steel 
concessions; overall, Chinese investment stock in Peru was US$796.48 million in 
2012, a 3.5 percent share of total FDI stock in the country. Mining is also the leading 
recipient of FDI in Peru, accounting for nearly 24 percent of capital stock at the end of 
2012 (ProInversion, 2014).
Colombia’s FDI from China is only a fraction of a percent of investment coming into 
the region; here, too, the published gures diverge. According to the Banco de la 
República, the accumulated gure for Chinese investment between 2000 and 2012 was 
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state-owned rms in priority sectors in China as not being so dissimilar from the 
United States: while clearly governed by dierent concerns, “national interests” were 
also cited by the US Congress in 2005 in its decision to prevent the takeover of Unocal 
by CNOOC.
CHINA’S TRADE WITH THE SUB-REGION.
Overall, trade with China has become especially important for the region as a whole 
and for the Andean sub-region in particular. While Peru, Ecuador and Colombia are 
all still dependent on the US market, China does seek to oer something of an 
alternative. As the second largest importer of fuel and minerals, China is increasing its 
presence in the Andean region. Peru leads the way with China as its most important 
partner of the three in bilateral trade (with aggregate gures doubling since the two 
governments signed a free trade agreement in 2009). Colombia has a more diverse 
industry with a strong manufacturing base, and heavily depends on the US market, 
with China accounting for only 3.6 percent of exports. When it comes to trade, 
Ecuador is not a priority for China in terms of volume, yet China sees considerable 
potential here and has taken an active role in the country when it comes to investment 
and loans for oil. 
Overall, China’s gains in imports between 2000 and 2009 have occurred while the US 
has either declined in signicance (Peru and Colombia) or remained static (Ecuador). 
Ecuador has increasingly relied on intra-regional destinations for its goods, while 
China and the United States have become slightly less important as export markets. 
Over the same period, Colombia has sent moderately more of its exports to the Asia 
Pacic, China and the EU, while seeing a slight decline in its exports to LAC and a 
move toward decreasing its dependency on the US market. 
CHINESE AID TO THE SUB-REGION.
Chinese aid to LAC has also been a subject of great speculation, although the 
withholding of some information and a view of aid and investment that diverges 
signicantly from traditional Western methodology is partly to blame for the 
discrepancies. For our purposes, we dene aid as any assistance coming from China 
that may be classied as concessional loans or otherwise designed to improve 
infrastructure or assist in the delivery of basic services to recipient countries. As 
mentioned earlier, it is not entirely clear how much China gives and where it invests 
(Stallings, 2013; Dussel Peters, 2012). e idea that cooperation is a key element of its 
relationship with other developing countries is steeped in a tradition that has been 
briey touched upon above. To dismiss the rhetoric and conceptions put across by 
Chinese development actors and commentators is disingenuous and rearms common 
misconceptions, as Varrall elaborates on in her work on Chinese development experts 
(2013). 
By reminding ourselves of these Chinese perspectives, we can see how Ocial 
Development Assistance (ODA) as dened by the OECD, does not allow for some 
types of “cooperation” between China and LAC to be understood as ODA. As Stallings 
(2013) points out, much of the ows that arrive in LAC and certainly those funds that 
reach Ecuador and Peru are not so easily dened. Bräutigam (2011) has questioned the 
accuracy of the China Development Bank’s label as a development bank, yet it appears 
that the Chinese government has maintained this label and the bank’s terms for loans 
to developing countries even in the face of criticism. We must rely on the data available 
with the understanding that it overlaps frequently and inconveniently. 
In terms of loans, Peru maintains a fairly even spread from the IDB, World Bank, 
China and the US. Peru has received signicant amounts of ODA from the United 
States in recent years. Chinese loans are a relatively new source of nance and, at 
roughly 22 percent, make up more than double the ODA coming from the US and 
closing in on the larger amounts from the IDB and World Bank, which account for 
roughly a third of the total from major sources of lending. 
Colombia has borrowed mainly from the World Bank and the IDB, while loans 
coming in from the US are less signicant and follow the pattern across the region. In 
other words, they are based on peace and security,3 while democracy, human rights, and 
October 1971. e Hierro Peru mine was purchased by China’s state-owned Shougang 
Company in 1992. Ecuador’s ties with China stand out for the loans-for-oil and other 
lending that ranks it among China’s biggest borrowers within Latin America. Beyond 
trade, Colombia’s relationship with China has been less pronounced (Creutzfeldt, 
2012; Ellis, 2014), although both sides are exploring the negotiation of a bilateral free 
trade agreement.
Peru’s Shougang deal reected a desire to diversify primary exporting partners. While 
Peru has apparently sought diversication in Chinese investments, away from primary 
commodities and into more higher-value production, a review of Chinese investments 
there today falls short of its expectations. Today, the Ecuadorian loans indicate that 
China is willing to be innovative in acquiring resources. ese loans are part of a 
symbiotic bilateral strategy to advance mining, crude extraction, renement and 
delivery and a general upgrade of infrastructure in the small, but remarkably endowed 
country, while allowing for an ambitious public spending scheme. It is worth noting 
that this relationship is dominated by large-scale projects and loans, and that there is a 
certain peculiarity due to the Ecuadorian government’s close involvement in these 
projects accompanied by a crowding out of investors from other countries. 
It has become a commonplace desire throughout the region to attract more investment 
and diversity in Chinese ventures, while China has indicated it will be looking to invest 
signicant sums in the short and medium term. One study estimates that China’s FDI 
outows could reach as high as US$1-2 trillion by 2020 (Rosen & Hanemann, 2012), 
and Latin America should be well positioned to capture a healthy portion of those 
funds. Optimism is tempered by those cautioning against the resource curse, or Dutch 
Disease, but it is unclear what could be done to eectively circumvent the economic 
and geographic realities that lead developing countries down this path. 
Another looming question is, to what extent are Chinese corporate activities, in fact, 
an extension of Beijing’s foreign policy strategy? China’s energy security is a national 
priority and its huge foreign currency reserves, coupled with state ownership of the 
energy and infrastructure rms, make a strong case for a national agenda. However, it 
may be more useful to consider the interdependence of national interests and 
role are evident as illustrated in the examples provided by Economy and Levi in their 
recent analysis of China’s resource quest, indicates that cooperation is preferred (in line 
with the behaviour of a rational state actor) and that new methods of forestalling 
conict are necessary and therefore likely. 
e implications are that the language and the goals laid out in ocial Chinese 
speeches and policy papers are not mere rhetoric, but rmly held and internalized (see 
for instance Song, 2012). Eective analysis of these attitudes should come in part from 
case studies that examine what Chinese cooperation means on the ground in countries 
where it is heavily investing. is is not to say that these approaches are always 
preferred to Western modalities or that there are not contingent and external factors 
that will undermine such intentions, but it does mean that the worldview of Chinese 
actors tasked with engaging developing countries can generate misinterpretation and 
confusion, with the overlapping of aid and investment statistics being just one example 
of this problem. Another critical issue that may arise is the reliance on leadership from 
partners abroad whose policies may appear complementary to the PRC’s vision but 
may be unpopular or problematic from other vantage points.  
at said, by empirically tracking China’s participation in the Andean region we can 
gain greater insights. While the values laid out in the Policy Paper are important to 
consider from the Chinese perspective and approach, what of the Andean experience 
and perspectives? 
We focus on these three Andean countries because they share similar endowment 
factors and have close trade and investment ties with the United States, as well as 
rapidly growing ties with China. At the same time, the cases diverge in terms of 
economic policy choice, with Peru and Colombia both pro-market countries that are 
members of the Pacic Alliance and negotiators for the Trans-Pacic Partnership. e 
embrace of free trade agreements in Colombia and Peru has resulted in remarkably 
open economies, although many critics of neoliberalism question how much this 
benets these countries and their respective populations. Ecuador, by contrast, claims 
to have moved away from neoliberalism and actually shuns FTAs, but critics of the 
current government, including former allies such as ex-ministers Alberto Acosta 
(Energy and Mining) and Fausto Ortiz (Finance), question if this is more rhetorical 
than factual due to such constraints as its historical reliance on foreign capital, 
highlighting the recent dependence on Chinese loans due to the willingness to break 
with traditional lenders such as the IMF and World Bank, by defaulting on its 
sovereign debt. Regardless of economic policy preferences, we suggest that China’s 
trade, aid and investment in these countries has given them greater room to manoeuvre 
in the management of their respective political economies. 
An analysis of case studies within the Andean sub-region of South America allows us to 
gain insights into three dynamic economic cases, all rich in natural resources but with 
distinct development strategies. It further allows for a view of dierent sectors within 
those countries where China is having a profound eect: mining in Peru, petroleum 
and electricity generation in Ecuador, and various commodities in Colombia, as well as 
a signicant manufacturing sector. Finally, by looking at these dierent sectors in LAC, 
we can disaggregate China and understand the considerations of actors from various 
companies that sometimes even compete with one another (González-Vicente, 2013; 
Fornés & Butt Philip, 2012). 
CHINA’S EXPECTATIONS IN THE ANDEAN REGION.
China has looked to LAC from much the same perspective it has engaged with 
Southeast Asia and Africa: as oering a wealth of opportunities for the world’s 
fastest-rising economic power and help for some chronically underdeveloped nations 
in these regions. e Andean sub-region holds rich deposits of oil, gas and minerals, 
but its geographical location renders it a logical gateway for Chinese products into the 
region, as well as regional exports back to China and the Asia Pacic region. 
Reciprocally, political leaders and economic actors in the Andean sub-region have been 
eager for their countries to play this role, most notably Chile and, more recently, Peru 
(Narins, 2012; Myers, 2012; Chen, 2011).
It is in this region where China rst sought a major investment in an iron mine in the 
early 1990s. e PRC’s relations with Peru have been strong ever since the Andean 
nation became the second country in South America after Chile to recognize the PRC 
in November 1971, shortly after the PRC gained its seat at the United Nations in 
US$155 million, less than 1% of inward FDI. e total given by the Chinese Embassy 
in Bogota stands at US$2.3 billion. Our research suggests Chinese capital interests in 
Colombia being over US$ 3 billion. is reects those assets acquired by Chinese 
SOEs in the hydrocarbon sector, which were previously owned by other transnational 
corporations, and reinvestments by Chinese companies with strong sales growth in the country.
Ecuador did not receive much investment from China until around 2009 and has since 
then been receiving ows that largely go to hydroelectric projects, the oil sector and 
copper mines. Most recently, initial nance agreements were reached with the 
Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) for a 30 percent share in the Pacic 
Renery at Manta, which will reportedly satisfy Ecuador’s petroleum needs and allow 
for oil exports to China and Asia (La Renería del Pacíco, 2013).
CHINA’S IMPACT ON DEVELOPMENT IN THE ANDEAN REGION.
Having signed FTAs with the United States, neither Peru nor Colombia is willing or 
able to turn away from Washington along the lines of a more combative Ecuador, 
although all three countries are clearly seeking to diversify their economic and 
diplomatic relations. China is a natural partner, due to the structural complementarity 
of factor endowments between China and all three countries. e question remains, 
however, as to the ability of these countries and the civil societies of which they are 
comprised, to work compatibly with Chinese companies and other PRC representatives 
on the ground in the context of ongoing investments and development projects.
For China to eectively carry out its stated aims in the Andean region, it will have to 
learn how to better broker with the increasingly organized and cohesive grassroots 
networks that have sprung to life around the complex extraction and related 
infrastructure projects that China is promoting. One important example of this is the 
movement to preserve not only indigenous groups but the extraordinarily biodiverse 
forests they have called home for millennia, including the Ecuadorian group Yasunidos 
and the Shuar people in the south of the country mobilizing against Chinese-led 
mining projects. It must also realistically assess the risks and navigate the regulatory 
frameworks now evolving within those governments. Economic considerations weigh 
heavily in government decisions, even when such decisions imply betrayals of trust and 
ideals that helped garner electoral support for national politicians. While citizen 
concerns may not be their top priority, Chinese rms must learn to balance their 
commercial and strategic interests with responsibilities and social realities rarely 
experienced at home. e question remains as to whether Chinese rms can carry o 
complex negotiations and societal intermediation as they seek to deepen their presence 
in the Andean region. An optimistic vision could even see China playing a positive role 
in reshaping the nature of these extractive realities and what they mean for the local 
communities aected by this behaviour. 
Still, the weak record of foreign extractive rms in Peru has been linked to the 
government’s own lax approach to regulation, as exemplied by the dual role of the 
Ministry of Energy and Mines (MINEM) as a promoter of mining and enforcer of 
environmental regulations. Sanborn notes that fears about the behaviour of Chinese 
rms are often generated by their multinational competitors and a media eager to 
sensationalize what a rising China means and that diligent oversight is necessary to 
smoothen the process (Sanborn & Torres, 2009, 351). As an interview with the 
Coordinator for Corporate Aairs for Chinalco in Lima, Peru revealed, Chinese rms 
regularly claim to be moving toward socially responsible action. ere appears to be a 
learning curve, as this company’s Toromocho copper mine project has beneted from 
the negative lessons of the Shougang iron mine, hiring Western executives to deal with 
the concerns of the surrounding communities (Irwin & Gallagher, 2013, 227). 
e learning curve required of Chinese enterprises is still quite steep, however. 
Although many manufacturing and trading rms in Colombia rely on imports from 
China, the perception persists that Chinese industry, along with the political and social 
structures it represents, constitutes a threat to the status quo. is perception has led to 
anti-Chinese demonstrations reminiscent of those in small towns in Mexico, though 
less violently articulated (Hearn, 2012). While some joint ventures have succeeded in 
adapting to local conditions and maintaining a low prole, the new Chinese owners 
(Sinochem) of Emerald Industries in Colombia succeeded in quickly oending the 
local population, leading to poor press and popular resentment. 
In Ecuador, the government is increasingly interested in challenging the role of 
multinationals, using enhanced centralization and oversight to benet as many civic 
groups as possible. Despite these eorts, there are battles brewing over oil and mineral 
concessions around the country and the perception among opposition groups and 
international observers is that Ecuador is merely replacing its dependency on Western 
multinationals and primary commodities with Chinese rms. ere may be some truth 
to these allegations, but in our interviews with activists, government ocials, and 
international critics of the Correa administration, we have found that the specic 
dangers presented by Chinese companies are often exaggerated and there is a similar 
pattern of sensationalism at work as that highlighted by Sanborn in Peru (2009). 
Moreover, the build-up in foreign exchange reserves and primary budget surpluses that 
have emerged as a result has allowed these countries to launch social programs and 
poverty reduction initiatives. ere is, in other words, something in this for everyone, 
including China, although it is incumbent on all stakeholders in this new evolving 
China-LAC scenario to carry their weight and act accordingly. 
CONCLUSION.
is paper illustrates ways in which China’s engagement with the countries of the 
Andean region coincides with that of the larger LAC emerging economies, and how it 
diers. e nature of China’s evolving ties with the three Andean countries discussed 
here ts with the general South American themes of economic complementarities in 
factor endowments and China’s voracious appetite for natural resources to spur its high 
growth model. e dierences lie mainly in the composition of state-society relations 
in the Andean region where civic groups, social movements, and indigenous 
communities have all been recognized as formidable actors on the national political 
stage. is aspect of China-Andean relations is less pronounced in larger more 
industrialized Latin American countries like Argentina, Brazil and Mexico. e 
Andean angle thus adds a new twist to China’s heightened interest in extracting 
primary commodities from the LAC region. 
In short, Chinese investors and ocials, who have not had their feet held closely to the 
re on their own authoritarian home turf, are now being contested. Interestingly, some 
Chinese companies operating in these countries have adopted the Western practice of 
donating to local governments for schools or hospitals, but this contribution to local 
social capital has not earned them much credit (Parish Flannery, 2013). Some scholars 
have argued that Chinese rms may be at a disadvantage precisely because of their lack 
of experience with societal intermediation on the home front, while others argue that 
this is changing (Alden & Hughes, 2009). If we take China’s 2008 Policy Paper at its 
word, the PRC leadership maintains that it will ensure the livelihood of people in 
partnering countries by “complying with local laws and regulations, and adhering to 
fair, transparent public works project contracts, making a commitment to and fullling 
the necessary social responsibility to protect the legitimate rights and interests of local 
employees, paying attention to environmental resource protection, caring for and 
supporting the local community.”
It remains to be seen whether the lofty goals of a new internationalism embedded in 
recent Chinese history can genuinely be achieved given the strength and scale of the 
Chinese economy with its inherent asymmetry and the power of market demands. 
However, such pronouncements should not be overlooked or discarded, as China’s 
dependence on massive primary commodity imports from LAC promises to become a 
permanent feature of China-LAC relations for years to come.  China has every 
incentive to make the relationship work, even if it must do considerably more to bring 
it up to true international standards. 
Certain unsavoury realities persist about the nature of resource extraction and the 
problems it invariably creates. e leadership required to navigate a nation’s way 
through the price uctuations, abundance, corruption, environmental problems, 
indigenous rights, resistance from civil society and diculty involved in institution 
building may lie beyond the realm of possibilities of any one country. It does appear, 
however, that the purported principles of China’s aid, trade, and investment with the 
developing world are sincere and oer an opportunity to the leaders of 
twenty-rst-century South America to set in motion processes and structures that can 
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governance, and education and social services are minor in comparison. Loans from 
China are negligible. 
Ecuador’s credit line received a much needed boost from China after it defaulted on 
$3.2 billion of foreign debt in 2008 following a government audit that found domestic 
laws had been violated, in addition to US Securities and Exchange Commission 
regulations and general principles of international law (Watkins & Anders, 2008). is 
came amidst a rejection of neoliberal policies and a reduced role in the drug 
interdiction scheme, which was the basis for US development assistance and 
preferential treatment in trade agreements. A signicant feature of Chinese loans to 
Ecuador is that they are based on oil (loans-for-oil), with China purchasing the oil on 
the spot market rather than locking in advantageous prices (Gallagher, Irwin & 
Koleski, 2012). 
CHINA’S INVESTMENTS IN THE ANDEAN SUB-REGION.
When it comes to investment, the data is, again, problematic, mainly due to the fact 
that China does not publish this information. For our purposes, investment will 
qualify regardless of being private (FDI) or public. China typically distributes its 
investment through various SOEs, which causes confusion and may be considered 
awkward for various reasons (Dussel Peters, 2012), although it looks and behaves like 
typical investment coming from private foreign rms. As mentioned earlier, there is the 
problem of a conceptual overlap between Chinese lending and investing. 
Peru had been a major destination for Chinese investment, but that trend slowed down 
after 2010. Chinese investments in Peru have primarily gone toward copper and steel 
concessions; overall, Chinese investment stock in Peru was US$796.48 million in 
2012, a 3.5 percent share of total FDI stock in the country. Mining is also the leading 
recipient of FDI in Peru, accounting for nearly 24 percent of capital stock at the end of 
2012 (ProInversion, 2014).
Colombia’s FDI from China is only a fraction of a percent of investment coming into 
the region; here, too, the published gures diverge. According to the Banco de la 
República, the accumulated gure for Chinese investment between 2000 and 2012 was 
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state-owned rms in priority sectors in China as not being so dissimilar from the 
United States: while clearly governed by dierent concerns, “national interests” were 
also cited by the US Congress in 2005 in its decision to prevent the takeover of Unocal 
by CNOOC.
CHINA’S TRADE WITH THE SUB-REGION.
Overall, trade with China has become especially important for the region as a whole 
and for the Andean sub-region in particular. While Peru, Ecuador and Colombia are 
all still dependent on the US market, China does seek to oer something of an 
alternative. As the second largest importer of fuel and minerals, China is increasing its 
presence in the Andean region. Peru leads the way with China as its most important 
partner of the three in bilateral trade (with aggregate gures doubling since the two 
governments signed a free trade agreement in 2009). Colombia has a more diverse 
industry with a strong manufacturing base, and heavily depends on the US market, 
with China accounting for only 3.6 percent of exports. When it comes to trade, 
Ecuador is not a priority for China in terms of volume, yet China sees considerable 
potential here and has taken an active role in the country when it comes to investment 
and loans for oil. 
Overall, China’s gains in imports between 2000 and 2009 have occurred while the US 
has either declined in signicance (Peru and Colombia) or remained static (Ecuador). 
Ecuador has increasingly relied on intra-regional destinations for its goods, while 
China and the United States have become slightly less important as export markets. 
Over the same period, Colombia has sent moderately more of its exports to the Asia 
Pacic, China and the EU, while seeing a slight decline in its exports to LAC and a 
move toward decreasing its dependency on the US market. 
CHINESE AID TO THE SUB-REGION.
Chinese aid to LAC has also been a subject of great speculation, although the 
withholding of some information and a view of aid and investment that diverges 
signicantly from traditional Western methodology is partly to blame for the 
discrepancies. For our purposes, we dene aid as any assistance coming from China 
that may be classied as concessional loans or otherwise designed to improve 
infrastructure or assist in the delivery of basic services to recipient countries. As 
mentioned earlier, it is not entirely clear how much China gives and where it invests 
(Stallings, 2013; Dussel Peters, 2012). e idea that cooperation is a key element of its 
relationship with other developing countries is steeped in a tradition that has been 
briey touched upon above. To dismiss the rhetoric and conceptions put across by 
Chinese development actors and commentators is disingenuous and rearms common 
misconceptions, as Varrall elaborates on in her work on Chinese development experts 
(2013). 
By reminding ourselves of these Chinese perspectives, we can see how Ocial 
Development Assistance (ODA) as dened by the OECD, does not allow for some 
types of “cooperation” between China and LAC to be understood as ODA. As Stallings 
(2013) points out, much of the ows that arrive in LAC and certainly those funds that 
reach Ecuador and Peru are not so easily dened. Bräutigam (2011) has questioned the 
accuracy of the China Development Bank’s label as a development bank, yet it appears 
that the Chinese government has maintained this label and the bank’s terms for loans 
to developing countries even in the face of criticism. We must rely on the data available 
with the understanding that it overlaps frequently and inconveniently. 
In terms of loans, Peru maintains a fairly even spread from the IDB, World Bank, 
China and the US. Peru has received signicant amounts of ODA from the United 
States in recent years. Chinese loans are a relatively new source of nance and, at 
roughly 22 percent, make up more than double the ODA coming from the US and 
closing in on the larger amounts from the IDB and World Bank, which account for 
roughly a third of the total from major sources of lending. 
Colombia has borrowed mainly from the World Bank and the IDB, while loans 
coming in from the US are less signicant and follow the pattern across the region. In 
other words, they are based on peace and security,3 while democracy, human rights, and 
October 1971. e Hierro Peru mine was purchased by China’s state-owned Shougang 
Company in 1992. Ecuador’s ties with China stand out for the loans-for-oil and other 
lending that ranks it among China’s biggest borrowers within Latin America. Beyond 
trade, Colombia’s relationship with China has been less pronounced (Creutzfeldt, 
2012; Ellis, 2014), although both sides are exploring the negotiation of a bilateral free 
trade agreement.
Peru’s Shougang deal reected a desire to diversify primary exporting partners. While 
Peru has apparently sought diversication in Chinese investments, away from primary 
commodities and into more higher-value production, a review of Chinese investments 
there today falls short of its expectations. Today, the Ecuadorian loans indicate that 
China is willing to be innovative in acquiring resources. ese loans are part of a 
symbiotic bilateral strategy to advance mining, crude extraction, renement and 
delivery and a general upgrade of infrastructure in the small, but remarkably endowed 
country, while allowing for an ambitious public spending scheme. It is worth noting 
that this relationship is dominated by large-scale projects and loans, and that there is a 
certain peculiarity due to the Ecuadorian government’s close involvement in these 
projects accompanied by a crowding out of investors from other countries. 
It has become a commonplace desire throughout the region to attract more investment 
and diversity in Chinese ventures, while China has indicated it will be looking to invest 
signicant sums in the short and medium term. One study estimates that China’s FDI 
outows could reach as high as US$1-2 trillion by 2020 (Rosen & Hanemann, 2012), 
and Latin America should be well positioned to capture a healthy portion of those 
funds. Optimism is tempered by those cautioning against the resource curse, or Dutch 
Disease, but it is unclear what could be done to eectively circumvent the economic 
and geographic realities that lead developing countries down this path. 
Another looming question is, to what extent are Chinese corporate activities, in fact, 
an extension of Beijing’s foreign policy strategy? China’s energy security is a national 
priority and its huge foreign currency reserves, coupled with state ownership of the 
energy and infrastructure rms, make a strong case for a national agenda. However, it 
may be more useful to consider the interdependence of national interests and 
role are evident as illustrated in the examples provided by Economy and Levi in their 
recent analysis of China’s resource quest, indicates that cooperation is preferred (in line 
with the behaviour of a rational state actor) and that new methods of forestalling 
conict are necessary and therefore likely. 
e implications are that the language and the goals laid out in ocial Chinese 
speeches and policy papers are not mere rhetoric, but rmly held and internalized (see 
for instance Song, 2012). Eective analysis of these attitudes should come in part from 
case studies that examine what Chinese cooperation means on the ground in countries 
where it is heavily investing. is is not to say that these approaches are always 
preferred to Western modalities or that there are not contingent and external factors 
that will undermine such intentions, but it does mean that the worldview of Chinese 
actors tasked with engaging developing countries can generate misinterpretation and 
confusion, with the overlapping of aid and investment statistics being just one example 
of this problem. Another critical issue that may arise is the reliance on leadership from 
partners abroad whose policies may appear complementary to the PRC’s vision but 
may be unpopular or problematic from other vantage points.  
at said, by empirically tracking China’s participation in the Andean region we can 
gain greater insights. While the values laid out in the Policy Paper are important to 
consider from the Chinese perspective and approach, what of the Andean experience 
and perspectives? 
We focus on these three Andean countries because they share similar endowment 
factors and have close trade and investment ties with the United States, as well as 
rapidly growing ties with China. At the same time, the cases diverge in terms of 
economic policy choice, with Peru and Colombia both pro-market countries that are 
members of the Pacic Alliance and negotiators for the Trans-Pacic Partnership. e 
embrace of free trade agreements in Colombia and Peru has resulted in remarkably 
open economies, although many critics of neoliberalism question how much this 
benets these countries and their respective populations. Ecuador, by contrast, claims 
to have moved away from neoliberalism and actually shuns FTAs, but critics of the 
current government, including former allies such as ex-ministers Alberto Acosta 
(Energy and Mining) and Fausto Ortiz (Finance), question if this is more rhetorical 
than factual due to such constraints as its historical reliance on foreign capital, 
highlighting the recent dependence on Chinese loans due to the willingness to break 
with traditional lenders such as the IMF and World Bank, by defaulting on its 
sovereign debt. Regardless of economic policy preferences, we suggest that China’s 
trade, aid and investment in these countries has given them greater room to manoeuvre 
in the management of their respective political economies. 
An analysis of case studies within the Andean sub-region of South America allows us to 
gain insights into three dynamic economic cases, all rich in natural resources but with 
distinct development strategies. It further allows for a view of dierent sectors within 
those countries where China is having a profound eect: mining in Peru, petroleum 
and electricity generation in Ecuador, and various commodities in Colombia, as well as 
a signicant manufacturing sector. Finally, by looking at these dierent sectors in LAC, 
we can disaggregate China and understand the considerations of actors from various 
companies that sometimes even compete with one another (González-Vicente, 2013; 
Fornés & Butt Philip, 2012). 
CHINA’S EXPECTATIONS IN THE ANDEAN REGION.
China has looked to LAC from much the same perspective it has engaged with 
Southeast Asia and Africa: as oering a wealth of opportunities for the world’s 
fastest-rising economic power and help for some chronically underdeveloped nations 
in these regions. e Andean sub-region holds rich deposits of oil, gas and minerals, 
but its geographical location renders it a logical gateway for Chinese products into the 
region, as well as regional exports back to China and the Asia Pacic region. 
Reciprocally, political leaders and economic actors in the Andean sub-region have been 
eager for their countries to play this role, most notably Chile and, more recently, Peru 
(Narins, 2012; Myers, 2012; Chen, 2011).
It is in this region where China rst sought a major investment in an iron mine in the 
early 1990s. e PRC’s relations with Peru have been strong ever since the Andean 
nation became the second country in South America after Chile to recognize the PRC 
in November 1971, shortly after the PRC gained its seat at the United Nations in 
US$155 million, less than 1% of inward FDI. e total given by the Chinese Embassy 
in Bogota stands at US$2.3 billion. Our research suggests Chinese capital interests in 
Colombia being over US$ 3 billion. is reects those assets acquired by Chinese 
SOEs in the hydrocarbon sector, which were previously owned by other transnational 
corporations, and reinvestments by Chinese companies with strong sales growth in the country.
Ecuador did not receive much investment from China until around 2009 and has since 
then been receiving ows that largely go to hydroelectric projects, the oil sector and 
copper mines. Most recently, initial nance agreements were reached with the 
Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) for a 30 percent share in the Pacic 
Renery at Manta, which will reportedly satisfy Ecuador’s petroleum needs and allow 
for oil exports to China and Asia (La Renería del Pacíco, 2013).
CHINA’S IMPACT ON DEVELOPMENT IN THE ANDEAN REGION.
Having signed FTAs with the United States, neither Peru nor Colombia is willing or 
able to turn away from Washington along the lines of a more combative Ecuador, 
although all three countries are clearly seeking to diversify their economic and 
diplomatic relations. China is a natural partner, due to the structural complementarity 
of factor endowments between China and all three countries. e question remains, 
however, as to the ability of these countries and the civil societies of which they are 
comprised, to work compatibly with Chinese companies and other PRC representatives 
on the ground in the context of ongoing investments and development projects.
For China to eectively carry out its stated aims in the Andean region, it will have to 
learn how to better broker with the increasingly organized and cohesive grassroots 
networks that have sprung to life around the complex extraction and related 
infrastructure projects that China is promoting. One important example of this is the 
movement to preserve not only indigenous groups but the extraordinarily biodiverse 
forests they have called home for millennia, including the Ecuadorian group Yasunidos 
and the Shuar people in the south of the country mobilizing against Chinese-led 
mining projects. It must also realistically assess the risks and navigate the regulatory 
frameworks now evolving within those governments. Economic considerations weigh 
heavily in government decisions, even when such decisions imply betrayals of trust and 
ideals that helped garner electoral support for national politicians. While citizen 
concerns may not be their top priority, Chinese rms must learn to balance their 
commercial and strategic interests with responsibilities and social realities rarely 
experienced at home. e question remains as to whether Chinese rms can carry o 
complex negotiations and societal intermediation as they seek to deepen their presence 
in the Andean region. An optimistic vision could even see China playing a positive role 
in reshaping the nature of these extractive realities and what they mean for the local 
communities aected by this behaviour. 
Still, the weak record of foreign extractive rms in Peru has been linked to the 
government’s own lax approach to regulation, as exemplied by the dual role of the 
Ministry of Energy and Mines (MINEM) as a promoter of mining and enforcer of 
environmental regulations. Sanborn notes that fears about the behaviour of Chinese 
rms are often generated by their multinational competitors and a media eager to 
sensationalize what a rising China means and that diligent oversight is necessary to 
smoothen the process (Sanborn & Torres, 2009, 351). As an interview with the 
Coordinator for Corporate Aairs for Chinalco in Lima, Peru revealed, Chinese rms 
regularly claim to be moving toward socially responsible action. ere appears to be a 
learning curve, as this company’s Toromocho copper mine project has beneted from 
the negative lessons of the Shougang iron mine, hiring Western executives to deal with 
the concerns of the surrounding communities (Irwin & Gallagher, 2013, 227). 
e learning curve required of Chinese enterprises is still quite steep, however. 
Although many manufacturing and trading rms in Colombia rely on imports from 
China, the perception persists that Chinese industry, along with the political and social 
structures it represents, constitutes a threat to the status quo. is perception has led to 
anti-Chinese demonstrations reminiscent of those in small towns in Mexico, though 
less violently articulated (Hearn, 2012). While some joint ventures have succeeded in 
adapting to local conditions and maintaining a low prole, the new Chinese owners 
(Sinochem) of Emerald Industries in Colombia succeeded in quickly oending the 
local population, leading to poor press and popular resentment. 
In Ecuador, the government is increasingly interested in challenging the role of 
multinationals, using enhanced centralization and oversight to benet as many civic 
groups as possible. Despite these eorts, there are battles brewing over oil and mineral 
concessions around the country and the perception among opposition groups and 
international observers is that Ecuador is merely replacing its dependency on Western 
multinationals and primary commodities with Chinese rms. ere may be some truth 
to these allegations, but in our interviews with activists, government ocials, and 
international critics of the Correa administration, we have found that the specic 
dangers presented by Chinese companies are often exaggerated and there is a similar 
pattern of sensationalism at work as that highlighted by Sanborn in Peru (2009). 
Moreover, the build-up in foreign exchange reserves and primary budget surpluses that 
have emerged as a result has allowed these countries to launch social programs and 
poverty reduction initiatives. ere is, in other words, something in this for everyone, 
including China, although it is incumbent on all stakeholders in this new evolving 
China-LAC scenario to carry their weight and act accordingly. 
CONCLUSION.
is paper illustrates ways in which China’s engagement with the countries of the 
Andean region coincides with that of the larger LAC emerging economies, and how it 
diers. e nature of China’s evolving ties with the three Andean countries discussed 
here ts with the general South American themes of economic complementarities in 
factor endowments and China’s voracious appetite for natural resources to spur its high 
growth model. e dierences lie mainly in the composition of state-society relations 
in the Andean region where civic groups, social movements, and indigenous 
communities have all been recognized as formidable actors on the national political 
stage. is aspect of China-Andean relations is less pronounced in larger more 
industrialized Latin American countries like Argentina, Brazil and Mexico. e 
Andean angle thus adds a new twist to China’s heightened interest in extracting 
primary commodities from the LAC region. 
In short, Chinese investors and ocials, who have not had their feet held closely to the 
re on their own authoritarian home turf, are now being contested. Interestingly, some 
Chinese companies operating in these countries have adopted the Western practice of 
donating to local governments for schools or hospitals, but this contribution to local 
social capital has not earned them much credit (Parish Flannery, 2013). Some scholars 
have argued that Chinese rms may be at a disadvantage precisely because of their lack 
of experience with societal intermediation on the home front, while others argue that 
this is changing (Alden & Hughes, 2009). If we take China’s 2008 Policy Paper at its 
word, the PRC leadership maintains that it will ensure the livelihood of people in 
partnering countries by “complying with local laws and regulations, and adhering to 
fair, transparent public works project contracts, making a commitment to and fullling 
the necessary social responsibility to protect the legitimate rights and interests of local 
employees, paying attention to environmental resource protection, caring for and 
supporting the local community.”
It remains to be seen whether the lofty goals of a new internationalism embedded in 
recent Chinese history can genuinely be achieved given the strength and scale of the 
Chinese economy with its inherent asymmetry and the power of market demands. 
However, such pronouncements should not be overlooked or discarded, as China’s 
dependence on massive primary commodity imports from LAC promises to become a 
permanent feature of China-LAC relations for years to come.  China has every 
incentive to make the relationship work, even if it must do considerably more to bring 
it up to true international standards. 
Certain unsavoury realities persist about the nature of resource extraction and the 
problems it invariably creates. e leadership required to navigate a nation’s way 
through the price uctuations, abundance, corruption, environmental problems, 
indigenous rights, resistance from civil society and diculty involved in institution 
building may lie beyond the realm of possibilities of any one country. It does appear, 
however, that the purported principles of China’s aid, trade, and investment with the 
developing world are sincere and oer an opportunity to the leaders of 
twenty-rst-century South America to set in motion processes and structures that can 
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governance, and education and social services are minor in comparison. Loans from 
China are negligible. 
Ecuador’s credit line received a much needed boost from China after it defaulted on 
$3.2 billion of foreign debt in 2008 following a government audit that found domestic 
laws had been violated, in addition to US Securities and Exchange Commission 
regulations and general principles of international law (Watkins & Anders, 2008). is 
came amidst a rejection of neoliberal policies and a reduced role in the drug 
interdiction scheme, which was the basis for US development assistance and 
preferential treatment in trade agreements. A signicant feature of Chinese loans to 
Ecuador is that they are based on oil (loans-for-oil), with China purchasing the oil on 
the spot market rather than locking in advantageous prices (Gallagher, Irwin & 
Koleski, 2012). 
CHINA’S INVESTMENTS IN THE ANDEAN SUB-REGION.
When it comes to investment, the data is, again, problematic, mainly due to the fact 
that China does not publish this information. For our purposes, investment will 
qualify regardless of being private (FDI) or public. China typically distributes its 
investment through various SOEs, which causes confusion and may be considered 
awkward for various reasons (Dussel Peters, 2012), although it looks and behaves like 
typical investment coming from private foreign rms. As mentioned earlier, there is the 
problem of a conceptual overlap between Chinese lending and investing. 
Peru had been a major destination for Chinese investment, but that trend slowed down 
after 2010. Chinese investments in Peru have primarily gone toward copper and steel 
concessions; overall, Chinese investment stock in Peru was US$796.48 million in 
2012, a 3.5 percent share of total FDI stock in the country. Mining is also the leading 
recipient of FDI in Peru, accounting for nearly 24 percent of capital stock at the end of 
2012 (ProInversion, 2014).
Colombia’s FDI from China is only a fraction of a percent of investment coming into 
the region; here, too, the published gures diverge. According to the Banco de la 
República, the accumulated gure for Chinese investment between 2000 and 2012 was 
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state-owned rms in priority sectors in China as not being so dissimilar from the 
United States: while clearly governed by dierent concerns, “national interests” were 
also cited by the US Congress in 2005 in its decision to prevent the takeover of Unocal 
by CNOOC.
CHINA’S TRADE WITH THE SUB-REGION.
Overall, trade with China has become especially important for the region as a whole 
and for the Andean sub-region in particular. While Peru, Ecuador and Colombia are 
all still dependent on the US market, China does seek to oer something of an 
alternative. As the second largest importer of fuel and minerals, China is increasing its 
presence in the Andean region. Peru leads the way with China as its most important 
partner of the three in bilateral trade (with aggregate gures doubling since the two 
governments signed a free trade agreement in 2009). Colombia has a more diverse 
industry with a strong manufacturing base, and heavily depends on the US market, 
with China accounting for only 3.6 percent of exports. When it comes to trade, 
Ecuador is not a priority for China in terms of volume, yet China sees considerable 
potential here and has taken an active role in the country when it comes to investment 
and loans for oil. 
Overall, China’s gains in imports between 2000 and 2009 have occurred while the US 
has either declined in signicance (Peru and Colombia) or remained static (Ecuador). 
Ecuador has increasingly relied on intra-regional destinations for its goods, while 
China and the United States have become slightly less important as export markets. 
Over the same period, Colombia has sent moderately more of its exports to the Asia 
Pacic, China and the EU, while seeing a slight decline in its exports to LAC and a 
move toward decreasing its dependency on the US market. 
CHINESE AID TO THE SUB-REGION.
Chinese aid to LAC has also been a subject of great speculation, although the 
withholding of some information and a view of aid and investment that diverges 
signicantly from traditional Western methodology is partly to blame for the 
discrepancies. For our purposes, we dene aid as any assistance coming from China 
that may be classied as concessional loans or otherwise designed to improve 
infrastructure or assist in the delivery of basic services to recipient countries. As 
mentioned earlier, it is not entirely clear how much China gives and where it invests 
(Stallings, 2013; Dussel Peters, 2012). e idea that cooperation is a key element of its 
relationship with other developing countries is steeped in a tradition that has been 
briey touched upon above. To dismiss the rhetoric and conceptions put across by 
Chinese development actors and commentators is disingenuous and rearms common 
misconceptions, as Varrall elaborates on in her work on Chinese development experts 
(2013). 
By reminding ourselves of these Chinese perspectives, we can see how Ocial 
Development Assistance (ODA) as dened by the OECD, does not allow for some 
types of “cooperation” between China and LAC to be understood as ODA. As Stallings 
(2013) points out, much of the ows that arrive in LAC and certainly those funds that 
reach Ecuador and Peru are not so easily dened. Bräutigam (2011) has questioned the 
accuracy of the China Development Bank’s label as a development bank, yet it appears 
that the Chinese government has maintained this label and the bank’s terms for loans 
to developing countries even in the face of criticism. We must rely on the data available 
with the understanding that it overlaps frequently and inconveniently. 
In terms of loans, Peru maintains a fairly even spread from the IDB, World Bank, 
China and the US. Peru has received signicant amounts of ODA from the United 
States in recent years. Chinese loans are a relatively new source of nance and, at 
roughly 22 percent, make up more than double the ODA coming from the US and 
closing in on the larger amounts from the IDB and World Bank, which account for 
roughly a third of the total from major sources of lending. 
Colombia has borrowed mainly from the World Bank and the IDB, while loans 
coming in from the US are less signicant and follow the pattern across the region. In 
other words, they are based on peace and security,3 while democracy, human rights, and 
October 1971. e Hierro Peru mine was purchased by China’s state-owned Shougang 
Company in 1992. Ecuador’s ties with China stand out for the loans-for-oil and other 
lending that ranks it among China’s biggest borrowers within Latin America. Beyond 
trade, Colombia’s relationship with China has been less pronounced (Creutzfeldt, 
2012; Ellis, 2014), although both sides are exploring the negotiation of a bilateral free 
trade agreement.
Peru’s Shougang deal reected a desire to diversify primary exporting partners. While 
Peru has apparently sought diversication in Chinese investments, away from primary 
commodities and into more higher-value production, a review of Chinese investments 
there today falls short of its expectations. Today, the Ecuadorian loans indicate that 
China is willing to be innovative in acquiring resources. ese loans are part of a 
symbiotic bilateral strategy to advance mining, crude extraction, renement and 
delivery and a general upgrade of infrastructure in the small, but remarkably endowed 
country, while allowing for an ambitious public spending scheme. It is worth noting 
that this relationship is dominated by large-scale projects and loans, and that there is a 
certain peculiarity due to the Ecuadorian government’s close involvement in these 
projects accompanied by a crowding out of investors from other countries. 
It has become a commonplace desire throughout the region to attract more investment 
and diversity in Chinese ventures, while China has indicated it will be looking to invest 
signicant sums in the short and medium term. One study estimates that China’s FDI 
outows could reach as high as US$1-2 trillion by 2020 (Rosen & Hanemann, 2012), 
and Latin America should be well positioned to capture a healthy portion of those 
funds. Optimism is tempered by those cautioning against the resource curse, or Dutch 
Disease, but it is unclear what could be done to eectively circumvent the economic 
and geographic realities that lead developing countries down this path. 
Another looming question is, to what extent are Chinese corporate activities, in fact, 
an extension of Beijing’s foreign policy strategy? China’s energy security is a national 
priority and its huge foreign currency reserves, coupled with state ownership of the 
energy and infrastructure rms, make a strong case for a national agenda. However, it 
may be more useful to consider the interdependence of national interests and 
role are evident as illustrated in the examples provided by Economy and Levi in their 
recent analysis of China’s resource quest, indicates that cooperation is preferred (in line 
with the behaviour of a rational state actor) and that new methods of forestalling 
conict are necessary and therefore likely. 
e implications are that the language and the goals laid out in ocial Chinese 
speeches and policy papers are not mere rhetoric, but rmly held and internalized (see 
for instance Song, 2012). Eective analysis of these attitudes should come in part from 
case studies that examine what Chinese cooperation means on the ground in countries 
where it is heavily investing. is is not to say that these approaches are always 
preferred to Western modalities or that there are not contingent and external factors 
that will undermine such intentions, but it does mean that the worldview of Chinese 
actors tasked with engaging developing countries can generate misinterpretation and 
confusion, with the overlapping of aid and investment statistics being just one example 
of this problem. Another critical issue that may arise is the reliance on leadership from 
partners abroad whose policies may appear complementary to the PRC’s vision but 
may be unpopular or problematic from other vantage points.  
at said, by empirically tracking China’s participation in the Andean region we can 
gain greater insights. While the values laid out in the Policy Paper are important to 
consider from the Chinese perspective and approach, what of the Andean experience 
and perspectives? 
We focus on these three Andean countries because they share similar endowment 
factors and have close trade and investment ties with the United States, as well as 
rapidly growing ties with China. At the same time, the cases diverge in terms of 
economic policy choice, with Peru and Colombia both pro-market countries that are 
members of the Pacic Alliance and negotiators for the Trans-Pacic Partnership. e 
embrace of free trade agreements in Colombia and Peru has resulted in remarkably 
open economies, although many critics of neoliberalism question how much this 
benets these countries and their respective populations. Ecuador, by contrast, claims 
to have moved away from neoliberalism and actually shuns FTAs, but critics of the 
current government, including former allies such as ex-ministers Alberto Acosta 
(Energy and Mining) and Fausto Ortiz (Finance), question if this is more rhetorical 
than factual due to such constraints as its historical reliance on foreign capital, 
highlighting the recent dependence on Chinese loans due to the willingness to break 
with traditional lenders such as the IMF and World Bank, by defaulting on its 
sovereign debt. Regardless of economic policy preferences, we suggest that China’s 
trade, aid and investment in these countries has given them greater room to manoeuvre 
in the management of their respective political economies. 
An analysis of case studies within the Andean sub-region of South America allows us to 
gain insights into three dynamic economic cases, all rich in natural resources but with 
distinct development strategies. It further allows for a view of dierent sectors within 
those countries where China is having a profound eect: mining in Peru, petroleum 
and electricity generation in Ecuador, and various commodities in Colombia, as well as 
a signicant manufacturing sector. Finally, by looking at these dierent sectors in LAC, 
we can disaggregate China and understand the considerations of actors from various 
companies that sometimes even compete with one another (González-Vicente, 2013; 
Fornés & Butt Philip, 2012). 
CHINA’S EXPECTATIONS IN THE ANDEAN REGION.
China has looked to LAC from much the same perspective it has engaged with 
Southeast Asia and Africa: as oering a wealth of opportunities for the world’s 
fastest-rising economic power and help for some chronically underdeveloped nations 
in these regions. e Andean sub-region holds rich deposits of oil, gas and minerals, 
but its geographical location renders it a logical gateway for Chinese products into the 
region, as well as regional exports back to China and the Asia Pacic region. 
Reciprocally, political leaders and economic actors in the Andean sub-region have been 
eager for their countries to play this role, most notably Chile and, more recently, Peru 
(Narins, 2012; Myers, 2012; Chen, 2011).
It is in this region where China rst sought a major investment in an iron mine in the 
early 1990s. e PRC’s relations with Peru have been strong ever since the Andean 
nation became the second country in South America after Chile to recognize the PRC 
in November 1971, shortly after the PRC gained its seat at the United Nations in 
US$155 million, less than 1% of inward FDI. e total given by the Chinese Embassy 
in Bogota stands at US$2.3 billion. Our research suggests Chinese capital interests in 
Colombia being over US$ 3 billion. is reects those assets acquired by Chinese 
SOEs in the hydrocarbon sector, which were previously owned by other transnational 
corporations, and reinvestments by Chinese companies with strong sales growth in the country.
Ecuador did not receive much investment from China until around 2009 and has since 
then been receiving ows that largely go to hydroelectric projects, the oil sector and 
copper mines. Most recently, initial nance agreements were reached with the 
Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) for a 30 percent share in the Pacic 
Renery at Manta, which will reportedly satisfy Ecuador’s petroleum needs and allow 
for oil exports to China and Asia (La Renería del Pacíco, 2013).
CHINA’S IMPACT ON DEVELOPMENT IN THE ANDEAN REGION.
Having signed FTAs with the United States, neither Peru nor Colombia is willing or 
able to turn away from Washington along the lines of a more combative Ecuador, 
although all three countries are clearly seeking to diversify their economic and 
diplomatic relations. China is a natural partner, due to the structural complementarity 
of factor endowments between China and all three countries. e question remains, 
however, as to the ability of these countries and the civil societies of which they are 
comprised, to work compatibly with Chinese companies and other PRC representatives 
on the ground in the context of ongoing investments and development projects.
For China to eectively carry out its stated aims in the Andean region, it will have to 
learn how to better broker with the increasingly organized and cohesive grassroots 
networks that have sprung to life around the complex extraction and related 
infrastructure projects that China is promoting. One important example of this is the 
movement to preserve not only indigenous groups but the extraordinarily biodiverse 
forests they have called home for millennia, including the Ecuadorian group Yasunidos 
and the Shuar people in the south of the country mobilizing against Chinese-led 
mining projects. It must also realistically assess the risks and navigate the regulatory 
frameworks now evolving within those governments. Economic considerations weigh 
heavily in government decisions, even when such decisions imply betrayals of trust and 
ideals that helped garner electoral support for national politicians. While citizen 
concerns may not be their top priority, Chinese rms must learn to balance their 
commercial and strategic interests with responsibilities and social realities rarely 
experienced at home. e question remains as to whether Chinese rms can carry o 
complex negotiations and societal intermediation as they seek to deepen their presence 
in the Andean region. An optimistic vision could even see China playing a positive role 
in reshaping the nature of these extractive realities and what they mean for the local 
communities aected by this behaviour. 
Still, the weak record of foreign extractive rms in Peru has been linked to the 
government’s own lax approach to regulation, as exemplied by the dual role of the 
Ministry of Energy and Mines (MINEM) as a promoter of mining and enforcer of 
environmental regulations. Sanborn notes that fears about the behaviour of Chinese 
rms are often generated by their multinational competitors and a media eager to 
sensationalize what a rising China means and that diligent oversight is necessary to 
smoothen the process (Sanborn & Torres, 2009, 351). As an interview with the 
Coordinator for Corporate Aairs for Chinalco in Lima, Peru revealed, Chinese rms 
regularly claim to be moving toward socially responsible action. ere appears to be a 
learning curve, as this company’s Toromocho copper mine project has beneted from 
the negative lessons of the Shougang iron mine, hiring Western executives to deal with 
the concerns of the surrounding communities (Irwin & Gallagher, 2013, 227). 
e learning curve required of Chinese enterprises is still quite steep, however. 
Although many manufacturing and trading rms in Colombia rely on imports from 
China, the perception persists that Chinese industry, along with the political and social 
structures it represents, constitutes a threat to the status quo. is perception has led to 
anti-Chinese demonstrations reminiscent of those in small towns in Mexico, though 
less violently articulated (Hearn, 2012). While some joint ventures have succeeded in 
adapting to local conditions and maintaining a low prole, the new Chinese owners 
(Sinochem) of Emerald Industries in Colombia succeeded in quickly oending the 
local population, leading to poor press and popular resentment. 
In Ecuador, the government is increasingly interested in challenging the role of 
multinationals, using enhanced centralization and oversight to benet as many civic 
groups as possible. Despite these eorts, there are battles brewing over oil and mineral 
concessions around the country and the perception among opposition groups and 
international observers is that Ecuador is merely replacing its dependency on Western 
multinationals and primary commodities with Chinese rms. ere may be some truth 
to these allegations, but in our interviews with activists, government ocials, and 
international critics of the Correa administration, we have found that the specic 
dangers presented by Chinese companies are often exaggerated and there is a similar 
pattern of sensationalism at work as that highlighted by Sanborn in Peru (2009). 
Moreover, the build-up in foreign exchange reserves and primary budget surpluses that 
have emerged as a result has allowed these countries to launch social programs and 
poverty reduction initiatives. ere is, in other words, something in this for everyone, 
including China, although it is incumbent on all stakeholders in this new evolving 
China-LAC scenario to carry their weight and act accordingly. 
CONCLUSION.
is paper illustrates ways in which China’s engagement with the countries of the 
Andean region coincides with that of the larger LAC emerging economies, and how it 
diers. e nature of China’s evolving ties with the three Andean countries discussed 
here ts with the general South American themes of economic complementarities in 
factor endowments and China’s voracious appetite for natural resources to spur its high 
growth model. e dierences lie mainly in the composition of state-society relations 
in the Andean region where civic groups, social movements, and indigenous 
communities have all been recognized as formidable actors on the national political 
stage. is aspect of China-Andean relations is less pronounced in larger more 
industrialized Latin American countries like Argentina, Brazil and Mexico. e 
Andean angle thus adds a new twist to China’s heightened interest in extracting 
primary commodities from the LAC region. 
In short, Chinese investors and ocials, who have not had their feet held closely to the 
re on their own authoritarian home turf, are now being contested. Interestingly, some 
Chinese companies operating in these countries have adopted the Western practice of 
donating to local governments for schools or hospitals, but this contribution to local 
social capital has not earned them much credit (Parish Flannery, 2013). Some scholars 
have argued that Chinese rms may be at a disadvantage precisely because of their lack 
of experience with societal intermediation on the home front, while others argue that 
this is changing (Alden & Hughes, 2009). If we take China’s 2008 Policy Paper at its 
word, the PRC leadership maintains that it will ensure the livelihood of people in 
partnering countries by “complying with local laws and regulations, and adhering to 
fair, transparent public works project contracts, making a commitment to and fullling 
the necessary social responsibility to protect the legitimate rights and interests of local 
employees, paying attention to environmental resource protection, caring for and 
supporting the local community.”
It remains to be seen whether the lofty goals of a new internationalism embedded in 
recent Chinese history can genuinely be achieved given the strength and scale of the 
Chinese economy with its inherent asymmetry and the power of market demands. 
However, such pronouncements should not be overlooked or discarded, as China’s 
dependence on massive primary commodity imports from LAC promises to become a 
permanent feature of China-LAC relations for years to come.  China has every 
incentive to make the relationship work, even if it must do considerably more to bring 
it up to true international standards. 
Certain unsavoury realities persist about the nature of resource extraction and the 
problems it invariably creates. e leadership required to navigate a nation’s way 
through the price uctuations, abundance, corruption, environmental problems, 
indigenous rights, resistance from civil society and diculty involved in institution 
building may lie beyond the realm of possibilities of any one country. It does appear, 
however, that the purported principles of China’s aid, trade, and investment with the 
developing world are sincere and oer an opportunity to the leaders of 
twenty-rst-century South America to set in motion processes and structures that can 
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governance, and education and social services are minor in comparison. Loans from 
China are negligible. 
Ecuador’s credit line received a much needed boost from China after it defaulted on 
$3.2 billion of foreign debt in 2008 following a government audit that found domestic 
laws had been violated, in addition to US Securities and Exchange Commission 
regulations and general principles of international law (Watkins & Anders, 2008). is 
came amidst a rejection of neoliberal policies and a reduced role in the drug 
interdiction scheme, which was the basis for US development assistance and 
preferential treatment in trade agreements. A signicant feature of Chinese loans to 
Ecuador is that they are based on oil (loans-for-oil), with China purchasing the oil on 
the spot market rather than locking in advantageous prices (Gallagher, Irwin & 
Koleski, 2012). 
CHINA’S INVESTMENTS IN THE ANDEAN SUB-REGION.
When it comes to investment, the data is, again, problematic, mainly due to the fact 
that China does not publish this information. For our purposes, investment will 
qualify regardless of being private (FDI) or public. China typically distributes its 
investment through various SOEs, which causes confusion and may be considered 
awkward for various reasons (Dussel Peters, 2012), although it looks and behaves like 
typical investment coming from private foreign rms. As mentioned earlier, there is the 
problem of a conceptual overlap between Chinese lending and investing. 
Peru had been a major destination for Chinese investment, but that trend slowed down 
after 2010. Chinese investments in Peru have primarily gone toward copper and steel 
concessions; overall, Chinese investment stock in Peru was US$796.48 million in 
2012, a 3.5 percent share of total FDI stock in the country. Mining is also the leading 
recipient of FDI in Peru, accounting for nearly 24 percent of capital stock at the end of 
2012 (ProInversion, 2014).
Colombia’s FDI from China is only a fraction of a percent of investment coming into 
the region; here, too, the published gures diverge. According to the Banco de la 
República, the accumulated gure for Chinese investment between 2000 and 2012 was 
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state-owned rms in priority sectors in China as not being so dissimilar from the 
United States: while clearly governed by dierent concerns, “national interests” were 
also cited by the US Congress in 2005 in its decision to prevent the takeover of Unocal 
by CNOOC.
CHINA’S TRADE WITH THE SUB-REGION.
Overall, trade with China has become especially important for the region as a whole 
and for the Andean sub-region in particular. While Peru, Ecuador and Colombia are 
all still dependent on the US market, China does seek to oer something of an 
alternative. As the second largest importer of fuel and minerals, China is increasing its 
presence in the Andean region. Peru leads the way with China as its most important 
partner of the three in bilateral trade (with aggregate gures doubling since the two 
governments signed a free trade agreement in 2009). Colombia has a more diverse 
industry with a strong manufacturing base, and heavily depends on the US market, 
with China accounting for only 3.6 percent of exports. When it comes to trade, 
Ecuador is not a priority for China in terms of volume, yet China sees considerable 
potential here and has taken an active role in the country when it comes to investment 
and loans for oil. 
Overall, China’s gains in imports between 2000 and 2009 have occurred while the US 
has either declined in signicance (Peru and Colombia) or remained static (Ecuador). 
Ecuador has increasingly relied on intra-regional destinations for its goods, while 
China and the United States have become slightly less important as export markets. 
Over the same period, Colombia has sent moderately more of its exports to the Asia 
Pacic, China and the EU, while seeing a slight decline in its exports to LAC and a 
move toward decreasing its dependency on the US market. 
CHINESE AID TO THE SUB-REGION.
Chinese aid to LAC has also been a subject of great speculation, although the 
withholding of some information and a view of aid and investment that diverges 
signicantly from traditional Western methodology is partly to blame for the 
discrepancies. For our purposes, we dene aid as any assistance coming from China 
that may be classied as concessional loans or otherwise designed to improve 
infrastructure or assist in the delivery of basic services to recipient countries. As 
mentioned earlier, it is not entirely clear how much China gives and where it invests 
(Stallings, 2013; Dussel Peters, 2012). e idea that cooperation is a key element of its 
relationship with other developing countries is steeped in a tradition that has been 
briey touched upon above. To dismiss the rhetoric and conceptions put across by 
Chinese development actors and commentators is disingenuous and rearms common 
misconceptions, as Varrall elaborates on in her work on Chinese development experts 
(2013). 
By reminding ourselves of these Chinese perspectives, we can see how Ocial 
Development Assistance (ODA) as dened by the OECD, does not allow for some 
types of “cooperation” between China and LAC to be understood as ODA. As Stallings 
(2013) points out, much of the ows that arrive in LAC and certainly those funds that 
reach Ecuador and Peru are not so easily dened. Bräutigam (2011) has questioned the 
accuracy of the China Development Bank’s label as a development bank, yet it appears 
that the Chinese government has maintained this label and the bank’s terms for loans 
to developing countries even in the face of criticism. We must rely on the data available 
with the understanding that it overlaps frequently and inconveniently. 
In terms of loans, Peru maintains a fairly even spread from the IDB, World Bank, 
China and the US. Peru has received signicant amounts of ODA from the United 
States in recent years. Chinese loans are a relatively new source of nance and, at 
roughly 22 percent, make up more than double the ODA coming from the US and 
closing in on the larger amounts from the IDB and World Bank, which account for 
roughly a third of the total from major sources of lending. 
Colombia has borrowed mainly from the World Bank and the IDB, while loans 
coming in from the US are less signicant and follow the pattern across the region. In 
other words, they are based on peace and security,3 while democracy, human rights, and 
October 1971. e Hierro Peru mine was purchased by China’s state-owned Shougang 
Company in 1992. Ecuador’s ties with China stand out for the loans-for-oil and other 
lending that ranks it among China’s biggest borrowers within Latin America. Beyond 
trade, Colombia’s relationship with China has been less pronounced (Creutzfeldt, 
2012; Ellis, 2014), although both sides are exploring the negotiation of a bilateral free 
trade agreement.
Peru’s Shougang deal reected a desire to diversify primary exporting partners. While 
Peru has apparently sought diversication in Chinese investments, away from primary 
commodities and into more higher-value production, a review of Chinese investments 
there today falls short of its expectations. Today, the Ecuadorian loans indicate that 
China is willing to be innovative in acquiring resources. ese loans are part of a 
symbiotic bilateral strategy to advance mining, crude extraction, renement and 
delivery and a general upgrade of infrastructure in the small, but remarkably endowed 
country, while allowing for an ambitious public spending scheme. It is worth noting 
that this relationship is dominated by large-scale projects and loans, and that there is a 
certain peculiarity due to the Ecuadorian government’s close involvement in these 
projects accompanied by a crowding out of investors from other countries. 
It has become a commonplace desire throughout the region to attract more investment 
and diversity in Chinese ventures, while China has indicated it will be looking to invest 
signicant sums in the short and medium term. One study estimates that China’s FDI 
outows could reach as high as US$1-2 trillion by 2020 (Rosen & Hanemann, 2012), 
and Latin America should be well positioned to capture a healthy portion of those 
funds. Optimism is tempered by those cautioning against the resource curse, or Dutch 
Disease, but it is unclear what could be done to eectively circumvent the economic 
and geographic realities that lead developing countries down this path. 
Another looming question is, to what extent are Chinese corporate activities, in fact, 
an extension of Beijing’s foreign policy strategy? China’s energy security is a national 
priority and its huge foreign currency reserves, coupled with state ownership of the 
energy and infrastructure rms, make a strong case for a national agenda. However, it 
may be more useful to consider the interdependence of national interests and 
role are evident as illustrated in the examples provided by Economy and Levi in their 
recent analysis of China’s resource quest, indicates that cooperation is preferred (in line 
with the behaviour of a rational state actor) and that new methods of forestalling 
conict are necessary and therefore likely. 
e implications are that the language and the goals laid out in ocial Chinese 
speeches and policy papers are not mere rhetoric, but rmly held and internalized (see 
for instance Song, 2012). Eective analysis of these attitudes should come in part from 
case studies that examine what Chinese cooperation means on the ground in countries 
where it is heavily investing. is is not to say that these approaches are always 
preferred to Western modalities or that there are not contingent and external factors 
that will undermine such intentions, but it does mean that the worldview of Chinese 
actors tasked with engaging developing countries can generate misinterpretation and 
confusion, with the overlapping of aid and investment statistics being just one example 
of this problem. Another critical issue that may arise is the reliance on leadership from 
partners abroad whose policies may appear complementary to the PRC’s vision but 
may be unpopular or problematic from other vantage points.  
at said, by empirically tracking China’s participation in the Andean region we can 
gain greater insights. While the values laid out in the Policy Paper are important to 
consider from the Chinese perspective and approach, what of the Andean experience 
and perspectives? 
We focus on these three Andean countries because they share similar endowment 
factors and have close trade and investment ties with the United States, as well as 
rapidly growing ties with China. At the same time, the cases diverge in terms of 
economic policy choice, with Peru and Colombia both pro-market countries that are 
members of the Pacic Alliance and negotiators for the Trans-Pacic Partnership. e 
embrace of free trade agreements in Colombia and Peru has resulted in remarkably 
open economies, although many critics of neoliberalism question how much this 
benets these countries and their respective populations. Ecuador, by contrast, claims 
to have moved away from neoliberalism and actually shuns FTAs, but critics of the 
current government, including former allies such as ex-ministers Alberto Acosta 
(Energy and Mining) and Fausto Ortiz (Finance), question if this is more rhetorical 
than factual due to such constraints as its historical reliance on foreign capital, 
highlighting the recent dependence on Chinese loans due to the willingness to break 
with traditional lenders such as the IMF and World Bank, by defaulting on its 
sovereign debt. Regardless of economic policy preferences, we suggest that China’s 
trade, aid and investment in these countries has given them greater room to manoeuvre 
in the management of their respective political economies. 
An analysis of case studies within the Andean sub-region of South America allows us to 
gain insights into three dynamic economic cases, all rich in natural resources but with 
distinct development strategies. It further allows for a view of dierent sectors within 
those countries where China is having a profound eect: mining in Peru, petroleum 
and electricity generation in Ecuador, and various commodities in Colombia, as well as 
a signicant manufacturing sector. Finally, by looking at these dierent sectors in LAC, 
we can disaggregate China and understand the considerations of actors from various 
companies that sometimes even compete with one another (González-Vicente, 2013; 
Fornés & Butt Philip, 2012). 
CHINA’S EXPECTATIONS IN THE ANDEAN REGION.
China has looked to LAC from much the same perspective it has engaged with 
Southeast Asia and Africa: as oering a wealth of opportunities for the world’s 
fastest-rising economic power and help for some chronically underdeveloped nations 
in these regions. e Andean sub-region holds rich deposits of oil, gas and minerals, 
but its geographical location renders it a logical gateway for Chinese products into the 
region, as well as regional exports back to China and the Asia Pacic region. 
Reciprocally, political leaders and economic actors in the Andean sub-region have been 
eager for their countries to play this role, most notably Chile and, more recently, Peru 
(Narins, 2012; Myers, 2012; Chen, 2011).
It is in this region where China rst sought a major investment in an iron mine in the 
early 1990s. e PRC’s relations with Peru have been strong ever since the Andean 
nation became the second country in South America after Chile to recognize the PRC 
in November 1971, shortly after the PRC gained its seat at the United Nations in 
US$155 million, less than 1% of inward FDI. e total given by the Chinese Embassy 
in Bogota stands at US$2.3 billion. Our research suggests Chinese capital interests in 
Colombia being over US$ 3 billion. is reects those assets acquired by Chinese 
SOEs in the hydrocarbon sector, which were previously owned by other transnational 
corporations, and reinvestments by Chinese companies with strong sales growth in the country.
Ecuador did not receive much investment from China until around 2009 and has since 
then been receiving ows that largely go to hydroelectric projects, the oil sector and 
copper mines. Most recently, initial nance agreements were reached with the 
Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) for a 30 percent share in the Pacic 
Renery at Manta, which will reportedly satisfy Ecuador’s petroleum needs and allow 
for oil exports to China and Asia (La Renería del Pacíco, 2013).
CHINA’S IMPACT ON DEVELOPMENT IN THE ANDEAN REGION.
Having signed FTAs with the United States, neither Peru nor Colombia is willing or 
able to turn away from Washington along the lines of a more combative Ecuador, 
although all three countries are clearly seeking to diversify their economic and 
diplomatic relations. China is a natural partner, due to the structural complementarity 
of factor endowments between China and all three countries. e question remains, 
however, as to the ability of these countries and the civil societies of which they are 
comprised, to work compatibly with Chinese companies and other PRC representatives 
on the ground in the context of ongoing investments and development projects.
For China to eectively carry out its stated aims in the Andean region, it will have to 
learn how to better broker with the increasingly organized and cohesive grassroots 
networks that have sprung to life around the complex extraction and related 
infrastructure projects that China is promoting. One important example of this is the 
movement to preserve not only indigenous groups but the extraordinarily biodiverse 
forests they have called home for millennia, including the Ecuadorian group Yasunidos 
and the Shuar people in the south of the country mobilizing against Chinese-led 
mining projects. It must also realistically assess the risks and navigate the regulatory 
frameworks now evolving within those governments. Economic considerations weigh 
heavily in government decisions, even when such decisions imply betrayals of trust and 
ideals that helped garner electoral support for national politicians. While citizen 
concerns may not be their top priority, Chinese rms must learn to balance their 
commercial and strategic interests with responsibilities and social realities rarely 
experienced at home. e question remains as to whether Chinese rms can carry o 
complex negotiations and societal intermediation as they seek to deepen their presence 
in the Andean region. An optimistic vision could even see China playing a positive role 
in reshaping the nature of these extractive realities and what they mean for the local 
communities aected by this behaviour. 
Still, the weak record of foreign extractive rms in Peru has been linked to the 
government’s own lax approach to regulation, as exemplied by the dual role of the 
Ministry of Energy and Mines (MINEM) as a promoter of mining and enforcer of 
environmental regulations. Sanborn notes that fears about the behaviour of Chinese 
rms are often generated by their multinational competitors and a media eager to 
sensationalize what a rising China means and that diligent oversight is necessary to 
smoothen the process (Sanborn & Torres, 2009, 351). As an interview with the 
Coordinator for Corporate Aairs for Chinalco in Lima, Peru revealed, Chinese rms 
regularly claim to be moving toward socially responsible action. ere appears to be a 
learning curve, as this company’s Toromocho copper mine project has beneted from 
the negative lessons of the Shougang iron mine, hiring Western executives to deal with 
the concerns of the surrounding communities (Irwin & Gallagher, 2013, 227). 
e learning curve required of Chinese enterprises is still quite steep, however. 
Although many manufacturing and trading rms in Colombia rely on imports from 
China, the perception persists that Chinese industry, along with the political and social 
structures it represents, constitutes a threat to the status quo. is perception has led to 
anti-Chinese demonstrations reminiscent of those in small towns in Mexico, though 
less violently articulated (Hearn, 2012). While some joint ventures have succeeded in 
adapting to local conditions and maintaining a low prole, the new Chinese owners 
(Sinochem) of Emerald Industries in Colombia succeeded in quickly oending the 
local population, leading to poor press and popular resentment. 
In Ecuador, the government is increasingly interested in challenging the role of 
multinationals, using enhanced centralization and oversight to benet as many civic 
groups as possible. Despite these eorts, there are battles brewing over oil and mineral 
concessions around the country and the perception among opposition groups and 
international observers is that Ecuador is merely replacing its dependency on Western 
multinationals and primary commodities with Chinese rms. ere may be some truth 
to these allegations, but in our interviews with activists, government ocials, and 
international critics of the Correa administration, we have found that the specic 
dangers presented by Chinese companies are often exaggerated and there is a similar 
pattern of sensationalism at work as that highlighted by Sanborn in Peru (2009). 
Moreover, the build-up in foreign exchange reserves and primary budget surpluses that 
have emerged as a result has allowed these countries to launch social programs and 
poverty reduction initiatives. ere is, in other words, something in this for everyone, 
including China, although it is incumbent on all stakeholders in this new evolving 
China-LAC scenario to carry their weight and act accordingly. 
CONCLUSION.
is paper illustrates ways in which China’s engagement with the countries of the 
Andean region coincides with that of the larger LAC emerging economies, and how it 
diers. e nature of China’s evolving ties with the three Andean countries discussed 
here ts with the general South American themes of economic complementarities in 
factor endowments and China’s voracious appetite for natural resources to spur its high 
growth model. e dierences lie mainly in the composition of state-society relations 
in the Andean region where civic groups, social movements, and indigenous 
communities have all been recognized as formidable actors on the national political 
stage. is aspect of China-Andean relations is less pronounced in larger more 
industrialized Latin American countries like Argentina, Brazil and Mexico. e 
Andean angle thus adds a new twist to China’s heightened interest in extracting 
primary commodities from the LAC region. 
In short, Chinese investors and ocials, who have not had their feet held closely to the 
re on their own authoritarian home turf, are now being contested. Interestingly, some 
Chinese companies operating in these countries have adopted the Western practice of 
donating to local governments for schools or hospitals, but this contribution to local 
social capital has not earned them much credit (Parish Flannery, 2013). Some scholars 
have argued that Chinese rms may be at a disadvantage precisely because of their lack 
of experience with societal intermediation on the home front, while others argue that 
this is changing (Alden & Hughes, 2009). If we take China’s 2008 Policy Paper at its 
word, the PRC leadership maintains that it will ensure the livelihood of people in 
partnering countries by “complying with local laws and regulations, and adhering to 
fair, transparent public works project contracts, making a commitment to and fullling 
the necessary social responsibility to protect the legitimate rights and interests of local 
employees, paying attention to environmental resource protection, caring for and 
supporting the local community.”
It remains to be seen whether the lofty goals of a new internationalism embedded in 
recent Chinese history can genuinely be achieved given the strength and scale of the 
Chinese economy with its inherent asymmetry and the power of market demands. 
However, such pronouncements should not be overlooked or discarded, as China’s 
dependence on massive primary commodity imports from LAC promises to become a 
permanent feature of China-LAC relations for years to come.  China has every 
incentive to make the relationship work, even if it must do considerably more to bring 
it up to true international standards. 
Certain unsavoury realities persist about the nature of resource extraction and the 
problems it invariably creates. e leadership required to navigate a nation’s way 
through the price uctuations, abundance, corruption, environmental problems, 
indigenous rights, resistance from civil society and diculty involved in institution 
building may lie beyond the realm of possibilities of any one country. It does appear, 
however, that the purported principles of China’s aid, trade, and investment with the 
developing world are sincere and oer an opportunity to the leaders of 
twenty-rst-century South America to set in motion processes and structures that can 
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governance, and education and social services are minor in comparison. Loans from 
China are negligible. 
Ecuador’s credit line received a much needed boost from China after it defaulted on 
$3.2 billion of foreign debt in 2008 following a government audit that found domestic 
laws had been violated, in addition to US Securities and Exchange Commission 
regulations and general principles of international law (Watkins & Anders, 2008). is 
came amidst a rejection of neoliberal policies and a reduced role in the drug 
interdiction scheme, which was the basis for US development assistance and 
preferential treatment in trade agreements. A signicant feature of Chinese loans to 
Ecuador is that they are based on oil (loans-for-oil), with China purchasing the oil on 
the spot market rather than locking in advantageous prices (Gallagher, Irwin & 
Koleski, 2012). 
CHINA’S INVESTMENTS IN THE ANDEAN SUB-REGION.
When it comes to investment, the data is, again, problematic, mainly due to the fact 
that China does not publish this information. For our purposes, investment will 
qualify regardless of being private (FDI) or public. China typically distributes its 
investment through various SOEs, which causes confusion and may be considered 
awkward for various reasons (Dussel Peters, 2012), although it looks and behaves like 
typical investment coming from private foreign rms. As mentioned earlier, there is the 
problem of a conceptual overlap between Chinese lending and investing. 
Peru had been a major destination for Chinese investment, but that trend slowed down 
after 2010. Chinese investments in Peru have primarily gone toward copper and steel 
concessions; overall, Chinese investment stock in Peru was US$796.48 million in 
2012, a 3.5 percent share of total FDI stock in the country. Mining is also the leading 
recipient of FDI in Peru, accounting for nearly 24 percent of capital stock at the end of 
2012 (ProInversion, 2014).
Colombia’s FDI from China is only a fraction of a percent of investment coming into 
the region; here, too, the published gures diverge. According to the Banco de la 
República, the accumulated gure for Chinese investment between 2000 and 2012 was 
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state-owned rms in priority sectors in China as not being so dissimilar from the 
United States: while clearly governed by dierent concerns, “national interests” were 
also cited by the US Congress in 2005 in its decision to prevent the takeover of Unocal 
by CNOOC.
CHINA’S TRADE WITH THE SUB-REGION.
Overall, trade with China has become especially important for the region as a whole 
and for the Andean sub-region in particular. While Peru, Ecuador and Colombia are 
all still dependent on the US market, China does seek to oer something of an 
alternative. As the second largest importer of fuel and minerals, China is increasing its 
presence in the Andean region. Peru leads the way with China as its most important 
partner of the three in bilateral trade (with aggregate gures doubling since the two 
governments signed a free trade agreement in 2009). Colombia has a more diverse 
industry with a strong manufacturing base, and heavily depends on the US market, 
with China accounting for only 3.6 percent of exports. When it comes to trade, 
Ecuador is not a priority for China in terms of volume, yet China sees considerable 
potential here and has taken an active role in the country when it comes to investment 
and loans for oil. 
Overall, China’s gains in imports between 2000 and 2009 have occurred while the US 
has either declined in signicance (Peru and Colombia) or remained static (Ecuador). 
Ecuador has increasingly relied on intra-regional destinations for its goods, while 
China and the United States have become slightly less important as export markets. 
Over the same period, Colombia has sent moderately more of its exports to the Asia 
Pacic, China and the EU, while seeing a slight decline in its exports to LAC and a 
move toward decreasing its dependency on the US market. 
CHINESE AID TO THE SUB-REGION.
Chinese aid to LAC has also been a subject of great speculation, although the 
withholding of some information and a view of aid and investment that diverges 
signicantly from traditional Western methodology is partly to blame for the 
discrepancies. For our purposes, we dene aid as any assistance coming from China 
that may be classied as concessional loans or otherwise designed to improve 
infrastructure or assist in the delivery of basic services to recipient countries. As 
mentioned earlier, it is not entirely clear how much China gives and where it invests 
(Stallings, 2013; Dussel Peters, 2012). e idea that cooperation is a key element of its 
relationship with other developing countries is steeped in a tradition that has been 
briey touched upon above. To dismiss the rhetoric and conceptions put across by 
Chinese development actors and commentators is disingenuous and rearms common 
misconceptions, as Varrall elaborates on in her work on Chinese development experts 
(2013). 
By reminding ourselves of these Chinese perspectives, we can see how Ocial 
Development Assistance (ODA) as dened by the OECD, does not allow for some 
types of “cooperation” between China and LAC to be understood as ODA. As Stallings 
(2013) points out, much of the ows that arrive in LAC and certainly those funds that 
reach Ecuador and Peru are not so easily dened. Bräutigam (2011) has questioned the 
accuracy of the China Development Bank’s label as a development bank, yet it appears 
that the Chinese government has maintained this label and the bank’s terms for loans 
to developing countries even in the face of criticism. We must rely on the data available 
with the understanding that it overlaps frequently and inconveniently. 
In terms of loans, Peru maintains a fairly even spread from the IDB, World Bank, 
China and the US. Peru has received signicant amounts of ODA from the United 
States in recent years. Chinese loans are a relatively new source of nance and, at 
roughly 22 percent, make up more than double the ODA coming from the US and 
closing in on the larger amounts from the IDB and World Bank, which account for 
roughly a third of the total from major sources of lending. 
Colombia has borrowed mainly from the World Bank and the IDB, while loans 
coming in from the US are less signicant and follow the pattern across the region. In 
other words, they are based on peace and security,3 while democracy, human rights, and 
October 1971. e Hierro Peru mine was purchased by China’s state-owned Shougang 
Company in 1992. Ecuador’s ties with China stand out for the loans-for-oil and other 
lending that ranks it among China’s biggest borrowers within Latin America. Beyond 
trade, Colombia’s relationship with China has been less pronounced (Creutzfeldt, 
2012; Ellis, 2014), although both sides are exploring the negotiation of a bilateral free 
trade agreement.
Peru’s Shougang deal reected a desire to diversify primary exporting partners. While 
Peru has apparently sought diversication in Chinese investments, away from primary 
commodities and into more higher-value production, a review of Chinese investments 
there today falls short of its expectations. Today, the Ecuadorian loans indicate that 
China is willing to be innovative in acquiring resources. ese loans are part of a 
symbiotic bilateral strategy to advance mining, crude extraction, renement and 
delivery and a general upgrade of infrastructure in the small, but remarkably endowed 
country, while allowing for an ambitious public spending scheme. It is worth noting 
that this relationship is dominated by large-scale projects and loans, and that there is a 
certain peculiarity due to the Ecuadorian government’s close involvement in these 
projects accompanied by a crowding out of investors from other countries. 
It has become a commonplace desire throughout the region to attract more investment 
and diversity in Chinese ventures, while China has indicated it will be looking to invest 
signicant sums in the short and medium term. One study estimates that China’s FDI 
outows could reach as high as US$1-2 trillion by 2020 (Rosen & Hanemann, 2012), 
and Latin America should be well positioned to capture a healthy portion of those 
funds. Optimism is tempered by those cautioning against the resource curse, or Dutch 
Disease, but it is unclear what could be done to eectively circumvent the economic 
and geographic realities that lead developing countries down this path. 
Another looming question is, to what extent are Chinese corporate activities, in fact, 
an extension of Beijing’s foreign policy strategy? China’s energy security is a national 
priority and its huge foreign currency reserves, coupled with state ownership of the 
energy and infrastructure rms, make a strong case for a national agenda. However, it 
may be more useful to consider the interdependence of national interests and 
role are evident as illustrated in the examples provided by Economy and Levi in their 
recent analysis of China’s resource quest, indicates that cooperation is preferred (in line 
with the behaviour of a rational state actor) and that new methods of forestalling 
conict are necessary and therefore likely. 
e implications are that the language and the goals laid out in ocial Chinese 
speeches and policy papers are not mere rhetoric, but rmly held and internalized (see 
for instance Song, 2012). Eective analysis of these attitudes should come in part from 
case studies that examine what Chinese cooperation means on the ground in countries 
where it is heavily investing. is is not to say that these approaches are always 
preferred to Western modalities or that there are not contingent and external factors 
that will undermine such intentions, but it does mean that the worldview of Chinese 
actors tasked with engaging developing countries can generate misinterpretation and 
confusion, with the overlapping of aid and investment statistics being just one example 
of this problem. Another critical issue that may arise is the reliance on leadership from 
partners abroad whose policies may appear complementary to the PRC’s vision but 
may be unpopular or problematic from other vantage points.  
at said, by empirically tracking China’s participation in the Andean region we can 
gain greater insights. While the values laid out in the Policy Paper are important to 
consider from the Chinese perspective and approach, what of the Andean experience 
and perspectives? 
We focus on these three Andean countries because they share similar endowment 
factors and have close trade and investment ties with the United States, as well as 
rapidly growing ties with China. At the same time, the cases diverge in terms of 
economic policy choice, with Peru and Colombia both pro-market countries that are 
members of the Pacic Alliance and negotiators for the Trans-Pacic Partnership. e 
embrace of free trade agreements in Colombia and Peru has resulted in remarkably 
open economies, although many critics of neoliberalism question how much this 
benets these countries and their respective populations. Ecuador, by contrast, claims 
to have moved away from neoliberalism and actually shuns FTAs, but critics of the 
current government, including former allies such as ex-ministers Alberto Acosta 
(Energy and Mining) and Fausto Ortiz (Finance), question if this is more rhetorical 
than factual due to such constraints as its historical reliance on foreign capital, 
highlighting the recent dependence on Chinese loans due to the willingness to break 
with traditional lenders such as the IMF and World Bank, by defaulting on its 
sovereign debt. Regardless of economic policy preferences, we suggest that China’s 
trade, aid and investment in these countries has given them greater room to manoeuvre 
in the management of their respective political economies. 
An analysis of case studies within the Andean sub-region of South America allows us to 
gain insights into three dynamic economic cases, all rich in natural resources but with 
distinct development strategies. It further allows for a view of dierent sectors within 
those countries where China is having a profound eect: mining in Peru, petroleum 
and electricity generation in Ecuador, and various commodities in Colombia, as well as 
a signicant manufacturing sector. Finally, by looking at these dierent sectors in LAC, 
we can disaggregate China and understand the considerations of actors from various 
companies that sometimes even compete with one another (González-Vicente, 2013; 
Fornés & Butt Philip, 2012). 
CHINA’S EXPECTATIONS IN THE ANDEAN REGION.
China has looked to LAC from much the same perspective it has engaged with 
Southeast Asia and Africa: as oering a wealth of opportunities for the world’s 
fastest-rising economic power and help for some chronically underdeveloped nations 
in these regions. e Andean sub-region holds rich deposits of oil, gas and minerals, 
but its geographical location renders it a logical gateway for Chinese products into the 
region, as well as regional exports back to China and the Asia Pacic region. 
Reciprocally, political leaders and economic actors in the Andean sub-region have been 
eager for their countries to play this role, most notably Chile and, more recently, Peru 
(Narins, 2012; Myers, 2012; Chen, 2011).
It is in this region where China rst sought a major investment in an iron mine in the 
early 1990s. e PRC’s relations with Peru have been strong ever since the Andean 
nation became the second country in South America after Chile to recognize the PRC 
in November 1971, shortly after the PRC gained its seat at the United Nations in 
US$155 million, less than 1% of inward FDI. e total given by the Chinese Embassy 
in Bogota stands at US$2.3 billion. Our research suggests Chinese capital interests in 
Colombia being over US$ 3 billion. is reects those assets acquired by Chinese 
SOEs in the hydrocarbon sector, which were previously owned by other transnational 
corporations, and reinvestments by Chinese companies with strong sales growth in the country.
Ecuador did not receive much investment from China until around 2009 and has since 
then been receiving ows that largely go to hydroelectric projects, the oil sector and 
copper mines. Most recently, initial nance agreements were reached with the 
Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) for a 30 percent share in the Pacic 
Renery at Manta, which will reportedly satisfy Ecuador’s petroleum needs and allow 
for oil exports to China and Asia (La Renería del Pacíco, 2013).
CHINA’S IMPACT ON DEVELOPMENT IN THE ANDEAN REGION.
Having signed FTAs with the United States, neither Peru nor Colombia is willing or 
able to turn away from Washington along the lines of a more combative Ecuador, 
although all three countries are clearly seeking to diversify their economic and 
diplomatic relations. China is a natural partner, due to the structural complementarity 
of factor endowments between China and all three countries. e question remains, 
however, as to the ability of these countries and the civil societies of which they are 
comprised, to work compatibly with Chinese companies and other PRC representatives 
on the ground in the context of ongoing investments and development projects.
For China to eectively carry out its stated aims in the Andean region, it will have to 
learn how to better broker with the increasingly organized and cohesive grassroots 
networks that have sprung to life around the complex extraction and related 
infrastructure projects that China is promoting. One important example of this is the 
movement to preserve not only indigenous groups but the extraordinarily biodiverse 
forests they have called home for millennia, including the Ecuadorian group Yasunidos 
and the Shuar people in the south of the country mobilizing against Chinese-led 
mining projects. It must also realistically assess the risks and navigate the regulatory 
frameworks now evolving within those governments. Economic considerations weigh 
heavily in government decisions, even when such decisions imply betrayals of trust and 
ideals that helped garner electoral support for national politicians. While citizen 
concerns may not be their top priority, Chinese rms must learn to balance their 
commercial and strategic interests with responsibilities and social realities rarely 
experienced at home. e question remains as to whether Chinese rms can carry o 
complex negotiations and societal intermediation as they seek to deepen their presence 
in the Andean region. An optimistic vision could even see China playing a positive role 
in reshaping the nature of these extractive realities and what they mean for the local 
communities aected by this behaviour. 
Still, the weak record of foreign extractive rms in Peru has been linked to the 
government’s own lax approach to regulation, as exemplied by the dual role of the 
Ministry of Energy and Mines (MINEM) as a promoter of mining and enforcer of 
environmental regulations. Sanborn notes that fears about the behaviour of Chinese 
rms are often generated by their multinational competitors and a media eager to 
sensationalize what a rising China means and that diligent oversight is necessary to 
smoothen the process (Sanborn & Torres, 2009, 351). As an interview with the 
Coordinator for Corporate Aairs for Chinalco in Lima, Peru revealed, Chinese rms 
regularly claim to be moving toward socially responsible action. ere appears to be a 
learning curve, as this company’s Toromocho copper mine project has beneted from 
the negative lessons of the Shougang iron mine, hiring Western executives to deal with 
the concerns of the surrounding communities (Irwin & Gallagher, 2013, 227). 
e learning curve required of Chinese enterprises is still quite steep, however. 
Although many manufacturing and trading rms in Colombia rely on imports from 
China, the perception persists that Chinese industry, along with the political and social 
structures it represents, constitutes a threat to the status quo. is perception has led to 
anti-Chinese demonstrations reminiscent of those in small towns in Mexico, though 
less violently articulated (Hearn, 2012). While some joint ventures have succeeded in 
adapting to local conditions and maintaining a low prole, the new Chinese owners 
(Sinochem) of Emerald Industries in Colombia succeeded in quickly oending the 
local population, leading to poor press and popular resentment. 
In Ecuador, the government is increasingly interested in challenging the role of 
multinationals, using enhanced centralization and oversight to benet as many civic 
groups as possible. Despite these eorts, there are battles brewing over oil and mineral 
concessions around the country and the perception among opposition groups and 
international observers is that Ecuador is merely replacing its dependency on Western 
multinationals and primary commodities with Chinese rms. ere may be some truth 
to these allegations, but in our interviews with activists, government ocials, and 
international critics of the Correa administration, we have found that the specic 
dangers presented by Chinese companies are often exaggerated and there is a similar 
pattern of sensationalism at work as that highlighted by Sanborn in Peru (2009). 
Moreover, the build-up in foreign exchange reserves and primary budget surpluses that 
have emerged as a result has allowed these countries to launch social programs and 
poverty reduction initiatives. ere is, in other words, something in this for everyone, 
including China, although it is incumbent on all stakeholders in this new evolving 
China-LAC scenario to carry their weight and act accordingly. 
CONCLUSION.
is paper illustrates ways in which China’s engagement with the countries of the 
Andean region coincides with that of the larger LAC emerging economies, and how it 
diers. e nature of China’s evolving ties with the three Andean countries discussed 
here ts with the general South American themes of economic complementarities in 
factor endowments and China’s voracious appetite for natural resources to spur its high 
growth model. e dierences lie mainly in the composition of state-society relations 
in the Andean region where civic groups, social movements, and indigenous 
communities have all been recognized as formidable actors on the national political 
stage. is aspect of China-Andean relations is less pronounced in larger more 
industrialized Latin American countries like Argentina, Brazil and Mexico. e 
Andean angle thus adds a new twist to China’s heightened interest in extracting 
primary commodities from the LAC region. 
In short, Chinese investors and ocials, who have not had their feet held closely to the 
re on their own authoritarian home turf, are now being contested. Interestingly, some 
Chinese companies operating in these countries have adopted the Western practice of 
donating to local governments for schools or hospitals, but this contribution to local 
social capital has not earned them much credit (Parish Flannery, 2013). Some scholars 
have argued that Chinese rms may be at a disadvantage precisely because of their lack 
of experience with societal intermediation on the home front, while others argue that 
this is changing (Alden & Hughes, 2009). If we take China’s 2008 Policy Paper at its 
word, the PRC leadership maintains that it will ensure the livelihood of people in 
partnering countries by “complying with local laws and regulations, and adhering to 
fair, transparent public works project contracts, making a commitment to and fullling 
the necessary social responsibility to protect the legitimate rights and interests of local 
employees, paying attention to environmental resource protection, caring for and 
supporting the local community.”
It remains to be seen whether the lofty goals of a new internationalism embedded in 
recent Chinese history can genuinely be achieved given the strength and scale of the 
Chinese economy with its inherent asymmetry and the power of market demands. 
However, such pronouncements should not be overlooked or discarded, as China’s 
dependence on massive primary commodity imports from LAC promises to become a 
permanent feature of China-LAC relations for years to come.  China has every 
incentive to make the relationship work, even if it must do considerably more to bring 
it up to true international standards. 
Certain unsavoury realities persist about the nature of resource extraction and the 
problems it invariably creates. e leadership required to navigate a nation’s way 
through the price uctuations, abundance, corruption, environmental problems, 
indigenous rights, resistance from civil society and diculty involved in institution 
building may lie beyond the realm of possibilities of any one country. It does appear, 
however, that the purported principles of China’s aid, trade, and investment with the 
developing world are sincere and oer an opportunity to the leaders of 
twenty-rst-century South America to set in motion processes and structures that can 
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governance, and education and social services are minor in comparison. Loans from 
China are negligible. 
Ecuador’s credit line received a much needed boost from China after it defaulted on 
$3.2 billion of foreign debt in 2008 following a government audit that found domestic 
laws had been violated, in addition to US Securities and Exchange Commission 
regulations and general principles of international law (Watkins & Anders, 2008). is 
came amidst a rejection of neoliberal policies and a reduced role in the drug 
interdiction scheme, which was the basis for US development assistance and 
preferential treatment in trade agreements. A signicant feature of Chinese loans to 
Ecuador is that they are based on oil (loans-for-oil), with China purchasing the oil on 
the spot market rather than locking in advantageous prices (Gallagher, Irwin & 
Koleski, 2012). 
CHINA’S INVESTMENTS IN THE ANDEAN SUB-REGION.
When it comes to investment, the data is, again, problematic, mainly due to the fact 
that China does not publish this information. For our purposes, investment will 
qualify regardless of being private (FDI) or public. China typically distributes its 
investment through various SOEs, which causes confusion and may be considered 
awkward for various reasons (Dussel Peters, 2012), although it looks and behaves like 
typical investment coming from private foreign rms. As mentioned earlier, there is the 
problem of a conceptual overlap between Chinese lending and investing. 
Peru had been a major destination for Chinese investment, but that trend slowed down 
after 2010. Chinese investments in Peru have primarily gone toward copper and steel 
concessions; overall, Chinese investment stock in Peru was US$796.48 million in 
2012, a 3.5 percent share of total FDI stock in the country. Mining is also the leading 
recipient of FDI in Peru, accounting for nearly 24 percent of capital stock at the end of 
2012 (ProInversion, 2014).
Colombia’s FDI from China is only a fraction of a percent of investment coming into 
the region; here, too, the published gures diverge. According to the Banco de la 
República, the accumulated gure for Chinese investment between 2000 and 2012 was 
